CULTURE WARS
Secular–Catholic Conflict in
Nineteenth-Century Europe

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Contents

List of illustrations page vii
List of contributors viii

Introduction: The European culture wars
Christopher Clark and Wolfram Kaiser 1

1 The New Catholicism and the European culture wars
Christopher Clark 11

2 'Clericalism – that is our enemy!': European anticlericalism and the culture wars
Wolfram Kaiser 47

3 'Priest hits girl': on the front line in the 'war of the two Frances'
James McMillan 77

4 The battle for monasteries, cemeteries and schools:
Belgium
Els Witte 102

5 Contested rituals and the battle for public space: the Netherlands
Peter Jan Margry and Henk te Velde 129

6 Nonconformity, clericalism and 'Englishness': the United Kingdom
J. P. Parry 152

7 The assault on the city of the Levites: Spain
Julio de la Cueva 181
CHAPTER 5

Contested rituals and the battle for public space: the Netherlands

Peter Jan Margry and Henk te Velde

INTRODUCTION

‘Zurück!’ (Stand back!) shouted Pastor Quaedvlieg, a priest from the Prussian border town of Haaren, when he and the members of his procession were brought to a halt by three Dutch national policemen in the autumn of 1878. Only shortly before, he and his pilgrims, returning from the important Marian shrine of Our Lady in 't Zand near Roermond in the southern Dutch province of Limburg, had formed a liturgical procession. Quaedvlieg had donned his chasuble in a field, brought out the processionnal cross and unfurled the liturgical processionnal banners. Then he had directed the forming of ranks: first two columns of women, then himself in the middle, then two columns of men, and finally the train, consisting of three covered wagons with baggage. In doing this he was deliberately taking a risk; since the beginning of the Kulturkampf in Prussia, the rules relating to public religious rituals had also been sharpened in Dutch Limburg, and throughout the Netherlands the holding of religious rituals in public had become an extremely sensitive issue. Of the eleven provinces of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, only the two most southern, North Brabant and Limburg, had Catholic majorities. Of the 230,000 inhabitants of Limburg, about 99 per cent were Catholic. From 1830 to 1839 Limburg had belonged to the newly formed Belgium, and until the 1860s it was part of both the Netherlands and the German Bund. Because this province had an entirely different history from other regions of the Netherlands, there was a greater leeway here for the public observance of religion by Catholics.

Quaedvlieg, however, went further than even the Limburg situation permitted. He knocked the gloves off one of the policemen who attempted

Het processierecht in Limburg.

The Dutch situation

The violent afternoon of 15 September 1878 is part of a remarkably turbulent period in Dutch history. It was one of the last confrontations in a long conflict over public religious rituals that revived in the Netherlands at the beginning of the nineteenth century and reached its climax in the 1870s. The year 1878 was the culmination of a concerted official campaign against processions that, in part influenced by the German *Kulturkampf*, had been gaining pace since 1873. Under this policy, notwithstanding the country’s long tradition of tolerance, pilgrims were stopped at the Prussian border or even forced back across it with violence.

The incident near Roermond is an episode from the Dutch culture wars of the period. The title of this book uses the plural, and this is certainly appropriate for the situation in the Netherlands. While the German *Kulturkampf* was primarily a struggle between the state and the Catholic church or Catholic community, the conflict in the Netherlands turned mainly on the opposition between Catholics and Protestants. Yet there was a certain similarity in general terms between the Prussian/German situation and the Dutch. In both cases there was a Protestant majority and a considerable Catholic minority – in both cases slightly over a third of the population. Of the Dutch population of about 3.6 million in 1870, about 2 million were Reformed (55 per cent) and 1,310,000 were Roman Catholic (36.5 per cent); the rest consisted of other Protestants, Jews and a very small group of unchurched persons.

Despite the general similarity in the size of the Catholic minority, the course of the Dutch *Kulturkampf* was different from that in Germany. The Dutch government was rather more restrained and the conduct of the Catholic minority was more tentative and cautious. Perhaps for these

ranging from one month to a year. The pastor was later found guilty of violating the ban on processions.

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1 The affair is described in the *proces-verbal*; see *Weekblad van het regt* no. 4177 (1879), 2-3; see also the *Courrier de la Mense*, 28 September 1878 no. 226, 2 October 1878, no. 230, 4 October 1878, no. 230 and Giel Hutschemaekers, *Limburgse processieperkelen 1873-1880*, *De Maasgouw* 99 (1980), 117-127, 184-208, here 192-3.

2 The violent afternoon of 15 September 1878 is part of a remarkably turbulent period in Dutch history. It was one of the last confrontations in a long conflict over public religious rituals that revived in the Netherlands at the beginning of the nineteenth century and reached its climax in the 1870s. The year 1878 was the culmination of a concerted official campaign against processions that, in part influenced by the German *Kulturkampf*, had been gaining pace since 1873. Under this policy, notwithstanding the country’s long tradition of tolerance, pilgrims were stopped at the Prussian border or even forced back across it with violence.

3 In vernacular Dutch, the idea of a bedlam is proverbially expressed as ‘het ging er pruisisch aan toe’ – ‘things got Prussian’.


5 H. H. Knippenberg, *De religieuze kaart van Nederland* (Aasen, 1992), passim.
reasons, little attention has been paid in histories of the nineteenth-century Netherlands to the conflict between Catholics and the state. The accent has traditionally been laid on the rise of a liberal parliamentary system with a fully constitutional monarchy as a result of the constitutional revisions of 1848, and the emancipatory struggle, first of orthodox Protestants and Catholics, and later, at the end of the century, of Socialists. This three-fold struggle for emancipation resulted, it is generally assumed, in the twentieth-century Dutch model of 'consociational democracy', where minorities tolerated each other and had to work together to keep government running smoothly.

