0. Introduction

In the standard GB-approach (cf. Chomsky 1981) binding theory (henceforth BT) offers an explanation of the distribution of PRO. The interpretation of PRO is left to control theory. In this article we shall argue that PRO is best analyzed as an anaphor with respect to its binding properties, i.e. that BT identifies PRO by binding it to an antecedent in a local domain. In section 3 we shall present an alternative account of the distribution of PRO. We shall argue that the distribution of PRO can be made to follow from a representational theory of empty categories. This theory is discussed in more detail in Hoekstra & Bennis (this volume).

1. The distribution and interpretation of PRO; the PRO-theorem

The standard GB-account of the distribution of PRO runs as follows: PRO has properties of both anaphors and pronominals; it can thus be characterized as a pronominal anaphor; this characterization rests on an apparent contradiction since anaphors are bound within their governing category, whereas pronominals are free within the same domain; this contradiction is resolved if we assume that PRO is ungoverned; if PRO is ungoverned, it has no governing category and the requirement that PRO be both bound and free in its governing category is vacuously satisfied; from this account it follows that the distribution of PRO is limited to ungoverned positions, such as the subject position of most infinitival clauses. This account of the distribution of PRO, generally known as the PRO-theorem, is appealing since the distribution of PRO is made to follow from the independently motivated BT. However, the major problem is the paradox that the interpretation of PRO cannot be made to follow from BT. Although the binding properties of PRO constituted the starting point of the PRO-theorem, these properties cannot be accounted for in BT, given that PRO is considered as a pronominal anaphor. It has often been observed that PRO has several properties which are characteristic of anaphors (cf. Koster 1984, Lebeaux 1985, Manzini 1983, Williams 1980). Relevant properties of the antecedent are: c-command, obligatoriness and locality. These properties are illustrated in (1).

1. (a) John_i tries [PRO_j to go home]
   (b) [The father of John_i] tries [PRO_j to go home]
   (c) John_i tries to force Bill_j [PRO_j to go home]

If PRO were to be treated as an anaphor these properties would follow directly from BT. If the interpretation of PRO is removed from BT as a consequence of its status of pronominal anaphor, we have to assume that another module is able to account for the properties in (1). In general it is held that control theory accounts for the interpretation of PRO. We are now faced with an undesirable redundancy in the theory. Control theory has to copy a substantial part of BT in order to account for the interpretation of PRO. From this we may conclude that the PRO-theorem is able to provide an explanation of the distribution of PRO, but is faced with the problem that no conditions on the interpretation of PRO may be derived from BT.
If we drop the characterization of PRO as a pronominal anaphor, we may account for the interpretation of PRO in terms of BT. On the other hand, we then have to provide an alternative account of the distribution of PRO. We will adopt this approach here for two reasons. First, applying BT to the interpretation of PRO has interesting consequences and removes the redundancy between BT and control theory. Secondly, we do not need to make reference to the notion of government in the account of the distribution of PRO.

2. The interpretation of PRO; PRO as an anaphor

Several linguists have argued that PRO is or can be an anaphor. Williams (1980) and Koster (1984) argue for a distinction between obligatory control and non-obligatory control. They take PRO in the obligatory control configuration to be an anaphor. Manzini (1983) and Lebeaux (1985) take PRO to be an anaphor in all the constructions they discuss. They extend the theory in such a way that BT allows a correct interpretation. In this section we will argue that it is possible to consider PRO to be an anaphor in all instances and that we do not have to revise the theory in order to be able to let BT determine the domain of interpretation of PRO. Since for independent reasons government does not play a significant role in our theory, we will define principle A of BT as in (2). 1

(2) Principle A of the Binding Theory
   a. An anaphor must be bound in its binding category
   b. A category A is a binding category for B iff
      A is the minimal maximal projection which contains B and an opacity factor different from B
   c. Opacity factors are subject and [+finite] 2

The definition in (2) is in no significant way different from existing proposals concerning the interpretation of anaphors. It is our claim that this definition is sufficient for the interpretation of PRO. We will restrict our attention in this section to PRO as the subject of infinitival clauses. The definition in (2) allows a straightforward explanation for the facts in (1). The binding category for PRO is the matrix clause, since the matrix clause is the first maximal projection with an opacity factor. The obligatoriness of the antecedent follows from the fact that an anaphor must be bound, the c-command requirement follows from the fact that an anaphor must be bound and the locality requirement follows from the fact that an anaphor must be bound in its binding category. It is important to observe that the anaphoric status of PRO does not determine the interpretation of PRO entirely. BT determines a domain within which PRO should have an antecedent. The actual choice of a particular antecedent within that domain does not belong to BT. This choice is dependent on different kinds of lexical factors, such as the choice of the matrix verb. Unfortunately, there is not much insight into the way in which this selection of antecedent takes place. As is usual, we will refer to this set of properties as the theory of control, although it would be more appropriate to refer to this as the non-theory of control.

