When policy advisors cannot reach a consensus

Wilko Letterie, Otto H. Swank, Hendrik P. Van Dalen

Onderzoeksoutput: Bijdrage aan wetenschappelijk tijdschrift/periodieke uitgaveArtikelWetenschappelijkpeer review

Samenvatting

In this paper advisors are selected by two ministers with conflicting interests in order to (1) acquire information, and (2) obtain political legitimacy concerning a project. In the end, parliament decides whether or not the project, of which the consequences are uncertain, is implemented. In principle a minister wants to appoint an advisor whose preferences are similar. However, since the advisor needs to convince the decisive player in the model, the minister may appoint an advisor whose preferences are closer to those of the agents to be persuaded. We also show when polarised advice occurs (the advisors have different preferences) and when consensual advice occurs (they have the same preferences).

Originele taal-2Engels
Pagina's (van-tot)439-461
Aantal pagina's23
TijdschriftSocial Choice and Welfare
Volume17
Nummer van het tijdschrift3
DOI's
StatusGepubliceerd - 2000

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