It has been clear for a very long time that the Catholic minority in the Netherlands always took very cautious positions at the national level, and never really demanded the public role to which its numbers would have entitled it. This led to the paradoxical situation of the twentieth century, when Catholics were given a central role in national politics – from 1918, when the first Catholic prime minister was appointed, until 1994, the Catholics were part of virtually every government – but remained subordinate (until the 1960s at least) to the liberals and Protestants in society. It can thus be said that the Catholics have long acquiesced in a culture of repressive tolerance. They were tolerated by the liberal-Protestant establishment as long as they did not make waves. This culture also prevailed in the nineteenth century, with the result that, to all appearances, little repression was necessary. The image of peaceful religious development is all the more prevalent because all parties had their sights set on emancipation at the national level, and at that level violent religious clashes were rare. It is, as we will demonstrate, only local investigation that can really lay bare the nature of the religious conflict. For that reason, our aim in this chapter is twofold. We intend, firstly, to show that a fiercer conflict raged in the localities than at the national level of parliamentary representation in The Hague. Secondly, we will be seeking an explanation for the in part only apparent moderation of the Dutch culture wars and for the very careful attitude of the Catholic elite in the national context.

As we have said, in the Netherlands it was really the culture war between Catholics and Protestants that was central. In the nineteenth century not only the Protestants themselves but also foreign observers considered the Netherlands to be a Protestant country. It is true that there was a considerable Catholic minority, but for centuries it had been accustomed to keeping a low profile, and until the middle of the nineteenth century it had no internal organisation. Only the liberal constitutional reforms of 1848 effected a thorough separation of church and state that gave the Catholic church the freedom to organise itself as it wished. Not until then could the Catholic episcopal hierarchy be reintroduced on Dutch territory. In 1853, in somewhat provocative terms, the pope announced the installation of a number of bishops in the Netherlands. This measure placed the system of repressive tolerance under considerable strain. The Catholics were asserting themselves and demanding their place in the nation. The consequence was a fierce Protestant reaction in the form of the April Movement, centred in Utrecht, the city which was to become the seat of the archbishop. Protestant resistance spread like wildfire throughout the country. In the spectrum of Charles Tilly's repertoires of contention, this resistance fell somewhere between the old forms of direct action and the new forms of political protest. Protestant clergy protested from the pulpit, a petition was sent to the king (although officially, under the new constitution, he no longer had any direct involvement with ministerial responsibilities), Catholic stores were boycotted, Catholic workers were fired from their jobs, the homes of Catholics were painted with slogans, and Catholic clergy were intimidated. Although the introduction of the Catholic hierarchy eventually went through without disruption, the April Movement had a substantial effect. Within several months, as a kind of compensation to the offended Protestants, the government enacted the law on church denominations, which placed further restrictions on processions. Over the longer term, this new assertiveness on the part of the Catholic clergy was nipped in the bud; it would not revive until around 1900, though even then Catholics would continue to exercise caution, so as not to provoke a return to the 'no popery' excitement of 1853.

In the shorter term, the antipathies awakened by these events led to the fall of the Liberal cabinet of Prime Minister Johan Rudolf Thorbecke. It became clear that there was a large gap between the Liberal parliament, the pays légal, and the world outside it, the primarily Protestant pays réel. While the parliament primarily concerned itself with the constitution and the organisation of the state, the religious issue was the foremost concern of policies.
the population. In the parliament the primary opposition was that between Conservatives and Liberals; in the country the principal difference was that between Protestants and Catholics. It is true that the constitutional revisions of 1848 had strengthened the position of the ministers and parliament, but there was still a very limited franchise, and there was a great distance between the distinguished liberal lawyers of the Lower House in The Hague and the mass of the people who did not get excited about the constitution. Even the limited group to whom the franchise did extend—an elite, in other words—looked first at the religious background of the candidate when voting, and only thereafter at his political standpoint.\(^{21}\)

In the half-century after 1853 the Catholic elite tried to win a place in national politics. To secure this, however, they had to observe considerable circumspection so as to spare Protestant sensibilities. Ordinary Catholic churchgoers became increasingly self-confident and occasionally acted more assertively than the higher clergy, but this did not generally feed through into national politics. There were signs of a change in 1872. This was the three-hundredth anniversary year of the capture of Den Briel, a major event in the history of the sixteenth-century Dutch Revolution, and a high point for the Protestants in their struggle against Catholic Spain. It was a national commemorative celebration, but Catholics were understandably not very enthusiastic about it. Catholic leaders opposed the event, but did not go beyond verbal protests, a civilised polemic. Locally, however, the conflict sometimes took on a very different face. When Catholics refused to hang out flags on the occasion, they were beaten up, their furniture was destroyed, or they had their windows smashed. But in a number of places with a large Catholic population, it was the Catholics who went on the offensive. In large parts of the Catholic south of the country, the population simply did not observe the festivities, and houses that were flying the national flag were sometimes destroyed.\(^{19}\)

These incidents made a considerable impression. As contemporary accounts make clear, the contours of national politics had shifted. Whereas the organs of the liberal press had often sided with the Catholics against the popular Protestant fury in 1853, they now turned against ultramontane Catholicism. Some liberals, though not many, now pointed to Bismarck's policies vis-à-vis Catholicism as a model to be emulated in the Netherlands. On 17 November, six months after the anniversary celebration, the Lower House suddenly adopted a Liberal motion abolishing the Dutch embassy to the Holy See.\(^{31}\) This gesture, which deeply offended the Catholics and further alienated them from the Liberals, was a sign of advancing polarisation. It appeared that the rules of Dutch politics had been rewritten. Until the 1860s, there had been an alliance between the Liberals, who championed the separation of church and state, and the Catholics, who wished to profit from the freedom that this arrangement provided. The shift began with the *Syllabus errorum* in 1864, which labelled liberalism as an enemy, followed in the Netherlands itself in 1868 by the episcopate's unconditional support for Catholic elementary schools, which placed them in opposition to the confessionally neutral state-supported education promoted by the liberals. While orthodox Protestants and Catholics were still letting fly at each other in the streets in 1872, in national politics their interests had begun to converge. Both groups wanted a larger role for religion in elementary education, and rejected the Liberal attitudes toward education.