In a sentence such as (3a) BT determines that both John and Mary are possible antecedents, but Bill and Sue are not. The distinction between binding and control is confirmed by the fact that another choice of the matrix verb allows us to change the antecedent from Mary in (3a) to John in (3b). Another structure of the infinitival clause results in a similar change of controller, as can be seen from the difference between (3a) and (3c). However, it is not possible to arrive at a construction in which either Bill or Sue are interpreted as the antecedent of PRO by changing the matrix verb or the complement structure.
(3) a. Bill told Sue that John has asked Mary \[\text{PRO}_1\] to go home
    b. Bill told Sue that John has promised Mary \[\text{PRO}_1\] to go home
    c. Bill told Sue that John has asked Mary \[\text{PRO}_1\] to be allowed to go home

This indicates that within the domain determined by BT, control further restricts the choice of antecedent. This interpretation of control allows us to extend the domain of control to other cases of binding. In many respects the situation in (4) is similar to the situation in (3).

(4) De leraren vertelden de ouders dat de jongens de meisjes naar elkaars oordelen vroegen
    The teachers told the parents that the boys asked the girls for each others judgements

In (4) BT dictates that neither the teachers nor the parents can be the antecedent of each other. Within the subordinate clause both the boys and the girls are potential antecedents, even if the girls is to be taken as the actual antecedent in (4). We may consider this to be a case of object control.

We will now consider a number of objections to the interpretation of PRO in the way indicated above.

a) It has been suggested that there exists a difference between the interpretation of PRO and the interpretation of lexical anaphors: whereas the choice of an antecedent for a lexical anaphor is free within the binding category, the choice of an antecedent for PRO is uniquely determined. There are two ways to argue against this difference: one may either show that the interpretation of PRO is not as uniquely determined as claimed or that the selection of an antecedent for lexical anaphors is not as free as is claimed. Both lines of argument are in fact applicable. First, the antecedent of PRO is either an object, a subject or both, depending on either the matrix verb or the infinitival complement. This is shown in (5).

(5) a. Jan, belooft Marie, \[\text{PRO}_1\] naar huis te gaan
    Joh\n promises Marie to house to go
    'John promises Marie to go home'
    b. Jan, dwingt Marie, \[\text{PRO}_1\] naar huis te gaan
    Joh\n forces Marie to house to go
    c. Jan, stelt Marie, voor \[\text{PRO}_1\] naar huis te gaan
        Joh\n proposes Marie to house to go
    d. Jan, belooft Marie, \[\text{PRO}_1\] naar huis te mogen gaan
        Joh\n promises Marie to house to may go

The sentences in (5) do not argue for a unique determination of the antecedent of PRO. Similarly, we saw in (4) that with lexical anaphors the selection of the antecedent is not completely free either. We may conclude from this that there is no real difference between lexical anaphors and PRO in the determination of their antecedent.

b) It is evident that there are constructions in which there is no lexical antecedent for PRO. This so-called arbitrary PRO appears to be a very strong argument against a theory in which PRO is always an anaphor. Some examples are given in (6).

(6) a. Het is leuk om PRO een boek te lezen
    It is nice for a book to read
    'It is nice to read a book'
    b. Er wordt geprobeerd om PRO de deur open te maken
    There is tried for the door open to make
    'Someone tries to open the door'
We will argue that in these cases PRO is bound by an implicit argument in the matrix clause. This implies that we extend the class of potential antecedents to implicit, non-lexical arguments. In order to motivate this position, there are again two strategies. First, we will show that there are indications that it is indeed a non-lexical argument that is the antecedent of PRO. Next we will show that lexical anaphors can be bound by implicit arguments as well. In the sentences in (6) the implicit argument of the adjective/passive participle can be added in a PP, as in (7).

