Mobility Makes States
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Migration and Power in Africa

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Chapter 2

Portuguese Empire Building and Human Mobility in São Tomé and Angola,
1400s–1700s

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On July 10, 1638, skipper Cornelis Pietersz Croeger and pilot Pieter Tamesz arrived in São Tomé with the Alkmaar. The ship had been freighted by Jacob Pietersz de Vries, merchant in Amsterdam, and was manned by a Dutch crew. Yet she was traveling with “passes and licenses” issued by the city of Dunkirk in France. Following the arrival of the ship, these documents were presented to the Portuguese royal governor for inspection, who expressed doubts about their authenticity. As a consequence, the ship, crew, and cargo were held in São Tomé for more than six months, while the governor consulted with representatives of the Portuguese Crown in Iberia regarding how to proceed. Like the Alkmaar and her crew, the movements of other ships, sailors, merchants, and passengers were routinely subject to similar regulations and permissions whenever they entered ports in Europe, Africa, the Americas, and beyond. Much like modern airports, these ports were key sites where state power was concentrated and where the channeling of mobility took place.

While this particular story is chiefly concerned with the policing of mobility, there were also numerous occasions and settings where the European rulers of expanding empires, be they Dutch, Portuguese, Spanish, French, or English, also made sustained efforts to promote the long-distance movement of both people and goods. In an era where maritime
travel was central to the expansion, security, administration, and profitability of overseas imperial possessions, state building was inevitably bound up in the portability of state agents and institutions, such as the role and person of the governor mentioned above, and in the success or failure of efforts to harness and channel mobility toward various political, economic, and social ends. In the following pages, we examine how early modern states with extended overseas territories sought to promote, prevent, and channel mobility and the effects of these only partially successful efforts on state and empire building.

Building an overseas empire required sustained efforts to promote the movement of people and goods to help develop settlements and economic projects in new colonial spaces. However, maritime enterprise and colonial settlement also regularly threatened to escape metropolitan control, so states were obliged to take measures both to prevent and police the mobility and activities of suspect individuals. By transplanting and adapting metropolitan models to new territorial settings, states such as Portugal were able to concentrate power successfully at specific locations in many corners of the globe. Here, we will be looking at Portugal and two of its settlements in sub-Saharan Africa: São Tomé and Angola. We will start by looking into the debates surrounding the process of state building in an early modern imperial context. We will then proceed with a brief examination of the nature of the Portuguese Crown and its project of state building on the eve of maritime expansion. This will be followed by a study of the various groups of people moving within imperial domains in African regions, paying special attention to differences in regulation concerning Portuguese subjects, foreigners of European origin, Euroafricans, and Africans. In the closing section, we will analyze the difficulties faced by the Crown in its efforts to channel mobility through its network of possessions and institutions.

To do so, our analysis will focus on three key historical moments for Portuguese settlement in this region and its impact on African communities. In the case of Portuguese empire, the aforementioned process of colonial formation and consolidation may be divided into three main periods, during which different policies regarding human mobility and political authority were advanced by the Crown. The fifteenth century saw early expansionary efforts linked to official efforts to promote the movement of private actors to new colonial areas brought under the sovereignty of the Crown. The following century was marked by several attempts on the part
of the Crown to gain greater control over colonial spaces, their inhabitants, and the flow of people and products within the empire. This was achieved by a two-part strategy, which saw the Crown create a more sophisticated bureaucratic machine at home while simultaneously transferring several royal and political institutions overseas to guarantee a more effective presence. This system of royal representation overseas was key to overseas governance, the exercise of justice and military power, and the partial regulation of mobile products and people within imperial spaces. Due to growing competition from other European states with imperial ambitions, the Crown introduced additional measures to reinforce its control over the flow of people and products within the empire during the seventeenth century, but these efforts often had limited success.

States and Mobility in Historical Perspective

In *The Invention of the Passport*, John Torpey argues that European states have primarily shown "great interest in identifying and controlling the movement of their subjects/servants" in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. According to Torpey, it was during this period that states came to effectively monopolize the legitimate means of movement and exert control over subject populations and related patterns of mobility across internal and external borders. His study, therefore, chiefly focuses on the contribution of mobility controls to the formation of nation-states from the nineteenth century onward. With this focus, Torpey leaves the study of mobility and the state in the early modern period only superficially explored. Drawing on examples such as France, England, Prussia, and Russia, which are here primarily understood within a European context, he concludes that, in this earlier period, regulating movement was mainly an internal affair and was chiefly defined by limited forms of state centralization. This is said to have involved a twofold strategy, with one approach being to remove control over mobility from private hands, most notably the nobility and clergy, while simultaneously expanding central control over subject populations for economic purposes, such as the recruitment of a labor force for the army, navy, and other "public" services.

