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“The supreme power of the people”: local autonomy and radical democracy in the Batavian revolution (1795–1798)

Pepijn Brandon and Karwan Fatah-Black

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ABSTRACT

The Batavian Revolution of 1795 that overthrew the old stadtholderly regime of the Dutch Republic was followed by a period of intense political conflict in which popular mobilization played a key role. Among revolutionary elites, the main dividing line between moderates and radicals occurred around questions concerning the reorganization of the state apparatus and the writing of a new constitution. A full rejection of the federative model of the state that had characterized the former Dutch Republic became central to the repertoire of the radical faction in the National Convention. However, instances of protest and rebellion from below, often supported by the radicals in the Convention, generally remained conspicuously local in focus. This clash between national ideals and highly localized realities remains one of the central paradoxes of the Batavian Revolution. The form in which this process unfolded was peculiar to the trajectory of the Batavian Revolution, which more than any of its counterparts became centered on constitutional issues. But severe tensions between programs for the rationalization of state bureaucracy along nationalizing lines and popular support for far-reaching local autonomy existed in each of the Atlantic Revolutions. In January 1797, radical democrats in Leiden attempted to find an organizational form to solve this problem. They called for a national gathering of representatives from local revolutionary clubs and neighborhood assemblies. The response by the moderate provincial and national authorities was remarkably swift, and the initiative was repressed before the meeting could take place. Examining the failure of this unique attempt to bridge the divide between local popular mobilization and national revolutionary programs, as well as the discussion that followed this failure, can help us understand the possibilities and limitations of Batavian radicalism.

KEYWORDS

Atlantic revolutions; Dutch republic; Batavian revolution; nationalism; localism; popular mobilization

Introduction

On 15 January 1797, in the midst of a growing political crisis engulfing the Batavian Republic that had been established in the Netherlands two years earlier, the regional government of the province of Holland took a remarkable step. Without the permission of the Batavian National Convention, and encroaching upon the jurisdiction of local authorities, provincial officers marched into the city of Leiden and arrested five well-known radical democrats. Among them were the leading Leiden radical publishers Willem van Lelyveld

and Pieter Hendrik Trap. Their crime had been to sign a call for a “nation-wide assembly of neighborhood councils.”¹ The aim of this gathering was to rally the lowest electoral organs, independently of the National Convention, in order to push the revolution in a more radical direction. The attempt led to panic among moderate politicians, who perhaps unsurprisingly backed the regional government of Holland’s actions to quickly suppress the attempt. Rutger Jan Schimmelpenninck, a leading moderate who would later become head of state, led the charge. In a stormy meeting of the National Convention, he argued that if allowed, the nation-wide assembly of neighborhood councils would undercut the very system of indirect representation and create “a representative Body, that not just as *individual Citizens*, but with *authority* will pretend to sit in judgement of the interests of the Nation ...”² He therefore advocated stern measures to repress this attempt. Radicals at the local as well as the national level came to the defense of their Leiden associates. However, they did so not under the banner of their own program of direct democracy, but focused their protests on the violation by the Holland deputies of the local autonomy of the city of Leiden.

While the incident itself quickly sunk into oblivion, the brief uproar it created within radical circles with perfect clarity illustrates one of the key dilemmas faced by the Batavian revolution. Politically, the more radical leaders of the revolution advocated a far-reaching centralization of the state along national lines.³ On the other hand, the rank and file that they sought to mobilize remained highly committed to the defense of local autonomy against any encroachment by centralizing authorities.⁴ For radical leaders on the national as well as the local level, including the arrested publishers Trap and Lelyveld, the attempt at a “nation-wide convention of neighborhood councils” was aimed at strengthening the connections between the revolutionary leadership in the National Convention and local revolutionary politics. Instead, the complete failure of this attempt laid bare the fault lines along which the fragile alliance between state-modernizers and local popular mobilization would soon start unraveling.

R. R. Palmer was one of the first historians internationally to grant the Batavian Revolution its own distinct voice in the cacophony of the Age of Revolutions. While historians before him, including Dutch historians, had described the events surrounding the 1795 fall of the old regime primarily as an extension of French intervention, Palmer described the Batavian events as a “true revolution.”⁵ He pointed out the significant repercussions for the wider struggles in the Atlantic world, especially for the military conflict between France and Britain. He also noted the particular extent to which Batavian revolutionary politics became focused on constitutional issues, which was a result of the drawn-out crisis of the Dutch state that preceded it.⁶ Study of the Batavian Revolution since then has affirmed the need to recognize that this revolution was driven by its own dynamic of popular contention and intra-elite struggles, rather than being simply an extension of French military power.⁷

The recognition of the revolutionary character of constitutional struggles and conflicts between radicals and moderates over the nature of popular sovereignty and democracy has greatly increased the relevance of the Dutch case for comparisons with similar events in the Atlantic World and beyond. This is particularly true for the far-reaching conflicts that arose over the deeply entrenched federalism of Dutch political life. Clashes between programs for the rationalization of state bureaucracy along nationalizing lines and existing traditions of far-reaching local autonomy were certainly not confined to

the Netherlands. Although, as Pierre Serna has daringly suggested, all the Atlantic revolutions contained elements of a “War of Independence,” at the national level these revolutions increasingly evolved into wars of subjugation of the regions to the center.⁸

This tension gave rise to explosive struggles for autonomy, mixed with battles over direct versus representative democracy. Sometimes resistance was mounted under the flag of a purer version of the original revolution, as happened when the former enslaved on Haiti raised the standard of liberty.⁹ Sometimes it took more outwardly conservative forms, as in the War of the Vendée.¹⁰ Most often it alternated between these two extremes. The Dutch colonies in the Atlantic world provided a third variant, in which struggles over the implementation of the revolution became connected to the rise of creole elites and their own agendas of preserving local autonomy in the face of increasing imperial competition and slave resistance.¹¹ In this wide variety of forms, the question of local autonomy versus an expanding, rationalizing national state had important effects for the relationship between revolutionary regimes and leaderships and local popular mobilizations. In this light, the Leiden events can be seen as a microscopic example of a much wider problem.