(7) a. Het is leuk voor mij om PRO een boek te lezen
   It is nice for me for a book to read
   There is by me tried for the door open to make

b. Er wordt door mij geprobeerd om PRO de deur open te maken
   There is by me tried for the door open to make

It is clear that in these sentences PRO is obligatorily bound by the NP in the added PP, mij. If the sentences in (6) really involve arbitrary PRO, it is completely unexpected that the addition of an optional PP turns the sentence into a configuration of obligatory control. Moreover, the interpretation is not always influenced by the addition of a PP, as is shown in the sentence in (8).

(8) Er wordt voor mij geprobeerd om PRO de deur open te maken
   There is for me tried for the door open to make

Although a PP is added to (6b), PRO is not interpreted as bound by mij. The difference between (6) and (7) and between (8) and (7) is that the implicit argument of the adjective/participle is lexically absent in (6) and (8), but lexically present in a PP in (7). The interpretation of PRO in (6)-(8) can be accounted for quite easily if we allow implicit arguments to bind anaphors. This interpretation remains a mystery in a theory in which arbitrary PRO is allowed. An additional argument for the idea that the implicit argument is actually the antecedent of PRO in (6) can be derived from the ungrammaticality of the sentences in (9) (cf. Hoekstra & Wehmann 1985).

(9) a.*Het is waarschijnlijk om PRO morgen naar huis te gaan
   It is probable for tomorrow to go
   (Het is waarschijnlijk dat men morgen naar huis gaat)

b.*Er blijkt om PRO morgen naar huis te gaan
   There appears for tomorrow to go
   (Er blijkt dat men morgen naar huis gaat)

The difference between (6a) and (9a) resides in the type of adjective. Although both adjectives are allowed in a construction with a finite subordinate clause, adjectives of the type leuk (nice), moeilijk (difficult), interessant (interesting), mogelijk (possible) combine with infinitival clauses, whereas adjectives of the type waarschijnlijk (probable), zeker (certain) do not. At the same time the adjectives of the type waarschijnlijk do not combine with a voor-PP, as in (7a). This strongly suggests that these adjectives do not have an implicit argument. Under our approach the ungrammaticality of (9a) is due to the fact that no antecedent, explicit or implicit, is available as an antecedent for PRO. The same explanation can be given for the ungrammaticality of (9b). Impersonal passives such as (6b), have an implicit argument which may bind a PRO subject in an infinitival complement. Raising verbs, such as blijken (appear), do not have an implicit argument. The impossibility of an infinitival CP complement in (9b) then follows from the violation of principle A of the BT. If our approach is correct, we expect that implicit arguments can be the antecedent for lexical anaphors as well. The sentences in (10) illustrate that this situation does indeed occur.
(10) a. Er wordt gerekend op elkaars medewerking
   'People are counting on each others cooperation'
b. Er wordt in kroegen alleen maar over zichzelf gesproken
   'People speak in the pub only about themselves'

Another relevant observation is that this theory directly accounts for the fact that so-called arbitrary PRO seems to have features, such as [+human]. In sentences such as (11) the subject of the infinitival clause is interpreted as human. Since the verb gebeuren (happen) requires a non-human subject, (11b) is ungrammatical.

(11) a. Het is niet leuk om te vallen
   It is not nice for to fall
   (= it is not nice for someone to fall)
b. *Het is mogelijk om tegelijkertijd te gebeuren
   It is possible for simultaneously to happen

In our view this property follows from the fact that the implicit argument of an adjective, such as leuk or mogelijk, is human for the reason that only human beings have the capacity to evaluate. In a theory in which (11a) contains an arbitrary PRO the human interpretation of PRO is unexpected, since both humans and non-human objects have the capacity to fall. A final argument in favour of the analysis presented here concerns the fact that there is no expletive PRO. We do not find sentences such as (12a), although the finite counterpart in (12b) is perfectly acceptable.

(12) a. *Het is leuk om PRO gedanst te worden
       It is nice for danced to be
   b. Het is leuk dat er gedanst wordt
       It is nice that there danced is
       'It is nice that people are dancing'

Under our analysis the impossibility of (12a) follows directly from the fact that PRO is an anaphor. It is clear that there are no expletive implicit arguments. Therefore PRO is interpreted as [+human]. This results in a rather strange interpretation in which people can be danced.

With these observations we have turned an apparent problem for the anaphoric status of PRO into an advantage for our theory. Given that binding by an implicit argument is motivated, the anaphoric status of PRO allows an explanation of a number of otherwise puzzling phenomena.

c) The third potential argument against the anaphoric status of PRO is the lack of strict c-command in (13).