In Torpey's argument, control over movement in the early modern era is very much an internal European affair, so his analysis does not systematically engage with the consequences of European imperial and colonial
expansion, which first created and then subsequently expanded discontinuous political jurisdictions that eventually stretched across oceans to connect distant territories in Africa, the Americas, and Asia. In this larger imperial context, official efforts to control and channel human mobility faced significant logistical, political, and jurisdictional challenges, with maritime networks and ports functioning as key sites through which mobility was both controlled and channeled by the state and its agents. With the notable exception of the Americas, European empires during the early modern era were often comparatively modest affairs in terms of territorial rule—at least in comparison to the conquests of the nineteenth century—yet they were nonetheless one of the main sites of political innovation and state aspiration as far as mobility was concerned.

Early modern empires not only played a central role in the political, economic, and social development of states within Europe, but they also posed significant institutional and logistical challenges in relation to communications, transportation, credit, taxation and finance, technological capacity, and political, legal, and religious jurisdiction. State and empire building invariably required mobility, since overseas rule and maritime trade could not be conducted without movements, but mobility also regularly presented all kinds of challenges and complications to state power and authority, since far-flung mobile populations and goods proved to be difficult to channel and control. Much of the early impetus behind maritime expansion came from private initiatives and investments involving merchants, religious missions, adventurers, settlers, and migrant laborers. European states often followed in the wake of these private initiatives and were therefore obliged to find ways to (re)assert their authority over people, products, and ideas within their own empires, neighboring and rival European empires, and in relation to American, African, and Asian states. In the following sections of this chapter, we will examine how a small early modern European state like Portugal attempted to control and channel the movements of both its subjects and foreigners within imperial domains in sub-Saharan Africa.

The Portuguese State on the Eve
of Expansion: A Brief Introduction

When overseas expansion began, Portugal was still in many ways a medieval kingdom. The king held the power to define the political, administrative,
and financial bodies to support the government of the kingdom. The central government initially comprised the Council of State (Conselho de Estado) and the Treasury Council (Casa dos Contos, later named Conselho da Fazenda), but in the late sixteenth century, the king also established the Council of the Indies (Conselho das Índias, later named Overseas Council, Conselho Ultramarino) in an effort to engage more effectively with territories and trade outside Europe. These key political bodies were further supported by allied judicial institutions and legal codes, such as the Royal Supreme Courts—namely, the Casa da Suplicação and the Desembargo do Paço—which proved to be key legal instruments at the disposal of the king.

However, the administration of many territories within Portugal—both urban and rural—was also formally delegated by the king to private nobility and clergy, as well as to religious and military orders. Additionally, some urban centers were authorized to appoint their own rulers, who exercised significant autonomy over the governance of their town and its hinterland (terno). In theory, these town councils defended the interests of the common population against the abuses of the nobility, clergy, and the members of other religious organizations, who were usually the main landlords. Due to these arrangements, the power of the Crown was often limited in respect to territories under the rule of the nobility, church, or town councils. Relationships between these groupings were, in turn, mediated through a representative assembly: the Cortes (with the king exercising a right to convok or cancel gatherings). As we shall see below, the circumscribed and decenalize character of the state had a direct bearing on the policies and strategies adopted in the early stages of maritime expansion. Since the Crown had limited financial and institutional resources, private initiatives and investments played a key role in relation to patterns of settlement and economic development.

During the early modern period, indirect taxation was the main source of income for the Portuguese Crown. Taxes over the internal and external circulation of people and products amounted to 70 percent of Portugal's annual revenue in the last quarter of the sixteenth century, excluding the profits generated from overseas territories. This meant that the Crown had a major stake in developing systems to regulate and promote foreign trade in general and overseas trade in particular. To ensure that taxes were paid, the state was obliged to pay attention to the movements and activities of settlers, merchants, and maritime vessels. In addition, all products and enslaved Africans transported between different coastal areas of the African
continent, or from Africa to the Americas and Europe, needed to be inspected by a network of Crown officials and institutions. This web of officials and institutions spread throughout the empire, encompassing Portugal, African settlements, the Americas, and the Estado da Índia. As we shall see below, both the economic proceeds and processes of extraction associated with the Portuguese maritime empire played a key role in extending and strengthening centralized state authority from the early sixteenth century onward. During this period, the relative bargaining power of the Crown increased on many fronts, while the meetings of the Cortes became less frequent, reducing opportunities for negotiation between domestic elites and the Crown. In this sense, this chapter contributes to the "mobility makes states" argument by demonstrating how the regulation of mobility became a core means by which the colonial state extracted surpluses and ensured its continual growth.

The Portuguese empire was developed and consolidated through a network of military and commercial posts stretching across the Atlantic and the Indian Oceans. This network primarily involved coastal sites and economic activities in adjacent hinterlands. The most successful cases of settlement and economic development involve Madeira, the Azores, and Brazil. In the Atlantic, there were other important settlements in Cape Verde, São Tomé, and Angola and commercial posts in Senegambia, Guinea-Bissau, Sierra Leone, the Gold and Slave Coasts, and the kingdom of Kongo. All these posts and settlements were regularly visited by Portuguese and foreign merchants and by settlers established nearby. Here, we will pay attention to the flow of people to and in São Tomé and Angola, as well as the efforts of the Crown to channel mobility.