The opposition between confessional groups and the Liberals reached its high point during the left-Liberal cabinet of Johan Kappeyne van de Coppel0, 1877–9. Kappeyne introduced a Liberal education law that established higher qualitative criteria for elementary education, but which did not provide subsidies to enable church-related schools to meet them. It thus became more expensive and more difficult for confessional elementary education to continue operating. Both Catholics and orthodox Protestants called Kappeyne the 'Dutch Bismarck' and spoke of oppression. Histories written from confessional viewpoints cast him as a foe who had to be resisted by Catholics and orthodox Protestants alike. Under closer examination, it appears that his policy on education was not as extreme as this suggests. Indeed, editorial writers in confessional newspapers at the time of the law proposals were aware of this and passed milder judgements. Kappeyne himself was a principled Liberal who deeply valued neutral state-sponsored education, and certainly had no inclination toward oppression. As a legal historian and lawyer, he prized the constitutional state above all else; as an advocate he had provided legal counsel to orthodox Protestants, and had even defended Catholics in the courts. Viewed from this perspective, the 'Dutch Kulturkampf' was thus to some extent an invention by those confessional forces that had an interest in conjuring up a sharply


defined enemy for the purpose of rallying and organising their followers. The confessional groups were becoming better organised around 1870, and they demonstrated Kappeyne and ‘his’ Kulturkampf in order better to stake out their own ground. 14

Still, in some areas the Dutch culture wars were certainly virulent. In order to see this, however, we need to shift our focus away from the national to the local level, from the milieu of the senior clergy to that of the parish priests and ordinary churchgoers. The focus of the most intense confrontation was not that perennial issue in modern Dutch history, the school question, but the local conflicts over the public manifestation of religion in processions and other public rituals. 15 In national politics the Catholic elite had every reason to position themselves carefully in order not to taint their alliance with orthodox Protestants and end up in a vulnerable minority position. But the public manifestation of religion at the local level was an entirely different matter. It was here that the sharpest confrontations took place between a liberal and Protestant (and also anti-papal) desire for a neutral public space in which religion would not be visible, and a new Catholic self-confidence that aspired to manifest itself precisely on the street, through various kinds of public performance. While there was an increasingly confident and ebullient mood among Catholics, liberals and Protestants felt increasingly anxious at the prospect of Catholic dominance in the southern localities.

In the meantime, ultramontane views had begun to gain ground in the Netherlands, further feeding the fears of Protestants, who vigilantly followed developments within the Catholic church. The spectre of an international Jesuit network devoted to increasing the might of Rome and orchestrating new shrines, cloisters and organised pilgrimages haunted the Netherlands. 16 Nor did the phenomenal expansion of the Marian shrine at Lourdes go unnoticed in the Netherlands. In one of her visitations, the visionary Bernadette Soubirous had received the commission to have the priests of the world organise processions and pilgrimages. 17 For this reason, Lourdes became something of a bugbear for liberal and Protestant circles in the Netherlands – all the more so with the creation of successful branch shrines, such as that at Oostakker, in Belgium, and the great new Marian site that sprang up from nothing in the German town of Marpingen in 1876, which immediately became a reference point for Dutch priests and Catholics. 18

In contrast to Vatican I (1869–70) and the dogma of papal infallibility pronounced there, which caused relative little to-do in the Netherlands, it was the 1871 celebration of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the ascension of Pope Pius IX to the Holy See that was a catalyst for the growing self-confidence of Catholics. This anniversary was also the occasion for the first national Catholic public gathering of a political character, and throughout the country the festivities and street decorations led to polarisation and confrontations. 19

It was in the Catholic southern provinces of Limburg and North Brabant that the ultramontane movement received its greatest stimulus. While the declaration of papal infallibility had hardly any impact in the rest of the Netherlands, its effects in Limburg were dramatic. 20 How strongly Limburg was influenced by the papal cult can be seen in the fact that in various churches the parishioners had a statue of the pope placed on the altar, ‘before which there was genuflection, as before a saint’. 21 Loyal Catholic Limburgers were deeply stirred by the polemics in the newspapers and the activity of their parish priests, and their outlook became more and more ultramontane, in conformity with the Syllabus errorum. So encompassing was this subscription to papal authority that, in the eyes of many liberals, loyal Catholics could only be regarded in a secondary sense as citizens of a free state. 22 In 1873, the Limburg provincial authorities reported to the minister of home affairs that in addition to events outside the country, it was chiefly the ‘driving’ of the regular and secular clergy that was ‘grooming’ the mass of Catholics to adopt ultramontane convictions. There were special processions organised to the ‘Dutch’ pilgrimage site of Kevelaer – just across the German border – with the goal of averting the ‘liberal danger’, and mass meetings and semi-religious events were organised. In Münster, close to the Dutch border, 27,000 Catholics came together to display their loyalty to...

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15 The standard work on Dutch history, Ernst H. Kossmann, The Low Countries 1780–1940 (Oxford, 1978), deals at various points with the school conflict, but does not mention the issue of processions; regarding that, see Margry, Teedere Quaesties.
18 Ibid., 343–5; David Blackbourn, Marpingen. Apparitions of the Virgin Mary in Nineteenth-Century Germany (New York, 1994), 134.
19 De Valk, Roomers dan de pauw, 145; Margry, Teedere Quaesties, 369.
22 Maastricht, Limburgs Archief, provinciaal bestuur, inv. nr. 575, report on 1871, 30 March 1871, no. 65.
the bishop there. It was in this ultramontane Catholic milieu in Limburg that the conflict surrounding processions would reach its climax in the 1870s.