(13) a. Jan vroeg [aan Piet₁] om PRO₁ naar huis te gaan
       John asked to Pete₁ for to house to go
   b. Het is leuk [voor Jan₁] om PRO₁ naar huis te gaan
       It is nice for John₁ for to house to go

The antecedent in (13) is embedded in a PP. In this way the strict c-command requirement on binding is violated. The facts in (13) are problematic only if it can be shown that there is a distinction between binding of lexical anaphors and binding of PRO. However, it is well known that the strict c-command requirement should be relaxed for the binding of lexical anaphors as well. This is illustrated in (14).

(14) Ik sprak [met Piet₁] over zichzelf₁
       I spoke with Peter₁ about himself
d) Another potential argument against the anaphoric status of PRO is the possibility of non-local binding. In a sentence such as (15), the antecedent appears to be outside the binding category of PRO.

(15) Jan, zegt dat het gezond is om PRO₁ te zwemmen
John says that it healthy is for to swim

If the binding relation is indeed as is indicated in (15), this would be a serious problem for our theory. However, it can be shown that there is no direct relation between Jan and PRO in (15). The fact that they can be interpreted as coreferential is due to the fact that Jan can be interpreted as the implicit argument of mogelijk. If we add a non-coreferential implicit argument in a PP or if we replace the adjective mogelijk by waarschijnlijk, which has no implicit argument, the coreference between Jan and PRO becomes impossible. This is illustrated in (16).

(16) a. Jan, zegt dat het voor mij gezond is om PRO₁ te zwemmen
John says that it for me healthy is for to swim

b. Jan, zegt dat het waarschijnlijk is om PRO₁ te zwemmen
John says that it probable is for to swim

If PRO could take a long distance controller, as suggested by (15), the ungrammaticality of (16b) would come as a total surprise. The facts in (16) therefore indicate that there is no non-local binding of PRO.

e) A final potential argument against our analysis is the possibility of split-antecedents. Several matrix verbs (for instance voorstellen (suggest) and aandringen (urge)) allow PRO to be interpreted as the subject and the object of the matrix clause together. This is shown in (17).

(17)a. Jan, stelt Piet voor om PRO₁+Jon met elkaar naar de film te gaan
John suggest Peter for with each other to the movies to go

b. Rusland dringt er bij Amerika op aan om PRO₁+Jon elkaar te vertrouwen
Russia urge America for each other to trust

In the literature the property of split-antecedent is known as a typical pronominal property. Here too, there are ways to approach this argument. Either it is shown that PRO cannot have a split antecedent, or that lexical anaphors may have split antecedents as well. The first strategy is highly implausible since PRO in (17) must be plural as the antecedent of elkaar. Since the matrix clause does not contain a potential plural antecedent we have to assume that PRO has a split antecedent. Therefore, it must be shown that split antecedents may occur with lexical anaphors. The example in (18) shows that the anaphor elkaar can indeed have a split antecedent.

(18) Rusland, drong bij Amerika aan op elkaar’s medeverkering bij het toezicht op ontwapening
Russia urged America for each others cooperation with the supervision of the disarmament

We have thus shown that all arguments against an anaphoric status of PRO and in favour of a pronominal status of PRO can be disputed. Furthermore, we have seen that a theory in which PRO is always anaphoric provides us with a number of interesting explanations concerning the interpretation of PRO. Moreover, such a theory allows us to eliminate the redundancy between BT and control theory. However, we have lost the explanation for the initial motivation to consider PRO to be a pronominal anaphor: the distribution of PRO. In the next section we will discuss this subject.
3. The distribution of PRO

Having established that PRO is an ordinary anaphor, we can no longer derive its distribution from BT, i.e. the requirement that PRO be ungoverned is no longer a theorem. We propose an alternative, which is based on properties of chain formation (cf. Hoekstra & Bennis, this volume). Starting point is that there is not only a complementary distribution between PRO and lexical NP, but a complementarity of the interpretation of e as either trace or PRO as well. We maintain that there is only one empty category (ec). If this ec can be connected to an antecedent through a chain, i.e. if the ec is not the head of a chain, the interpretation of the ec depends on the interpretation of the head of the chain. This is the ec which is normally referred to as t or e. If no chain can be formed, i.e. if the ec itself is the head of the chain, the interpretation of the ec is dependent on the theory which characteristically relates two independent chains, viz. BT.