The Batavian context

The Batavian Revolution started in January 1795 with the overthrow of the stadtholderly regime that had ruled the Dutch Republic since 1747. The stadtholder and his family were forced into exile, the National Convention replaced the old States General, and the Batavian Republic became an ally of France in its war against Britain. Three years of popular rebellions and political conflict followed, culminating in 1798 in a coup and counter-coup. The defining political issue in the newly established National Convention became whether the Batavian Republic replacing the *Ancien Régime* should be a loose federation of provinces as had been the tradition of the old Dutch Republic, or a national state. Federalism was deeply imbued in the structures of the state. The founding principle of the Dutch Republic laid down in the *Unie van Utrecht* at the time of the sixteenth-century Dutch Revolt had been the protection of the autonomy of the seven federated provinces against central rule. As a result representation in all the main organs of the state, from the States General to the five independent Admiralty Boards, and from finance to the management of the East and West India Companies, had remained painstakingly divided over the seven provinces. Social policy and jurisdiction largely remained the prerogative of the influential town-governments. Local protectionism remained a central plank of their economic outlook. However, under pressure of eighteenth-century military and economic setbacks, criticism of this elaborate state-structure mounted. Now, provincial privileges seemed to hinder growth and development.¹²

Some steps toward centralization were taken under the *Ancien Régime*. The last stadtholder William V was a remarkably central figure in the otherwise fragmented republic. Not only had his predecessor managed to make his position hereditary, he was also stadtholder of all the provinces, he chaired the Dutch East India Company and West India Company and actively intervened in the politics of the colonies. During his tenure there were two major waves of opposition, the failed Patriot Revolution of 1785–1787 and the successful Batavian Revolution of 1795. These movements fused Dutch traditions of constitutional thinking with the newly emerging political winds that blew across the Atlantic. Being directed against centralizing, semi-monarchical Orangist rule, the Patriot

Revolution of 1785–1787 had called for a “restoration” of the old traditions of federative administration.¹³ In doing so, it naturally took its inspiration from the American War of Independence, where revolutionaries in turn upheld the Dutch Republic as one of their own constitutional models.¹⁴ The Patriots were able to take over several local governments until in 1787 the Prussian army invaded to restore the power of Willem V. This resulted in a purge of Patriots from the local governments and restoring supporters of the House of Orange to positions of power.

The chances of the Orangists turned in 1793 when the Dutch Republic entered the war against revolutionary France. The French invaded the Netherlands in January 1795, chasing out Willem V and opening the second wave of constitutional experiments. In the meantime, under the influence of the French Revolution and the constitutions of 1791 and 1793 that had proclaimed the nation “one and indivisible,” many of the former Patriots had changed their perspective on the desired outcome of their revolution. With few exceptions, the more radical revolutionary leaders now became ardent followers of the ideal of the centralized nation-state. The demand of a unitary state became the central plank of a program that henceforward became associated with state modernization, democratic opposition to local “aristocratic” ruling cliques, radicalism or even Jacobinism.¹⁵ In a pamphlet written less than two years before the Batavian Revolution Bernardus Bosch, who after the revolution became one of the most radical representatives in the National Convention, summed up this program. Borrowing his terminology from French debates, he directly equated federalism with feudalism. “All the *provinces* have to form *but one union*; the gates of the cities, that close in the Citizen as in a cage have to be forever opened, as a token of general unification.”¹⁶ For Bosch and his fellow-radicals, national unification was almost synonymous with democracy. Local prerogatives were the powerbase of the old elites and the stadtholderly regime. A popular revolution would break them down.

Once the revolution unfolded, however, things proved to be not so simple. Although popular revolts accompanied the French invasion of 1795, the installation of the new regime was as much the result of large sections of the old elite accommodating to foreign occupation. The founding of an elected National Convention as a replacement of the old States General, consisting of delegations of the Provincial elites, was a great departure from the old federative model. However, from the provinces to the central state an influential layer of administrators remained in place that supported at best a very moderate course for state reform, leaving part of the old federative structure intact.¹⁷ Frustrated radicals increasingly called for a purge of these “Orangists,” “aristocrats” and “federalists,” but lacked the powerbase to effect this. Meanwhile, popular protest did not unfold as the unified national revolution that the radicals had envisioned, but due to the completely fragmented nature of political life took the form of a loosely connected series of local uprisings. In this, they continued to resemble the pattern established by the Patriot revolution, that as Wayne te Brake noticed “was a localized revolution within a decentralized republic.”¹⁸ At the municipal level, regime-change was mostly enforced by heterogeneous coalitions of revolutionary clubs, moderate and radical veterans of the Patriot revolution, and sections of the lower classes.¹⁹ They railed against the representatives of the old order that had nestled themselves in positions of power, but because their support base often remained rather small, they did not manage to oust them. Instead, next to the moderate official Batavian organs of power and often in opposition

to them, local radical societies organized their own permanent structures of representation. One of these was the Citizens' Gathering in the *Marekerk* (a church) in Leiden, that would play an important part in the events leading up to January 1797. Similar institutions emerged elsewhere, under different names. In Amsterdam, a General Assembly of Neighborhood Councils became the seedbed of local radicalism.²⁰ In Friesland the *Hoofdvergadering* or Head Meeting fulfilled the same role.²¹

Through petitions, demonstrations and sometimes open riot, these institutions put pressure on local governments. Revolutionary societies and moderate municipal councils clashed over whether (male) suffrage should be universal or restricted for servants, the poor and other "dependents," over how to deal with the worsening state of the economy and its effect on living conditions, and over the desirability of "purges" of the supporters of the old Orangist regime from positions of power. Such conflicts led to particularly sharp outbursts of popular protest in Amsterdam. On 16 September 1795, armed and unarmed protestors stormed the Amsterdam City Hall to amplify their demands "to recognize the Batavian Clubs as official bodies, and to immediately decommission the civil servants of the old regime, and put sons of freedom in their place."²² In May of the next year, the same issue led to an even more threatening armed revolt that lasted several days and centrally involved the city's artillery regiment. A French garrison had to be called in to quell the unrest.²³ Radicals also tried to gain influence through the neighborhood councils, the electoral bodies organized at the local level to facilitate the selection of representatives to the municipalities and later the National Convention. While there was an important difference between the revolutionary societies, representing a small minority of political activists, and these neighborhood councils that effectively formed the lowest rung of the new electoral system, the radicals consciously tried to blur this distinction. In 1798, leading radical Gerrit Paape misleadingly claimed that "[a]lthough the Societies do not literally form or represent the Batavian People, they were indeed seen as the people. For by the small change of calling themselves Neighborhood Councils, they became the sovereigns of the nation."²⁴