**The 'Procession Question' in Maastricht, Limburg and the Netherlands**

The procession question ultimately goes back to a ban on public acts of Catholic worship that was instituted in the Dutch Republic during the Reformation. The Netherlands has never really had a state church, but during the Republic (from the end of the sixteenth to the end of the eighteenth century), the Calvinist Reformed church was dominant, while a blind eye was turned to Catholicism. After the brief liberalisation of the revolutionary period (1795–1813), the reorganised Reformed church remained the dominant church in the new kingdom under Willem I. There was still no state church as such, but the king attaché considerable value to a strong civil religion, and was of the opinion that undogmatic Protestantism could best fulfil that role. The bourgeoisie, free-thinking Protestant elite supported him in this and collectively turned against public expressions of both orthodox Protestantism and Catholicism. The first constitution of the new kingdom after the period of French domination, in 1814, had left open the possibility of holding processions and pilgrimages. However, the growing desire among Catholics to practise their public rituals as a ‘natural right’ collided with the political culture of Willem I’s centralised kingdom, in which public space and public life were seen as ‘neutral’ terrain, where religion must not be visible.

The early emancipation of the Catholics and their increasing public visibility were therefore the impetus for new legislation limiting public religious observance. The problems surrounding ritual displays – from the ringing of church bells and bringing the viaticum to homes and funeral processions, to full-scale processions and group pilgrimages – increased rapidly during the first half of the nineteenth century. Among these, the procession, with its powerful symbolic function and demonstrative attributes such as processional crosses, banners and torches, was the most serious bone of contention. The very spectacle of the religious procession awakened the fear that the cleansing of the sacral landscape that had taken place during the Reformation would be reversed. Although the ‘appeasement law’ of 1853 was a thorn in the side for Catholics, its general ban on clergy appearing in public places in vestments successfully repressed public rituals throughout most of the Netherlands, and for almost two decades there was relative calm on the issue. This calm was only disrupted when, at the time of the German Kulturkampf, a ‘national’ procession conflict broke out in Maastricht, the capital of Limburg.

In 1870, Maastricht had about 28,000 residents, almost all Catholics, but represented by a relatively strong liberal elite. The city became embroiled in a local culture war. Factions coalesced around two key political figures, the Catholic industrialist Petrus Regout and the Liberal Catholic councillor and burgomaster (mayor) W. H. Fijls. Regout had distanced himself from the Liberals after they had succeeded in preventing his re-election to parliament, and as a consequence of this local antagonism, he aligned himself with the ultramontane clerical camp. As well as these local players, the governor of Limburg, Pieter van der Does de Willebois, an energetic liberal and moderately anticlerical Catholic from outside the province, also played an important role. He found the influence of the clergy on social life too great, and distanced himself from public rituals such as processions.

However, the governor could not ignore St Servas (†384), the patron saint and first bishop of Maastricht. During the Middle Ages, pilgrims from across Europe had come every seven years for his jubilee and the display of his relics. But since the capture of Maastricht by the Dutch Republic in 1632, the city, like the rest of the Republic, had been purged of Catholic rituals, and the jubilee celebration was forbidden to take to the streets. In the nineteenth century this saint became an important symbol for the whole province of Limburg, and was a definitive element in the identity of the Catholic community. Thus, as a rule, the governor was also present for the annual celebration of St Servas’s feast.

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35 The most important step in the limiting of public Catholic rituals was the enactment of the constitution of 1848, which on the one hand made possible the episcopal hierarchy, but which at the same time contained a ban on public processions. The 1853 law on church denominations developed this further, making the ban stricter and more general, and setting out penalties.
37 He was governor from 1856 to 1874; on his person and performance in office, see J. Chairé (ed.), *Biografisch woordenboek van Nederland*, vol. III (The Hague, 1988), 619–62.
38 Regarding this observance, see P. C. Boereen, *Heiligdomsvaart Maastricht. Schets van de geschiedenis der heiligdomsvaarten en andere jubelvaarten* (Maastricht, 1962).
Franz Rutten, the pastor and dean of St Servas's church in Maastricht, was acutely aware of the functionality and value of the traditional large-scale open-air rituals. Because this element also played an important role in the Prussian Kulturkampf, Rutten began to work towards heightening the public presence of the Catholic church in Limburg. This could be seen already in the grandly conceived celebrations of Pius IX's jubilee in 1869 and 1871, and Rutten's role in supporting pilgrimages to various shrines. For Pastor Rutten, moreover, the threat of a Prussian-style Kulturkampf in the Netherlands and the strengthening of Catholic identity and groups were reasons to resist in principle the limitations imposed by the secular authorities on the public exercise of Catholic religion. Against a background of memories of glorious medieval processions and relic displays, Rutten developed the idea of a restoration of jubilees. He wanted a public manifestation as a symbolic protest, and he wanted to revitalise and raise international awareness of the medieval Dutch shrines.

After careful planning, and under the threat of all sorts of legal consequences, Rutten held the first public jubilee celebration since the seventeenth century on 27 July 1873. The event was carefully termed a 'trial run' and was not a formal liturgical procession. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that Rutten was aiming for a confrontation, and he made it clear that the main issue was the freedom of public religious observance. A total of about 14,000 believers came together, including three bishops (of Roermond, Chersonese and Batavia), the vicar-general of Liège and a representative of the archbishop of Cologne. Characteristic for the times was the symbolic function of neo-Gothic for the Dutch Catholic community. The neo-Gothic architects Pierre Cuypers and Johannes Kajser, two of the foremost designers associated with the new Dutch Catholic presence in the landscape and cityscape, were also involved.

The ritual that day consisted of a translation procession with about eighty ecclesiastical dignitaries, church wardens and confraternities, in which the prelates, in ecclesiastical vestments, and accompanied by music, banners, statues of saints, torches and lanterns, transferred the relics from the church, across the central city square (the Vrijthof) to the new treasury. Before

the event the church authorities had privately discussed the possible consequences with the police and the provincial authorities. How sensitive the situation was can be inferred from the observations of the provincial government, which took umbrage at the fact that the three invited bishops were conveyed through the city in vestments in an open carriage, in flagrant violation of the 'procession ban' forbidding members of the clergy to appear in public spaces wearing their vestments. This was even more true for the jubilee procession itself. The Public Prosecutor's Office concluded that a criminal violation had indeed been committed.