We will now turn to a first approximation of the algorithm which determines whether a chain can be formed or not. Suppose we have the following formulation of chain formation:

(19) Chain Formation (1st preliminary version)
   a. Link an empty category to a c-commanding NP if possible
   b. CP breaks a chain

Let us see how this principle explains the ungrammaticality of the examples in (20) and (21). The ungrammaticality of (20b-f) and (21) follows from Chain Formation. In all these cases a chain can and hence must be formed between the ec and an antecedent (John in (20b-f) and it in (21)) since no CP intervenes between them. The ungrammaticality of the sentences in (20b-f) then follows from the Θ-criterion because one chain receives two Θ-roles. The sentences in (21) are grammatical only if it is an argument, related to the ec in the position of PRO through a chain. In that case there is a chain with only one Θ-role.

(20) a.*PRO walks
    b.*John sees PRO
    c.*John counts on PRO
    d.*John considers PRO intelligent
    e.*John believes PRO to be intelligent
    f.*John hears PRO sing a song
(21) a.*It was kissed PRO
    b.*It seems PRO to be intelligent
    c.*It was believed PRO to be intelligent

The ungrammaticality of (20a) follows for a different reason. Chain formation is not applicable in this case. There is a local relation with AGR', but this relation is insufficient to identify the ec in a non-pro-drop language. However, it is an advantage of our theory that the explanation of (20a) is different from the explanation of the ungrammaticality of (20b-f), since it allows us to explain the fact that in pro-drop languages an ec is possible in subject position only.

Before we proceed to the refinement of Chain Formation, we will illustrate in which way the theory developed thusfar accounts for the properties of a simple control configuration as in (23).

(23) John promises Mary [ e to go home]

The ec in (23) is the subject of an infinitival CP. It follows that Chain Formation cannot be applied in such a way that the ec is connected to an
antecedent. Consequently the ec is the head of its chain, hence an anaphor. The binding category of the ec is the matrix clause. Within this clause e must find an antecedent. There are two potential candidates (John and Mary). The theory of control determines that in this case John is the antecedent of e.

It is easy to show that the formulation of Chain Formation given in (19) is not correct. The statement that a CP breaks a chain implies that CP is an absolute barrier to chain formation. A simple case of long wh-movement shows that this cannot be true. In order to allow the ec in (24) to be connected to its antecedent who, we will change (19) into (25).

(24) Who, do you think that John saw e₁
(25) Chain Formation (2nd preliminary version)
   a. link an empty category to a c-commanding NP if possible
   b. CP breaks an A-chain

It is not only the case that the type of chain is relevant to chain formation, the status of the category from which extraction takes place is relevant as well. In general adjuncts are islands to extraction. Moreover, adjuncts allow PRO-subjects. The sentences in (26) show the impossibility of extraction from adjuncts. The sentences in (27) show the possibility of a PRO-subject in adjunct clauses and adjunct small clauses.

(26) a. *Who, did John go home [after he had met e₁]
    b. *What₁ did Mary jump on the table [afraid of e₁]
(27) a. John went home [after e meeting Mary]
    b. Mary jumped on the table [e afraid of mice]

To account for these facts we will add to (25) the claim that adjuncts, including CP adjuncts, break a chain. Finally, we will add NP, or rather DP, to the set of categories which break a chain. DP may contain a PRO-subject and no movement from DP is allowed. We will not discuss this point here. We change (25) into (28).

(28) Chain Formation (3rd preliminary version)
   a. link an empty category to a c-commanding NP if possible
   b. CP breaks an A-chain
   c. Adjunct XP and DP break a chain

It is clear that the condition in (28) does not have much explanatory value itself since it just lists the different conditions under which chain-formation can(not) take place. In Hoekstra & Bennis (this volume) we show that conditions b. and c. in (28) are independently motivated.

Interestingly, the so-called strong binding requirement on empty operators follows straightforwardly from our approach. Such empty operators are found in [SPEC,CP] of an adjunct clause. Under our approach such an empty operator is not yet a new type of ec, but can be taken as a specific instance of e, the properties of which follow again from chain formation and BT. According to (28c), an ec in this position cannot enter into a chain. Hence, it is the head of a chain, which can only be identified through binding. Let us limit ourselves here to two specific instances of empty operator constructions, viz. infinitival relatives, as in (29), and tough movement constructions of the type in (30). For arguments that the phrase following easy in (30) is an adjunct, cf. Bennis & Wehrmann (1987). Given that these ec's are identified through binding, the interpretation of the sentences in (31) follows.

