When policy advisors cannot reach a consensus

Wilko Letterie*, Otto H. Swank, Hendrik P. Van Dalen

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal/periodicalArticleScientificpeer-review

Abstract

In this paper advisors are selected by two ministers with conflicting interests in order to (1) acquire information, and (2) obtain political legitimacy concerning a project. In the end, parliament decides whether or not the project, of which the consequences are uncertain, is implemented. In principle a minister wants to appoint an advisor whose preferences are similar. However, since the advisor needs to convince the decisive player in the model, the minister may appoint an advisor whose preferences are closer to those of the agents to be persuaded. We also show when polarised advice occurs (the advisors have different preferences) and when consensual advice occurs (they have the same preferences).

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)439-461
Number of pages23
JournalSocial Choice and Welfare
Volume17
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2000

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