As was often the case in this period, the senior clergy were more cautious than the lower ranks. Not only Rutten's legal adviser, but his bishop Joannus Paredis had expressly counselled him not to perform any religious ritual, but at the most to hold a legitimate parade. It was, however, Rutten's intention to foreground the national, and even international resonance of the celebrations. He therefore invited ecclesiastical representatives from regions caught up in the German and Belgian culture wars, and organised a special 'Pius IX mass' that linked the whole event to the Vatican and the pope. The concluding address was delivered by the priest and later Catholic political leader, Herman Schaepman, who had recently sat in on the Vatican Council while receiving training in Rome. Schaepman told his listeners of how the Catholics were organising themselves in Germany to oppose Bismarck. He also called upon all those in attendance to pray for the beleaguered church and for 'Pius the Great'. Rutten later informed the pope by telegram of the massive response. The ceremonies were suffused with ultramontane sentiments; at the same time, they constituted an act of resistance against the measures of the Dutch government.

After the event Governor Van der Does informed the government in The Hague that the jubilee had incited sharp polemics and encouraged the launching of new and forbidden processions. He expected, moreover, that such 'ecclesiastical agitations' would go on for some time, because the Catholic population appeared to feel that its religious faith was at stake. The fact of the matter was that ecclesiastical developments in neighbouring Prussia had stirred up 'the sensibilities of many, very many Catholics, who otherwise would have been found to be more moderate'. This, Van der Does explained, was one of the reasons why he was currently maintaining a policy of restraint rather than having the new processions broken up by

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39 Cf. the revitalisation of 'national' shrines such as Amstelmond, Dokhum and Brielle. Moreover, in Maastricht competition with the jubilee at Aachen, a celebration that also attracted many Dutch people and also played a role; see Peter Jan Margry, 'De creatie van heilige ruimten in negentiende-eeuws Nederland: het Martelveld te Brielle', in J. C. Okkema et al. (eds.), Heidenen, Papen, Libertijnen en Fijnen (Delft, 1994), 249-76.

40 For a description of the procession, see Sint Servatiusblok 19 and 26 July 1873; 'La solennité de la translation', Courrier de la Meuse, 27/28 July 1873 (no. 173); Weekblad van het regt, no. 3841 (1875), 2; Hutschemaekers, 'Limburgse processieperikelen', 123-5.

41 For an account of his text, 'La solennité de la translation', and 'Feestrede van Dr. Schaepman', Weekblad De Limburger, 8 August 1873, no. 332.

42 'Un bel appendice à la belle fête de dimanche', Courrier de la Meuse, 19 July 1873, no. 176.

43 Maastricht, Limburgs Archief, provinciaal bestuur, inv. nr. 575, 31 March 1874, no. 19.
force. Because of various earlier disputes about processions in Maastricht, and the potential negative impact of the German Kulturkampf on Limburg society, the Public Prosecutor's Office was keen not to add fuel to the fire. It was precisely for this reason that they had not yet proceeded with prosecutions. The former minister of justice, the Catholic attorney-general for Limburg, Martin Strems, did not even view the new processions as an infringement of the law — they were 'mistaken, but well-intended' — and he predicted that with a populace so strongly influenced by ultramontane sentiments, a repressive policy would only lead to major problems. He wanted to dismiss all the cases involving procession violations in order to calm Catholic feelings and avoid polarisation. He was not enthusiastic about the 'outward display of religious ceremonies', but took the view that even Catholic superstition might have considerable value as a civil religion that would keep the population from becoming infected with 'the internationale and the commune'.

For Rutten all this signalled a moral victory, which strengthened him in his determination to hold a 'real' and much more extensive jubilee procession through the city in the following year. The project had already received the most authoritative endorsement possible, in the form of an indulgence from Pius IX to stimulate pilgrimage during the period when the relics were on display. With this, the traditional 'Kermesse de reliques' could be revived. As a consequence, a huge procession once again moved through the city in 1874. During the double octave, moreover, pilgrims from about fifty parishes in the region converged on Maastricht in newly formed group pilgrimages. Rutten's recidivism and the fresh provocations associated with the new jubilee made procession unavoidable. A controversial legal process was initiated, which led first to the conviction of Rutten, and ultimately to a judgement from the Supreme Court in 1875 that would send the procession question in a new direction. Limburg's procession culture was drastically limited and strict rules were drawn up, similar to those in force elsewhere in the Netherlands.

One factor complicating the conflict was the politically diffuse character of the region of which Limburg was a part. The transnational Maas-Rhine region was a patchwork quilt constructed of many small former political entities, with a historical, linguistic and socio-religious cultural landscape that transcended the nineteenth-century borders. Because national borders were less important here, processions of pilgrims frequently moved back and forth between Belgium, the German Niederheyden and Dutch Limburg; indeed they constituted one of the distinctive visual markers of the region. For instance, the Maastricht jubilee was historically linked with those in Aachen and Kornelimünster in Germany and Tongeren in Belgium. And it was not only in the area of religion that there were mutual influences. More than elsewhere in the Netherlands, the newspapers were oriented to the international region. They constantly reported on developments elsewhere in the border regions, and on the possible effects these might have in their own province. The ban on processions by the Liberal burgomaster in neighbouring Liège, after a confrontation with tranchons, made an impression throughout the area. When a group of liberals in Brussels brought a procession to a halt in 1875 and held several parodies of processions, the Catholics assumed the existence of a liberal conspiracy. The Limburg newspapers suggested that the German ambassador to Brussels, bowing to the wishes of Belgian and Prussian liberals, had received instructions to request the Belgian government to forbid processions entirely. This led to increased fears that further limitations on the rights of Catholics in Limburg would be forthcoming. The Prussians, for their part, let the Dutch know that henceforth no Dutch pilgrim groups or processions would be permitted entry, and the processional pilgrimages from Overijssel in the direction of Vreden and Stadtlohn in Germany, were kept under surveillance. These pilgrimages had generally only formed up as a procession once they had crossed the border with Prussia, but the Dutch government feared that the ritual would henceforth take place on the Dutch side of the border.