By the end of Year II of the Batavian Revolution, this stalemate between vociferous local radical coalitions and a deadlock on constitutional reform in the National Assembly had reached crisis point. In the eyes of the radicals, the revolution remained unfinished. They blamed this on "aristocrats" who had dressed up as Batavian revolutionaries and had gained positions at all levels of the state. *Slymgasten*, "slimy fellows," was the term that the radicals introduced for this group. The influential newspaper *De Democraten* defined *slymgasten* as

[...] such persons, who in the execution of the affairs of this Revolution always lean towards the soft side; who [...] imagine themselves that this is the securest way, and therefore do not dare to deviate from it by a single step, unless they are being forced to do so by the gravest emergency, and even then can only do so while shivering.²⁵

The only way to force such characters to take bolder action, was to make sure that they felt under direct pressure from the people. The radicals saw the Neighborhood Councils as the natural venue for organizing this pressure. A member of the Amsterdam society *Tot nut van het Vaderland* (For the benefit of the Fatherland), that in 1795 had taken the initiative for the establishment of the General Assembly of Neighborhood Councils, in the woolly language of the time proclaimed that "this Assembly is the access point between the

People of Amsterdam and the Representation of that People, because in its turn it becomes the point of access to the Representation of the People of the Netherlands.”²⁶ The same ideas would stimulate Leiden radicals to take the initiative for their Nation-wide Assembly of Neighborhood Councils.

Revolutionary Leiden

The course of the Batavian revolution in Leiden provides a good example of the ways in which radicals used popular mobilization around issues of democratic representation and local governance in order to push the revolutionary process further, as well as of the obstacles they faced in doing so. Already in 1795, the basic problems that gave rise to the failed attempt to form a National Convention of Neighborhood Councils were clearly laid out.²⁷

Immediately after the French General Pichegru had led his troops across the Meuse in January 1795, Leiden radicals took action. Several days before French soldiers entered the city, they proclaimed the dawn of “Batavian Freedom.” An estimated one thousand armed citizens participated in the overthrow of the old city government in the night of 18 and 19 January.²⁸ With a total urban population of 31,000, among whom were only 9,000 men of fighting age, this shows that the revolution was carried out with substantial popular participation.²⁹ An anonymous Orangist diarist noted that the crowd initially gathered at the Town hall. From there, they marched to the houses of members of the civil militia that they deemed untrustworthy in order to disarm them.³⁰ Already on the following day, the existing radical societies of Leiden convened the General Citizens’ Assembly in the Marekerk. This Assembly took the initiative in organizing elections for the neighborhood assemblies and installing a provisional municipal government.³¹ The Citizens’ Assembly remained in place, in order to guard the implementation of radical reforms. The lawyer Joost Roms-winckel opened the meeting. In his speech, he emphasized the need for citizens to maintain vigilant control of the activities of the municipality, “which *without* your great influence, *without* your powerful support, *without* your unending assistance, will only lead to weak, insignificant measures.”³²

The speed and ease with which the old order in Leiden was overturned was a result of the strong roots of local opposition to the stadtholderly regime, going back even before the Patriot revolution of the mid-1780s. The decline of manufacturing industries that was a general feature of the Dutch economy of this period was felt with particular intensity in this formerly prosperous center of the Dutch textile trade. Unemployment was exceptionally high, and about one quarter of the population at some point was dependent on poor relief.³³ Anti-Orangism had also penetrated the upper middle classes. Several of the curators and professors at the Leiden University had been known for their Patriot sympathies.³⁴ This longer history certainly had an influence on the formation of a Batavian radical leadership in the post-1795 period. The prominent Leiden Patriot Pieter Vreede, a democrat and abolitionist, became the main spokesperson of the radical wing of the National Convention. Both Willem van Lelyveld and Pieter Hendrik Trap, among those arrested in January 1797, came from families that were tied to the earlier opposition movement. Van Lelyveld came from a prominent regent family that included various known Patriots.³⁵ Trap’s mother had published the weekly *MOEI-AL* (“The Meddler”), containing blistering attacks on aristocratic government at the height of Orangist counter-revolution in 1790.³⁶

These strong antecedents also help explain why the Leiden radicals from the very start viewed their local activities in the light of a nation-wide revolution. In the very first months of its activities, the newly formed Revolutionary Committee of Insurrection defined its task as to “help in the work of effecting the revolution to our Brothers, both in the vicinity of our city and in various cities and villages, yes, in other parts of the Republic.”³⁷ Meanwhile, the Committee of Public Safety that convened on 19 January took concerted action within the town limits. Within two days, it elected a secretary, formed two armed companies, placed an officer of the old regime under house arrest, authorized the use of force in disarming the civil militia if the need arose, and ordered the city watchman to no longer blow the Orangist anthem on his trumpet.³⁸ The primary task of the Committee was a military one, but it also monitored the food supplies to the city population and garrisoned soldiers, market prices of basic goods, and conflicts between Leiden inhabitants and French soldiers.³⁹

Initially, the committee also was responsible for snuffing out former functionaries of the Orangist regime, but responsibility for purging local government soon was transferred to a separate committee.⁴⁰ Like elsewhere, conflicts between radicals and moderates soon emerged. One of the first questions around which this happened was who would have the right to vote. Radicals such as Romswinkel argued for extending voting rights to servants and the poor. The argument for excluding them from the vote was that only “independent” citizens – meaning people with property – could have a true stake in the future of the nation, and could be trusted not to deliver it back into the hands of tyranny. As counter-evidence, Romswinkel’s radical colleague Meerburg asked for the inclusion in the debates of Bernardus Bosch’ 1793 pamphlet.⁴¹ As part of his argument for a thorough democratization that should lay the foundation for a new unified national state, the fierce abolitionist Bosch had argued that excluding servants from the vote was the equivalent of relegating them to a position of slavery.⁴² Remarkably given the later course of Leiden events, this pamphlet also contained a warning that even universal suffrage would not suffice for keeping elected representatives on a clear revolutionary course. Therefore, Bosch proposed the erection of a separate, permanent assembly to control a future National Convention, “consisting mainly of neighborhood councilors or hundred-men, again elected by the people.” Only such a permanent form of direct representation could ensure the “OPPERMAGT DES VOLKS,” the supreme power of the people.⁴³