(29) a. a man [e₁ [e₁ to fix the sink]]
    b. a book [e₁ [e₁ to throw away e₁]]
(30) John is easy [e₁ [e₁ to please e₁]]
(31) a. Jan lijkt mij [e_i vervaelend (voor NP_k) [e_i/*j om [e_k e_i te zien]]]
   Johh seems (to)me boring for NP_k for to see
b. Ik vind [Jan vervaelend (voor NP_k) [e_i/*j om [e_k e_i te zien]]
   I consider John* boring for NP_k for to see

Given (28), the ec in object position of the infinitival clause in (31) cannot
be the head of a chain. The infinitival clause being an adjunct, the head of
the chain of this ec should be found within the infinitival clause. We thus
have two ec's in one clause which are both the head of their chain. These
categories occupy the position of [SPEC,CP] and [SPEC,IP]. Both ec's are
anaphors. They have to find an antecedent within their binding category. In
(31) it is the matrix small clause which is the first XP containing an opacity
factor (subject). Given that (31a) is a raising construction we correctly
predict the raised subject Jan to be the antecedent of the empty anaphor in
[SPEC,CP]. In (31b) the SC-subject (Jan) occupies its base position.
Consequently this is the antecedent for the ec in [SPEC,CP] of the
infinitival adjunct. The ec in [SPEC,IP] will have the implicit argument or
the NP in the voor-phrase as its antecedent. Our approach thus provides an
adequate account of the locality of strong binding in these empty operator
cases.

In the theory outlined above the class of ec's is partitioned into a class of
ec's which are the head of a chain, and those which are not. While the latter
are chain-identified, the former are subject to BT for their identification.
This analysis eliminates the redundancy between binding and control in the
standard theory, and reduces the inventory of ec's. The partitioning factor is
the principle of Chain Formation. In Hoekstra & Bennis (this volume), this
principle is extensively motivated.

Notes

1. Note that we use the notion Binding Category instead of Governing Category
   in our formulation of BT (cf. Chomsky 1981:220). In our approach the
   notion of government plays no independent role in the determination of
   domains relevant for BT.

2. This probably does not exhaust the class of possible opacity factors. As
   this paper is not concerned with the actual way in which binding is
   established, we shall not go into this issue.

3. Although it is true that the actual choice of antecedent seems to involve
   non-structural factors, it is by no means excluded that the properties
   which appear to be relevant are ultimately structurally represented, as is
   suggested for the alternation between subject and object control in e.g.

4. It is unclear to us at this point what the representation of implicit
   arguments should be taken to be. The minimal position, from the point of
   view of the Projection Principle, would be that implicit arguments are
   structurally instantiated, i.e. projected from the argument structure into
   the syntax. This raises questions concerning their licensing, on which we
   have nothing of interest to say. Alternatively, they are not projected,
   which would have obvious consequences for the characterization of BT, which
   go beyond the approach advocated here, certainly if we are right in
   claiming that lexical anaphors may also be bound by implicit arguments.

5. The point about split antecedents is that such an interpretation should be
   a matter of coreference rather than binding, if binding is construed as a
   coindexation relation between two NPs. If our claim is correct that not
   only alleged PRO, but also lexical anaphors can take a split antecedent,
   this conception on binding will have to be adapted.
6. In the literature (cf. Manzini 1983) it is suggested that instead of
government, the theory of Case might provide an explanation for the
distribution of PRO. Aside from the fact that an account of the
distribution of PRO in terms of Case is ad-hoc, it would not exclude PRO in
the sentences in (21).

7. Note that we have to assume that the presence of AGR-coindexation prohibits
an identification of e by means of BT. We would otherwise predict that e
can occur as the subject of finite embedded clauses even in non-pro-drop
languages. This suggests that AGR-coindexation is just a specific case of
chain formation, i.e. between AGR and its specifier.

8. Apart from pro in subject position, some languages also allow null objects.
This raises the question, within our approach, how these are licit. Note
that our approach predicts that these null objects should enter into a
chain with an A-bar antecedent, as they are themselves in a theta-position.
For null objects of the Chinese-Portugese type, this appears to be
essentially correct. For arbitrary null objects, as found in Italian and
other languages, our approach leads us to expect that these are licensed by
a possibly empty clitic.

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