Although Governor Van der Does was fearful of escalation and problems with Prussia, he downplayed the affair to himself and others. In his briefings with the minister of home affairs he continued to emphasise that no serious breaches of the peace or disruptions of public order had yet taken place. By comparison with Prussia, indeed, the situation was still relatively

34 The problem of processions had arisen in Maastricht previously in 1839, 1843, 1856 and 1858; see Margry, Thieler Quaesties, 427-8.
35 The Hague, Algemeen Rijksarchief, archive of the Ministry of Justice 1813-1876, inv. nr. 4847 # 29, 6 August 1873.
36 Maastricht, Limburgs Archief, episcopal archive, Roermond, inv. nr. 467, 5 May 1874: Courrier de la Meuse 7, 8, 9, 11, 12/13 to 26/27 July 1874.
37 Arrest, Hoge Raad, of 29 October 1875, in Weekblad van het regt, nr. 3910, 18 November 1875, 1-3.
39 For all this, see 'Belgie', Maas- en Roerbode, 29 May 1875, no. 22.
calm, although there was undeniably friction and a sense of mutual threat between Catholics and liberals. It was noted that the personal celebration of confirmation by Bishop Paredis of Roermond in parishes along the Dutch border had enticed thousands of Germans to cross over. However, aside from the procession question, the problem that appeared most frequently in provincial reports to the government in The Hague was the settlement in Limburg of German monks and nuns, especially after 1875. Limburg seems to have been a particularly attractive refuge for those who had fallen foul of the German May Laws. In the year 1875 alone, 167 female and 307 male religious (of whom 244 were Jesuits) settled in the province. As far as can be determined, a total of about 1,300 religious settled in the Netherlands during the Kulturkampf, almost all of them regularly belonging to some twenty-five different congregations.

Furthermore, the relatively large number of Jesuits among the immigrants contributed to the diffusion of wild myths about this order. Media representation of the procession question and other religious issues came to be dominated by caricatures of Jesuits. The 'cloister question', which was playing itself out in the Netherlands at this time, was likewise linked with the Jesuit 'black international'. In 1848, the law of 1814 forbidding the establishment of new monasteries as existing ones closed was repealed, with the result that monastic establishments proliferated, from 200 in 1861 to over 500 in 1888. This institutional growth was a thorn in the side for Protestants, especially because the construction of the new buildings threatened to disrupt the hitherto Protestant character of the landscape. In fact, it was above all in the sphere of architecture and the visual arts that a distinctively Catholic visual vocabulary emerged. An implicitly antagonistic morphology was developed, in the form of the widely used neo-Gothic architectural style. The neo-Gothic style had not, in fact, traditionally been associated with Catholic confessionalism; it was seen rather as a neutral idiom, suitable for public buildings, including Protestant churches and even the palace of King Willem II. By the end of the 1850s, however, a Catholic variant of the neo-Gothic style had emerged, which embodied claims for the history and truth of Catholic doctrines. The style was increasingly claimed or appropriated by Catholics, and acquired thereby a distinctively Catholic flavour. It was increasingly seen as a public assertion of Catholic doctrinal truth; the Gothic style was 'proof of the antiquity and immortality of faith', as the Dutch bishop, Gerardus Wilmer, formulated it.

The architectural design competition for the new national museum of the arts - the Rijksmuseum - at the end of the culture wars is an excellent case in point. The winning design was that of the Catholic Limburg architect, Pierre Cuypers. Critics disparaged the plan, claiming that it was more suitable for a cathedral, a monastery or an episcopal palace. The appropriation of the neo-Gothic architectural style by the Catholics in a sense marks a culture war that the Catholics actually won. On the occasion of the opening of the museum in 1885 a liberal magazine published a critical cartoon depicting it as a religious building, surrounded by processions and priests.

As well as architecture, printed and visual materials also became strategic propaganda instruments. The Catholic visual repertoire inspired by Rome and its iconographic elaboration in the Netherlands in these years bore witness to the rapid growth of ultramontane Catholicism; symbols of the pope (the triple crown and keys of St Peter) and the Vatican (St Peter's Church and Square) were enormously popular; indeed they became a kind of independent paradigm of the church itself.

The German Kulturkampf provided the immediate stimulus for a more robust legislative resolution of the Dutch procession question. The parliamentary questions occasioned by Rutten's second jubilee procession in 1874 did not set off any political fireworks at the time. The Conservative minister of justice, Constant van Lynden van Sandenburg, a Reformed church member who had been included in Prime Minister Theodorus Heemskerk's second cabinet (1874–7) shortly before, simply referred the parliament to the 1883 law and the judges who had used it since then to rule on the legality of processions. Nevertheless, in the face of international developments and

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40 Föhles, Kulturkampf und katholisches Milieu, pp. 50 and 255.
41 Limburgs Archief, provinciaal bestuur, inv. nr. 575, report on 1875, 27 March 1876, no. 80; De Coninck, 'Een les uit Praiiser', 256–59; Ubachs, Handboek voor de geschiedenis van Limburg, 401; Ubachs maintains that the number for Limburg was 650 at most. For the regional significance of all this, see Herbert Lepper, 'Der 'Kulturkampf im Rheinland und seine Auswirkungen auf Belgien und auf die Niederlande – Eine Skizze', in Detlev Arens (ed.), Rhein-Maas-Kulturraum in Europa (Keulen, 1991), 82–8.
The activism of Catholic laypeople and clergy, the Protestant and Conservative/Liberal majority in the Lower House became increasingly determined to take a stand against the further proliferation of processions, with their associated incidents of conflict and unrest.