However, on the issue of suffrage the radicals suffered a defeat. Women, men on poor relief and servants were all excluded from the vote, just as “bankrupts under guardianship, those who were dishonorably sentenced, prisoners and suspects.”⁴⁴ Since about a quarter of the population at times was dependent on poor relief and servants formed one of the largest professional groups within the city, this meant that effectively a majority of the working class was disenfranchised.⁴⁵ A second proposal by the radicals to elect all officials at the municipal level directly from the Neighborhood Councils was also blocked.⁴⁶

Radical attempts to influence the course of the revolution on the municipal level and the nature of local democracy were fueled by a stream of popular petitions, that also covered social and economic issues. Serious conflicts arose over the redistribution of offices and the punishment of former Orangist regents. The Citizens’ Assembly in the *Markerk* more than once demanded firmer action. Already on 24 March 1795 it sent a proposal initiated by one of the radical societies to the municipality, demanding a freeze on all but the indispensable nominations of new officials until a general plan for the cleansing of

local government from Orangist influence had been put into effect.⁴⁷ Similar requests were repeated well into 1797. But it was more militant protest that finally forced the moderates in the Municipality to give in. Public celebrations of another famous moment of popular struggle, the freeing of Leiden from a Spanish siege on 3 October 1583, set the stage. Probably under the influence of Leiden's main radical society, members of the armed militia attacked 70 houses of suspected Orangists. Now, after prevarications that had taken more than two years, a committee was formed to investigate the actions of former Orangist officials. The radical lawyer Romswinkel headed the investigation.

The failed nation-wide assembly of January 1797

Localized revolts combined with French invasion had been enough to replace the old order throughout the Republic. Reorganization of the organs of power at the level of the municipality demanded most of the attention of the radicals in this first period. But once the first National Convention replaced the old States General on 1 March 1796 democratic agitation became more and more focused on the deadlock that developed in national politics. The drafting of a new constitution fueled permanent conflict between radicals and moderates in the Convention that could not agree on the relationship between national, provincial and local organs of power. Meanwhile, revolutionary movements at the local level seemed to have hit a wall. The radical press fumed against "aristocrats" and "slimy fellows" sabotaging the process of reorganizing the state, but revolts in Amsterdam in November 1795 and April 1796 demanding wider popular representation and purges against former Orangists remained unsuccessful.⁴⁸ In Friesland the radicals held power at the provincial level, but were themselves confronted with popular protest against the failure to alleviate the economic hardship suffered by the lower classes, resulting in an uprising in the rural village Kollum early in 1797. To escape from the embarrassment that this caused for their democratic claims, radical administrators described these local rural riots as a Dutch Vendée.⁴⁹ Rumors of a planned British invasion and counter-revolutionary plots were rife. Already in 1796, the leading radicals in the National Convention Pieter Vreede, Bernardus Bosch and Johan Valckenaer called for popular armament against counter-revolution from within and from without. Significantly, they simultaneously sent round a call on Neighborhood Councils to put pressure on the National Convention and thus force the moderates to take concerted action. The majority in the National Convention responded immediately by sending their own call for restraint.⁵⁰

The Leiden initiative to organize the nation-wide assembly should be seen against this background. On 21 December 1796 the Leiden General Citizens' Assembly sent a letter to a large number of Neighborhood Councils and revolutionary societies throughout the country.⁵¹ The letter contained an invitation to elect delegates to a meeting that should take place on 18 or 19 January of the next year, the second anniversary of the revolution, in the old building of the Leiden civic militia. The aim of this gathering was "to form one Assembly of representatives in which the People, as it were, could speak with one mouth, [...] so that Growth and Prosperity could be advanced and established throughout the entire Republic, with united strength."⁵² The proclamation was signed by three Leiden democrats, H. Boonacker, J. C. Harnisch and P. H. Trap.⁵³ It was not the first time that radicals organized a gathering of revolutionary clubs across municipal or provincial borders.⁵⁴

But this time, they consciously styled their initiative a meeting of elected representatives of the local organs of democracy. Implicit in their suggestion that through this assembly the people would speak with one mouth, was the idea that the National Convention was not the real representative of the popular voice. This challenged the foundational claims of the Batavian state, and thus was indeed a revolutionary step.

The Government of the Province of Holland discussed the call for the nation-wide assembly on 14 January. It took immediate action, without observing the common forms of consultation with national and local authorities. The next morning, the Leiden citizens Trap, Lelyveld, Van Lil, Van Tricht and Van Klaaveren were apprehended. Explaining this course of action some months after the events, an investigative commission of the Provincial Government stressed:

[...] one should be willingly blind, when refusing to see that this letter [...] had as its aim to form an Assembly that very soon would have challenged this Government, yes, if it would have been possible would even have wrestled from it the power, entrusted to it by the People of Holland.⁵⁵

Two days later, provincial authorities tried to arrest Trap's two co-signers of the proclamation Boonacker and Harnish in the same fashion. However, the bailiff did not find them at home. Instead, at the door of one of the two fugitives an unknown person yelled "a large number of rude and immodest qualifications" at them.⁵⁶ A later statement by the bailiff himself revealed that these "rude qualifications" had consisted of the charge "that his actions were in contradiction with the rights of Man, and violated Civil liberties."⁵⁷

As soon as the president of the Leiden Municipality heard about the arrest, he called for an emergency meeting. Despite the differences in political outlook among the representatives, they condemned the actions of the provincial authorities. In their declaration, they foregrounded not the revolutionary aims of the proposed Assembly of Neighborhood Councils, but the infringement on local jurisdiction committed by the Provincial Government. They described the actions of the Province as:

