TY - JOUR
T1 - When policy advisors cannot reach a consensus
AU - Letterie, Wilko
AU - Swank, Otto H.
AU - Van Dalen, Hendrik P.
N1 - Copyright:
Copyright 2018 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.
PY - 2000
Y1 - 2000
N2 - In this paper advisors are selected by two ministers with conflicting interests in order to (1) acquire information, and (2) obtain political legitimacy concerning a project. In the end, parliament decides whether or not the project, of which the consequences are uncertain, is implemented. In principle a minister wants to appoint an advisor whose preferences are similar. However, since the advisor needs to convince the decisive player in the model, the minister may appoint an advisor whose preferences are closer to those of the agents to be persuaded. We also show when polarised advice occurs (the advisors have different preferences) and when consensual advice occurs (they have the same preferences).
AB - In this paper advisors are selected by two ministers with conflicting interests in order to (1) acquire information, and (2) obtain political legitimacy concerning a project. In the end, parliament decides whether or not the project, of which the consequences are uncertain, is implemented. In principle a minister wants to appoint an advisor whose preferences are similar. However, since the advisor needs to convince the decisive player in the model, the minister may appoint an advisor whose preferences are closer to those of the agents to be persuaded. We also show when polarised advice occurs (the advisors have different preferences) and when consensual advice occurs (they have the same preferences).
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=0034409736&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/s003550050172
DO - 10.1007/s003550050172
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:0034409736
VL - 17
SP - 439
EP - 461
JO - Social Choice and Welfare
JF - Social Choice and Welfare
SN - 0176-1714
IS - 3
ER -