The threat of escalation was great, because, as Limburg's Bishop Paredis acknowledged, priests were taking an increasingly critical attitude toward the civil government, influenced as it was by the Kulturkampf, and were no longer willing to follow the cautious course charted by the bishop.46 If the Maastricht jubilee procession was still controlled and planned from above, the incidents surrounding other processions generally arose spontaneously, at the initiative of local pastors or procession or confraternity officials. Furthermore, because politicians and the judiciary were not yet clear about precisely what was forbidden, in practice all processions - and particularly new initiatives - were routinely escorted and monitored by police and judicial officials. Around the middle of the 1870s there were thus a number of incidents involving arrests and even the occasional physical confrontation.47 On the other hand, adjoining Rhineland-Westphalia, with eleven violent confrontations between Catholics and the authorities, was considerably more discordant.48 The harder attitude of the Prussian authorities had the effect that the leaders of processions and pilgrimages, more or less following the footsteps of the Prussian religious, sought refuge on Dutch soil. This new cross-border effect finally tipped the scales toward a harder policy on the part of Dutch politicians and the government.49

On the orders of Justice Minister Van Lynden, the public prosecutor in Maastricht, A. B. M. Hanlo, secretly circularised the assistant prosecutors in Limburg at the beginning of the procession season in 1877, instructing them to take action against all new procession initiatives. Alluding to the formation of Kappayne's left-Liberal cabinet shortly thereafter, the regional Catholic newspapers now spoke of a 'Liberal government in Limburg', and predicted a campaign against processions and pilgrimages.50 In the first half of 1878 alone, indictments were issued against fifteen processions. If these involved foreign processions, they were in each case stopped with the help of the police. It was intended that this should send a clear signal to foreigners that the Netherlands too had reached the bounds of its tolerance. But the Prussian Catholics were not to be frightened off, as was shown by a procession of some 300 people that made its way from Kempen into the Netherlands on 24 August 1878. They wanted to make use of what they considered their right to process to the Marian shrine at Roermond praying and singing. They did not see this as merely a liturgical ritual, but also as a political and strategic action to denounce the new 'Dutch Kulturkampf'. These pressures in the border areas forced the government to take a stand. The consequence was the clash in Roermond with which this chapter opened. When a processional pilgrimage from the Prussian town of Haaren was violently dispersed on Sunday, 15 September 1878, the situation changed instantly. Almost all the parties involved felt that this confrontation between the Dutch authorities and the pilgrims marked a low point in the procession conflict, and almost everyone was of the opinion that things could not be allowed to go on like this. Politicians in The Hague concluded that the police and the judiciary had gone too far, and Catholic Limburg was reinforced in its belief that a liberal conspiracy was afoot. And yet, in a sense, it was precisely this hard line which finally brought peace to the situation. The question was formally settled in 1879 with two judgements from the Supreme Court concerning the sentences of two Limburg clergymen. Pastor Rutten and his Limburg colleagues held their peace and for several decades the defeated residents of Haaren and other Prussian communities no longer dared to mount collective pilgrimages to the Netherlands.51 The years 1878–9 were thus a turning-point. Peace returned to the procession question.

CONCLUSIONS: THE IMPACT OF THE CULTURE WARS

In the 1870s the procession question was primarily a regional affair. The exceptional position of Catholic Limburg as the last province to be integrated into the kingdom ensured that there would be firm support for processions there. Limburg's ecclesiastical and social elite wanted to protect regional culture, and this objective was broadly supported by the populace. As a rule, the new processions were not initiatives of the lower classes. The example of the dean of the province's most famous church, St Servas in Maastricht, set the tone. Ultramontane newspapers supported the initiatives; at the same time they supported and endorsed local understandings of

47 For an overview, see Hutschemaekers, 'Limburgse processieperikelen', passim.
48 Sperber, Popular Catholicism, 239-33; Füehles, Kulturkampf und katholisches Milieu, 235-7.
49 As in 1875-6, so in 1877-8, during the 'caccia alle processioni', the Vatican was kept informed of the events through its internuncio G. Caprì. Active intervention was hardly possible in this situation. See J. P. de Valk, Romeinse beurden . . . 1832-1874 (The Hague, 1996), I, nos. 3709, 3739, 3666, 3698, 3709 and 3730.
50 Maas- en Roerbode, 28 September 1878, no. 39.
51 Schmitz, 'Deutsche Wallfahrten naar Roermond', 104.
the meaning and importance of religious traditions and rituals. The landed nobility of Limburg played its own peculiar role in all this. After 1872, they offered their country houses as premises for new monastic communities, encouraged priests in organising processions, and committed themselves to paying any legal costs that were incurred as a result.\textsuperscript{52} The proximity of Germany was also significant. Many of the religious who had fled during the German \textit{Kulturkampf} did not return to their homeland after its end in 1887, but quickly integrated into their new surroundings, thereby increasing the influence of German Catholicism on the Dutch church. Separate Dutch provinces of German congregations were established. Apart from this, the influence of the German \textit{Kulturkampf} was primarily indirect; polemical representations and a mutual sense of threat were reinforced in the Netherlands by the conflict across the border, and militants on both sides felt their views were being vindicated. For the most part, however, Dutch Liberals thought Bismarck’s politics to be counter-productive. The vast majority rejected direct repression and remained true to the Dutch tradition of repressive tolerance.\textsuperscript{53}

There was also a large Catholic majority in North Brabant, and now and then the procession question flared up there, albeit less than in Limburg; elsewhere in the country low levels of support meant that only minor incidents occurred. There were few organisational links between the local initiators in the various parishes. At the most, there was a collective play on public sentiments through media and parochial channels. The procession question was chiefly a local matter. Local clergy and Catholic leaders often took the initiative. Bishops and vicars, on the one hand, preferred if possible to avoid provoking the authorities and the national Protestant majority, and they were in any case unenthusiastic about spontaneous initiatives on the part of churchgoing laypeople. In the nineteenth-century Netherlands, as in many other countries, a process of national integration was taking place, the consequence of better communications and more effective government, among other factors.\textsuperscript{54} Exceptions such as that of Limburg, which previously could be tolerated, became increasingly difficult to maintain in the more centralised nation of the late nineteenth century. This was certainly one aspect of the consternation generated by the Limburg procession question. The ecclesiastical authorities, for their part, were also at work on organisation and integration at the national level. The Catholic church was undergoing a process that paralleled that of the nation-states,\textsuperscript{55} and certainly in the Netherlands, where an episcopal hierarchy had only existed since 1853, the ecclesiastical authorities looked with suspicion upon local initiatives. This is why stronger government regulation initially met with little resistance from the ecclesiastical authorities, and why they were willing to cooperate in a compromise that did not leave religion in public spaces entirely free, but left their own authority intact.