[...] an actual assault on the Security of this Community and a supremely criminal violation of the right of all Free Citizens, without prior knowledge of any member of the Municipal Government, Minister, or anyone else, let alone with proper consent of the Committee of Public Interest, or a competent judge; an act, so contemptuous to this Council, that it directly contradicts the lawful rights that not only this municipality, but the entire people has possessed since ancient times.⁵⁸

The City Council decided on three points. First, it promised to do everything in its power to ensure the release of the five arrested citizens. Second, it promised full protection to H. Boonacker and J. C. Harnish. "The council will not allow that in the future any of the citizens of this Municipality will be stolen," except when the Leiden Committee of Public Interest had given its prior consent.⁵⁹ Finally, it made military preparations, in case the province would want to secure further arrests by sending troops. These measures were backed by popular mobilization, aimed at protecting the autonomy of the city against outside intrusion. The anonymous Orangist diarist that was previously cited, reported: "Early in the morning, one could hear that all those freshly converted patriotic citizens were up in arms and stood at the city gates."⁶⁰

Representatives of the General Citizens' Assembly came to the meeting of the Municipality and presented a letter in which they complained about "the violated rights of Men

and Citizens,” and “requested resolute cooperation of our good representatives so that our five apprehended fellow-citizens can promptly return to the bosom of their fellow-citizens.”⁶¹ The representatives were not received cordially. Signifying the unwillingness of the majority within the municipality to be seen too much as the handmaidens of the radicals, the letter was not even taken into formal deliberation.⁶² Instead, it installed an investigative committee that would judge the legality of the actions of the Province, as well as the proposed nation-wide assembly of Neighborhood Councils.⁶³

The investigation did not last long. The following day, the commission – consisting of the moderates Van Santen and Akersloot – reported its recommendations, which reflected the position taken by the municipality. On the one hand, Van Santen and Akersloot insisted on the release of the Leiden citizens. The provincial authorities quickly heeded their request. On the other hand, they suggested that the Assembly of Neighborhood Councils should be prohibited. Without much discussion, the municipal government agreed to both points. It sent a new letter to the Provincial Government, in which it clearly adopted the dramatic style of the radicals:

Now, when the aristocracy has been defeated and freedom has triumphed, you dare to undertake this action that supersedes those of our former tyrants in brazenness! Remember, fellow citizens, that all rule of terror is of such nature, that in order to remain standing, it needs more and more victims.⁶⁴

But despite the harsh language, the moderates in municipal government had profited politically from the actions by the provincial authorities. Given the substantial support that the radicals could still muster among the city population, the Leiden moderates in all likelihood would not have had the power to suppress the Nation-wide Assembly of Neighborhood Councils itself. Thanks to the actions of the Provincial authorities, the threatening radical initiative had been sunk, while the municipal moderates could at the same time present themselves as the staunch defenders of civil liberties against “tyranny.” Avoiding a direct confrontation with the influential Leiden General Citizens’ Assembly, they had managed to steal the radicals’ thunder by making the popular slogan of the “restauration of local autonomy” the only significant political demand following the arrests.

Resonance

The events that took place in Leiden were of national significance. On 16 January the National Convention heard its first report on the issue. Without delay, a commission was installed to judge on the political implications of the proposals of the Leiden radicals. The inclusion of the prominent representatives Van de Kastelee, Schimmelpenninck and Van Lennep in this commission shows how much weight the National Convention attached to this case. On the next day, Van Lennep presented their findings. They contained an unequivocal condemnation of the planned assembly, “for such a meeting already included in its name, that it was a representative assembly, which could create the most dangerous confusions and clashes.”⁶⁵ Several of the radical representatives protested this claim. Like Bernardus Bosch and the Leiden radicals, they argued that an assembly elected directly from the neighborhood councils could be a necessary means to put pressure from below on the National Convention and prevent a relapse of the state into federalism and aristocratic government. “How disastrous would the situation be of a

People, that is not allowed to meet in order to discuss its weightiest interests?," asked representative Nuhout van der Veen. And the leading Friesland radical C. L. van Beyma declared that the National Convention "would need the support from the People," suggesting that without popular backing, it lacked "courage and power."⁶⁶

The moderate leader Schimmelpenninck retorted in kind. He repeated that the revolution was in safe hands with the elected representatives, and that interference from below could only lead to anarchy and confusion:

It is about time to show the entire world that, on the one side, we will do everything in order to complete this Revolution with all our Republican energy, and will offer to the people a Constitution on the basis of the pure principles of a Popular Government through representation, but on the other side that we will counter with great resolution the principles of Anarchy and Demagoguery, in whatever lovely shape they might appear.⁶⁷

Not to do so, Schimmelpenninck added, would result in civil war.⁶⁸

The leading Leiden radical Pieter Vreede responded with equal intransigence. Unlike many of the other radicals in the Convention, he did not even attempt to prove that the Leiden proposal fell within the existing framework of legality. For "as long as the [new Batavian] Constitution is not accepted, we are still in Revolutionary times, and as a result, it is the Laws of Revolution, not constitutionality, according to which we should assess the actions of our fellow citizens."⁶⁹ Vreede continued to compare the Leiden initiative with the actions of Citizens' Assemblies that in 1785–1787 and 1795 had played such an important role in the struggle against the old order, thus indirectly comparing the moderates in the National Convention with the deposed Orangists. It was the lack of decisive action of the Convention that forced ordinary citizens to seek their own ways to push the revolution further.

Oh, let us condemn ourselves, that we spur them on to such irregular actions! That the lukewarm ways in which all the powers that represent the People in positions of authority treat the interest of Freedom makes the People depressed and drives it to despair; that the open protection that almost everywhere is given to the supporters of the House of Orange, and the repression with which they face the patriots at last begins to exhaust the People's patience.⁷⁰

After these words, the minutes of the session note that the applause from the public gallery was so loud that Pieter Vreede could no longer make himself heard. Confusion followed, in which some representatives demanded that the military empty the hall, under loud protest of others. After this intermission, the report of the commission was put to the vote. A majority of 78 representatives voted in favor, 24 voted against and 6 abstained. The next day, the French Ambassador to the Batavian Republic Noël wrote to Paris that the National Convention had taken resolute action in an incident that he deemed "assez important."⁷¹ But the debates had also revealed the depth of the political differences in the Assembly that remained unresolved until a radical coup on 22 January 1798 ousted the moderates from the Assembly.

Despite the intensity of the debate, at this point the conflict did not move beyond verbal confrontation. One of the reasons for this was that although the Leiden radicals received much moral support for their actions, practical actions remained purely confined within the city limits. Messages of support were addressed to the Leiden municipal government, and focused completely on the issue of the violation of local autonomy. They conspicuously failed to mention the proposed Nation-wide Assembly of Neighborhood Councils that had

been the cause of the riot. It is remarkable that the first letter of support that came in, on 19 January was sent by the moderate Municipality of Delft and mainly expressed its joy that the provincial attack on local jurisdiction had been thwarted.⁷² The Municipality of Zoetermeer sent a comparable message.⁷³ More importantly though, even the declarations sent to Leiden by radical associations from other parts of the country did not mention the proposal of Trap and the other radicals. The “Correspondence Commission of the Gathering of Representatives of Batavian Clubs and associated Popular Societies” wrote in a letter to the “sincere and courageous Council of the City of Leiden”:

We are touched – Yes! we would insult both your courage and our own feelings, if we would not express our emotions about your actions against the Holland Provincial Committee in the case of the citizens Lelyvelt & Trap; [...] We citizens of Amsterdam, members of Batavian clubs, do not only completely endorse your actions in this case, but affirm that our hearts beat for you at double speed.⁷⁴

The Citizens’ Society at Schiedam, the members of the “Assembly with the Slogan Courageous but Collected,” the “Association of Exiled and Persecuted Patriots at Amsterdam” and the “Batavian Club-ists” all sent similarly worded messages to the Leiden Municipality – the Batavian Club-ists even sent two.⁷⁵ The Leiden General Citizens’ Assembly in its proclamation did not include any criticism of the municipality’s suppression of its own initiative.⁷⁶ Trap and Lelyvelt sent a small note expressing their gratefulness for the municipality’s support for their release, again avoiding any mention of the cause of their arrest. They did however add their wish that “we soon may see the Altar of Freedom established on the Ruins of Aristocracy and Avarice.”⁷⁷

Aftermath

A little over a month after the Leiden events, an anonymous satirical pamphlet described the political fallout. Clearly marking the author as an adversary of the radicals, the pamphlet was dressed up as “a letter of a Jacobin revolutionary citizen to his friend.”⁷⁸ The Leiden radicals were portrayed as cunning knaves who were only after their own interests. The call for the Nation-wide Assembly supposedly was a calculated attempt to provoke the “slimy fellows” of the Provincial Government. Compromising the moderates at the provincial level would open the way to execute the radical’s sinister plans for a general purge. As the feigned Leiden Jacobin writes in his letter, the hidden intention of this scheme was to get all the radicals “a nice job in office.”⁷⁹

The Leiden affair had discredited the moderate Provincial Government. However, according to the anonymous author, this had been a close call: “if this would have gone wrong as well we could have rolled up our camp-beds, and our entire Revolutionary System would not have been worth as much as a single oilseed cake.”⁸⁰ However, the “Jacobins” had been rescued by the blunders of their own adversaries:

We were afraid like devils, I say, that nobody except us would open their mouths, and then it would have been over. But how lucky we were! We shouted, and the slimy fellows helped us shout. They have made themselves truly useful. They shouted even louder than we did. The members of the Provincial Government will now be sent packing, and we sing Victory! Victory! Vive la République!⁸¹

But the real radicals of 1797 did not feel so triumphant. More than anything, they saw the rising influence of the moderates in national politics, and feared that this would translate

in the nature of the new constitution. In July, one leading proponent of the Nation-wide Assembly, Pieter Trap, published an important pamphlet in which a group of radical representatives, including Vreede, Van Beyma and Bosch, rejected the majority proposal for the new constitution. Among other points, they rejected the indirect system of elections of representatives in the National Convention.

A People's Government is, in the truest meaning of the word, a Government, executed by the People itself. And a People's Government by representation is one, in which the People rules through its own Representatives. But how could we call such a People's Government by representation, if the People itself has been excluded from all influence over Government; when the People remains that old beast of burden, driven here and there by a handful, without any self-activity?⁸²

If the possibility of self-activity was not provided through constitutional means, the only alternative for the people would be to make itself heard through "a revolutionary outburst of its physical power." According to the authors, such an act would be fully justified:

[...] or would it be without example in these times, that the politicians would hold for revolt, what the good Citizen holds for nothing else than resistance against oppression? Should we commemorate here the recent events in Amsterdam, Leiden, and the things that happened to one hundred other individuals in almost all the Provinces?⁸³

But the events in Leiden and the revolts in Amsterdam had not only shown the opposition of moderate municipal and provincial governments against attempts at influencing the course of the revolution through popular mobilization. They had also laid bare the structural inability of the radicals to force a breakthrough in national politics through actions from below. When their initiatives had been blocked by the Holland Provincial Government, radicals inside and outside Leiden had done little more than cheer their own moderate municipal government, while the moderates had successfully contained the popular response to the politically safe framework of the defense of local autonomy.

During the summer of 1797, the radicals achieved their most significant political victory. With a majority of 108,761 votes against 27,955, the Neighborhood Assemblies rejected a proposal for the new constitution that was supported by the moderates in the National Convention.⁸⁴ However, it remained hard to interpret what this tally meant for the balance of forces on the ground. The process that resulted in the new constitution had been so muddy and so compromised that large numbers of moderates did not support the draft. More importantly, although the rejection of the constitution blocked the way for a resolution of the existing crisis in favor of the moderates, it did not end the impasse in a direction supported by the radicals. Time and time again, attempts by the radicals to reform the state were stranded by their inability to mobilize their support base beyond local and provincial borders. By the summer of 1797 fatigue had set in among the popular movements and the radical faction in the National Assembly. Meanwhile, the French were turning to a more interventionist course toward their "sister republics." The coup in France of 18 Fructidor of year V (4 September 1797) seemed to open up a new road for the radical Batavians.⁸⁵ The combination of the appointment of the new French ambassador Charles-François Delacroix and support of the military commander Daendels provided the radicals in the National Assembly with the opportunity to take power. In important ways, the successful coup that a select group of radicals executed on 22 January 1798 signified a definitive breach between the democratic elements of

radical Batavianism on the one side, and their focus on rationalizing and unifying the state from above on the other. After the coup, the Neighborhood Councils were purged of supporters of the moderates, only to be relegated a mere secondary role in the process of reforming the state. Their task was confined to execute decisions taken by the new directorate. Increasingly distrustful of its own popular base, the radical regime, in which Pieter Vreede played a leading role, quelled local revolts and dismantled popular committees and revolutionary societies.⁸⁶