Consistent with the liberal and Protestant domination of public life, liberal forces at the national level had generally taken the initiative, spurred on by traditional Protestant distaste for any public manifestation of the Catholic religion. At first sight, the outcome of the conflict seems to have been an unambiguous defeat for the Catholics. They now began to hold their processions in specially constructed procession parks, screened off from public thoroughfares, or circumvented the ban on processions through what were termed ‘silent processions’, such as that in Amsterdam, in which Catholics passed through the city without loud prayers, Catholic vestments or other Catholic symbols.\textsuperscript{56} The question also lost part of its urgency through the expansion of the railways and tram lines, which afforded alternatives to the journey on foot to pilgrimage sites – this too accelerated the disappearance of collective pilgrimages from public space. Finally, the outcome of the conflict surrounding processions created a clarity that resulted in restored peace. People on both sides accepted the new situation, and the provocations ceased.

The Catholics actually had much to gain from this outcome. In some European countries, the culture wars may have reinforced processes of secularisation, resulting in a decline in the influence of church-related parties. That was certainly not the case in the Netherlands. When, beginning in the 1870s, new groups began to enter the public domain that had been redefined by the Liberals in 1848, it appeared at first to be a general free-for-all for the domination of public life: Protestants against Catholics, Liberals against orthodox Protestants and Catholics, and all groups against the Socialists. The

\textsuperscript{52} houses in Exaen, Baexem, Swalmen, Bleijenbeek near Bergen, Wijnandstraat and Vaals, see Limburgs Archief, provinciaal bestuur, inv. 573, report on 1872, 31 maart 1873, no. 49; further also Lepper, ‘Der ‘Kulturkampf’’, 79–81; Margry, \textit{Teedere Quaesties}, 327–8.

\textsuperscript{53} De Coninck, ‘Een les uit Pruisen’, 151, 300–1 and 310–19.


\textsuperscript{55} Peter Raedts, ‘Tussen Rome en Den Haag: de integratie van de Nederlandse katholieken in kerk en staat’ in \textit{Te Velde and Verhage (eds.), De eenheid en de delen}, 29–44.

culmination of the procession question in the 1870s must be seen against this background: this was a struggle for public space, literally a struggle for the streets. However, no one group achieved domination; instead there emerged what were elsewhere called Lager (political camps) or milieu parties, termed zuilen (pillars) in Dutch – socio-moral communities within which not only the ecclesiastical, but also the whole social and cultural life of those involved took place. In addition to the orthodox Protestant pillar, there arose a Catholic and thereafter a Social Democratic pillar, while the Liberals were more or less forced into the position of a neutral island. The different moral communities later came to tolerate one another, although great contrasts remained. The Netherlands became a country of minorities, none of which was in a position to dominate national politics alone, without support from other minorities. Thus, the Catholics needed allies. In 1872 they were still fighting with the orthodox Protestants; in the 1870s the procession question came to a head. But 1888 saw the formation of the first combined government of Catholics and orthodox Protestants. The two groups had a common interest in protecting their own confessional worlds against the influence of a neutral state. Of the two questions which dominated the Dutch culture wars between 1870 and 1890, namely schools and processions, it would appear that the mass of Catholic churchgoers attached more importance to the latter – it was, after all, a question of the practice and public manifestation of their faith – whereas the Catholic elite saw the former at the chief concern. The procession question was the quid pro quo that made success in the school question possible. In 1889, a school law was adopted which accommodated the wishes of the confessional parties; it was followed by a constitutional amendment in 1917 that finally settled the issue.

A highly emotional conflict between Catholics and Protestants over processions did not serve this common interest. Cooperation with the traditionally strongly anti-papist orthodox Protestants made it possible for the Catholics to strengthen their position both in national politics and in social and cultural life. Thus, it could be said that defeat in the procession question yielded indirect gains. After the first Catholic-orthodox Protestant cabinet there was an era of alternating Liberal and confessional governments, but from 1918 onwards Catholics participated in all coalition governments; for a long period, indeed, there were only confessional cabinets. The dominant position of the confessional parties in Dutch politics has only recently disappeared: until 1994 their involvement was a central and abiding feature of political life. This share in political power was acquired, as we have seen, at a price. Ecclesiastical processions and public religious rituals continued to be forbidden. In any case, the urgency of the issue ultimately waned. After the Second Vatican Council (1963–5) Dutch Catholics turned away from the procession, whose rituals were now seen as old-fashioned, and Protestants, on the other hand, ceased to find public processions threatening. In this sense, the procession question solved itself, and in 1983 the procession ban too finally disappeared from the Dutch constitution.
The culture war in the Netherlands has not been the subject of a comprehensive study. On the one hand, information about the relationship between the state and the Catholic church can be found in the numerous studies of 'pillarisation', a term used for the separation of the population into closed religious and socio-political groups; on the other hand, there are several studies on the influence of the culture war in the narrower sense.


Although studies on popular Catholicism are beginning to appear in the Netherlands, a lot of work remains to be done in this field. It would be especially welcome if studies of this kind were to concentrate on the strange relationship between Catholics and politics. Catholics were a large minority, but they seem curiously absent from all non-strictly Catholic organisations. Protestants dominated public life. Catholics were not conspicuous in non-religious societies such as popular single-issue movements, nationalist societies, feminist groups or socialist parties. Catholics mainly joined their own 'pillarised' organisations, and even if their attitude could be explained by the long Dutch history of repressive tolerance, a thorough investigation of the question would be very welcome.
Annotated bibliography

The evaluation of the central position and strategies of the media in the Netherlands in the culture war is also a research desideratum. Newspapers, magazines, pamphlets and books played a major role in directing and influencing the opinion of the masses and of politics on a local, regional and national level. In relation to visual culture more research is also necessary into the function and results of the creation or revival of Catholic devotions and the massive circulation of devotional prints and leaflets.