Conclusion

The authoritarian turn of the radical leaders after 22 January 1798 has often led later historians to off-handedly dismiss their democratic pretensions of the years before.⁸⁷ However, to read the intentions of the radicals backwards in this way leads to conclusions that are one-sided at best, and more often are plainly mistaken about the complex interplay between revolutionary dynamics at the local and the national level. Instead, this article proposes to see the changing approach to the relationship between democracy and the struggle against federalism among leading Batavian radicals as the outcome of a very real clash between the ideal of radical and democratic unification on the one side, and the localized nature of radical popular mobilization on the other. This political problem reflected wider tensions between the sweeping success of the ideal of the national state as it was envisioned in the new French constitutions on the one hand, and on the other hand the strong traditions of revolt focused on the defense of local autonomy.

This article has suggested that the difficulties that radical Batavians experienced in advancing their ideals of a democratic national state at least in part resulted from the fact that among their own rank and file support base, patterns of mobilization remained highly localized. When faced with determined conservative resistance, the radicals themselves reframed their struggle in terms of the defense of ancient local rights. In this, they were not unique. The Leiden events form a microscopic example of the often contradictory relationship between popular struggles to defend local autonomy and the visions of a strong, rational and unified state among revolutionary elites that, in different and often more significant forms emerged in all the key struggles of the Age of Revolutions. Pierre Serna has suggested that all revolutions contain important elements of a war of independence. However, seen from the height of the national state, the ultimate aim of revolutionizing the existing state apparatus was often the far-reaching subjection of formally autonomous regions or polities. Popular democratic movements took shape within this contradictory force-field.

The Leiden initiative of January 1797 was significant for what it represented, as well as for the relative ease with which it was swept aside. As the article has shown, the idea that popular assemblies elected directly through the lowest rungs of the electoral system could function as driving force for the revolution, was deeply seated in the radical interpretation of the nature of representative democracy itself. As such, it was connected to the attempts that started immediately after the installation of the Batavian Republic to extend (male) suffrage to the widest possible layer of people, and to counter the moderate and federalist wing of Batavian democracy at the local and the national level. During the first years of the revolution, radical societies, neighborhood councils and lower-class constituencies often

coordinated their actions to further their demands. However, most of the time such coordination remained highly localized. The Leiden call for a nation-wide assembly was a serious attempt to muster these same forces on a supra-regional level, in order to change the course of the revolution itself. The ease with which the provincial authorities suppressed this attempt, as well as the success of moderates at the municipal level in diverting protest against this suppression in the direction of the politically more limited demand of the defense of local autonomy, lays bare one of the structural weaknesses of Batavian radicalism.

Notes

1. The text of the call for this meeting is included in *Dagverhaal*, Vol. IV, 486.
2. *Ibid.*, 520.
3. For an overview of the political programs advanced by competing groups, see Van Sas, "Scenario's," and Poell, "Local Particularism."
4. For a detailed case-study of local revolutionary struggles that highlights this issue, see Prak, *Republikeinse veelheid*. A longer-term view on the complex relationship between local and national social movements in the Low Countries is provided in Boone and Prak "Rulers, Patriots and Burghers."
5. Palmer, *Age of Democratic Revolution* II, 179–180. The view that the Batavian Revolution was primarily a French export-product at that time was still deeply ingrained in Dutch national historiography, especially through the work of H.T. Colebrander, e.g., Colenbrander, *De Bataafsche Republiek*. The influential Dutch historian Pieter Geyl had argued before Palmer that the Batavian Revolution was homegrown, but refused to extend this generosity to Batavian radicalism. Pieter Geyl, "De Bataafse revolutie," 106–127.
6. Palmer, *Age* II, 192. For a recent re-interpretation of the impact of the crisis of the old regime on revolutionary state-formation after 1795, see Brandon, *War*, Chapter 5.
7. An early attempt by C.H.E. de Wit to portray the Patriot and Batavian Revolutions of the 1780s and 1790s as a clash between "aristocracy and democracy" along a model derived directly from Palmer did not find many followers. De Wit, *De strijd*. For the new approaches that have emerged since then, see Grijzenhout, Van Sas and Velema, eds., *Het Bataafse experiment*.
8. Serna, "Every Revolution."
9. James, *Black Jacobins*.
10. Forrest, *Paris, the Provinces*, especially Chapter 8.
11. For example, see Klooster and Oostindie, *Curaçao*; Fatah-Black, "Patriot;" Van der Burg, "Cape of Good Hope."
12. Brandon, *War*, Chapter 5 and Poell, "Local Particularism."
13. Rutjes, *Gelijkheid*, 31.
14. Lucas, "Plakkaat van Verlatinghe." For American influence on the Patriots, also see Leeb, *Ideological Origins*, and Schama, *Patriots and liberators*.
15. For the concrete routes through which the French debates filtered into Batavian politics, see Rosendaal, *Bataven!*, Jourdan, *La Révolution Batave*, and Kubben, *Regeneration and Hegemony*.
16. Bosch, *Vrijhart*, 12.
17. Van Sas, *Metamorphose*, 109–112; Rutjes, *Gelijkheid*, 36–39.
18. Te Brake, "Popular Politics," 201.
19. See Schama, *Patriots and Liberators*, 178, and Rosendaal, *Nederlandse Revolutie*, 97.
20. Poell, "Bataafs-Franse Tijd," 451.
21. Kuiper, *Revolutie ontrafeld*, 61.
22. Cited in Brugmans, *Amsterdam* V, 25.
23. Brugmans, *Amsterdam* V, 27 and Jourdan, "La république Batave," 413–415.
24. Paape, *Onverbloemde geschiedenis*, 200.
25. "Staatkundig woordenboek," *De Democraten*, no. 30, 15 December 1796.

26. *Nodige ophelderingen, ter Beantwoording der tegen bedenkingen, op het plan, ter oprichting van algemeene wijk-vergaderingen in de stad Amsterdam. Voorgedragen in de burger-bijeenkomst, onder de spreuk: Tot nut van het vaderland* (1795), 10; Koninklijke Bibliotheek The Hague [hereafter KB], Knuttel Catalogus no. 18425.
27. A more detailed description of the course of Year One in Leiden is provided in Walle, "Revolutie in Leiden."
28. Blok, *Hollandsche stad*. Vol. IV, 386.
29. Ingekomen rapport van de commissie tot de telling en verdeling van het volk van Holland, 1796, GAL, SA II 501A, no. 898. Gemeente Archief Leiden [hereafter GAL], SA II 501A, no. 898.
30. Driessen, *Franschen Tijd*, 5.
31. The institution of neighborhood councils was not new, which explains why it proved such a natural step everywhere to convene them at the start of the revolution. However, pre-existing neighborhood organizations in no way had played the highly politicized role that the new neighborhood councils would play in the Batavian representative system. Walle, *Buurthouden*, 68–70 and 118–122.
32. Romswinkel, *Aanspraak*, 35.
33. De Vries and Van der Woude, *Nederland*, 339.
34. Van Maanen, "Leidse Patriotten," 251 and Blok, *Hollandsche Stad*, Vol. IV, 345.
35. Van Maanen, "Leidse Patriotten," 247.
36. Trap, "Patriot en stadsdrukker," 58.
37. Ingekomen stukken bij de provisionele raad 1795–1809, 19 January 1795–18 February 1795, GAL, SA II 501A, no. 586.
38. Notulen en bijlagen van het Committé van Algemeene Veiligheid, 1795, 19 January 1795, GAL, SA II 501A, no. 632.
39. Ingekomen stukken bij het Committé van Algemeene Veiligheid, 1795, GAL, SA II 501A, no. 688, and Minuten van uitgaande stukken van het Committé van Algemeene Veiligheid, met bijlagen, 1795, GAL, SA II 501A, no. 709.
40. Bijlagen bij de notulen van het Committé van Algemeene Veiligheid, 25 March – 26 May 1795, no. 6, GAL, SA II 501A, no. 667.
41. Notulen van een samengestelde commissie uit de raad en de burgerij ter organisatie van de grondvergaderingen, 1795. GAL, SA II 501A, no. 893, Annex 10.
42. Bosch, *Vrijhart*, 9–10.
43. Ibid., 28. Capitals in the original.
44. Blok, *Hollandsche Stad*, Vol. IV, 51.
45. A mid-eighteenth century survey counted 2,136 servants on a working population of 12,088. Of course many of them were women, who were excluded from voting all together. Diederiks, "Beroepsstructuur," 47.
46. Blok, *Hollandsche Stad*, Vol. IV, 49.
47. Ibid.
48. Jourdan, "Amsterdam en révolution," 23–30.
49. Kuiper, *Revolutie ontrafeld*, 256ff.
50. *Voorlichting aan de Grondvergaderingen, indien die moeten raadpleegen over het voorstel ter Nationale Vergadering gedaan, tot uitbreiding van derzelver magt* (Arnhem 1796), KB, Knuttel Catalogus no. 22700.
51. Blok, *Hollandsche Stad*, Volume IV, 55.
52. The integral text was read in the National Convention on 16 January 1797. *Dagverhaal*, Vol. IV, 486.
53. Ibid., 488.
54. Rosendaal, *Nederlandse Revolutie*, 98–99.
55. *Rapport der Personeele Commissie op het berigt van het Provinciaal Committé enz. mitsgaders het request van P.H. Trap c.s.* (The Hague 1797) 3; KB, Knuttel Catalogus no. 22930.
56. "Advies van den Advocaat Fiscaal en Procureur Generaal over Holland en Zeeland, in de zaken van P.H. Trap, G. van Klaveren Junior, J. van Trig, J. van Lil en W. van Lelyveld," 21 January 1797, *Jaarboeken der Bataafsche Republiek* X, 163–164.

57. Ibid., 179.
58. Notulen van de Municipaliteit, Volume 1, 16 January 1797. GAL, SA II 501A, no. 552.
59. Ibid.
60. Driessen, *Franschen Tijd*, 21.
61. Notulen van de Municipaliteit, Volume 1, 17 January 1797, No. 46. GAL, SA II 501A, no. 552.
62. Ibid.
63. Ibid.
64. Ibid., 18 January 1797.
65. *Dagverhaal*, Vol. IV, 513.
66. Ibid., 517.
67. Ibid., 520.
68. Ibid.
69. Ibid., 520–521.
70. Ibid., 522.
71. Noël to Delacroix, 29 nivôse an V (18 January 1797), in: Colenbrander, *Gedenkstukken*, Vol. II, 88.
72. Notulen van de Municipaliteit, Volume 1, 19 January 1797. GAL, SA II 501A, no. 552.
73. Ibid., no. 65.
74. Ibid., no. 59.
75. Ibid., 31 January 1797 and 10 February 1797, no. 66.
76. Ibid., 7 February 1797, no. 72.
77. Ibid., no. 67.
78. *Vryheid, Gelykheid en Broederschap. Brief van een' Jacobynsch revolutionair burger, aan zynen vriend* (z.p. 1797), KB, Knuttel-catalogus nr. 22907.
79. Ibid., 2.
80. Ibid., 3.
81. Ibid., 5.
82. *Beoordeeling van het ontwerp van constitutie voor het Bataafsche volk enz., door eenige burgers, zynde repraesentanten van het volk van Nederland* (Leiden 1797) 3, KB, Knuttel Catalogus no. 22864.
83. Ibid., 5.
84. Schama, *Patriots and Liberators*, 269.
85. Jourdan, "La république Batave," 758.
86. Kuiper, *Revolutie ontrafeld*, 418, 430.
87. Geyl, "De Bataafse Revolutie," 122–123; Kuiper, *Revolutie Ontrafeld*, 508–509, 519.

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