Building Empire by Channeling Mobility

Portuguese expansion in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans was legitimated by the pope, who endorsed Portuguese political authority over many newly "discovered" territories. Translating this authority from paper to practice required numerous alliances with private actors and interests, who helped expand Portuguese empire both militarily and commercially. Through royal donations, newly "discovered" territories were granted to private
individuals (donatários). The beneficiaries of this policy were usually noblemen, who divided the land (donatário) into a series of parcels (capitania-donatário). These parcels were then granted to a captain (capitão-donatário), usually a member of the beneficiary's noble house. Together, the donatário and the capitão-donatário were responsible for populating these new territories and promoting their economic development via agriculture, crafts, and/or commerce. They were also given responsibility for the government, exercise of justice, and military defense of their territories. As part of the settlement process, significant numbers of migrants would also relocate to these new territories, residing under the jurisdiction of the donatário or capitão-donatário.

The territory of Angola, for instance, was granted by the Crown to the nobleman Paulo Dias de Novais in the 1570s. The capitão-donatário was granted permission to occupy and explore thirty-five leagues of land along the coast, starting in the Cuanza River and going southward. Within ten years, Novais was expected to promote settlement and the development of agriculture covering an area of at least twenty leagues inland. These territories were to be divided into parcels and granted to free settlers, to be chosen by Novais. To develop his new colony, Novais was obliged to carry with him eleven ships, and four hundred men, including skilled workers, along with six horses. Within six years of his arrival, he was required to have a total of one hundred Portuguese families, including men, women, and children, residing within his settlement.

Without sustained political and economic efforts to promote human mobility, settlements such as Angola would never have been viable. It is clear from historical records that attracting sufficient investors to unknown and sometimes hostile territories was not an easy task. To help develop colonial ventures, the Crown accorded certain economic privileges to private actors. Paulo Dias de Novais was accorded numerous economic privileges by the Crown, including a monopoly over fishing, the extraction of salt, and the usage of watermills. He was also awarded permission to export annually one hundred slaves tax free and to receive one-third of all taxes and duties collected in the Dande-Cuanza region during his lifetime. Finally, Novais and his successors were also authorized to collect and manage all land leases and rents in the captaincy.

Convincing individuals to settle in these remote territories proved to be a challenge for the donatário and capitão-donatário. Consequently, the
Crown took further measures to promote the process of settlement and economic development under the initiative of private actors. Individuals willing to settle in new overseas territories were granted certain fiscal exemptions as well as commercial privileges. Permanent settlers in São Tomé, for instance, were granted commercial privileges to trade with the nearest coastal areas, such as the Gold Coast, the Bights of Benin and Biafra, Cape Lopez, the Loango Coast, and the rulers and traders of Kongo and Angola. By so doing, the Crown strengthened the relationship between settlers and the state and expanded the number of noble clients closely associated with the royal house. The donation system also made it possible to guarantee the occupation of territories by Portuguese subjects, which was essential to justifying Portuguese sovereignty in the eyes of rival foreign powers. Thanks to the significant private investment and input that took place, the Crown was able to develop new territories and opportunities within African territories that would not have been viable with state financial resources alone.

A continuous European presence was required in order to legitimate and sustain Portuguese territorial authority in Africa. Getting sufficient numbers of Europeans to relocate to Africa, either short- or long-term, consistently proved to be a difficult task. Despite the commercial incentives mentioned earlier, Europeans were reluctant to settle due to the distance between sub-Saharan Africa and Europe, the small number of profitable economic activities, the harshness of the climate, and the high levels of mortality among Europeans in African colonies. Since recruitment was so difficult, it proved necessary to make allowances for people from different backgrounds, with both free Portuguese migrants and other free European migrants being equally accommodated. Since migrants from Europe were reluctant to volunteer in sufficient numbers—and the overall number of European migrants remained relatively small throughout the early modern period—the Portuguese Crown also resorted to forced migration schemes involving both criminals and orphans.

From the perspective of the Crown, criminals and orphans were a cheap reservoir of manpower that could be easily dispatched to colonize overseas territories, to serve in the navy and army, and to construct and repair public buildings. In addition, their movements were relatively easily controlled by the state. In the early years of settlement in São Tomé and Angola, the Crown disposed of its orphans and exiles mainly to compensate for the high mortality rates among settlers, as well as to meet a shortage of skilled
workers, and above all, to recruit military forces for these territories. In this early period, both orphans and convicts benefited from relative autonomy once they had been forcibly relocated. In São Tomé, for example, the Crown granted each convict "permission to import goods from Portugal and to conduct slave raids in the Mina areas. . . . Each convict was [also] to be given a male or female slave for his personal service." The same policy applied in Angola. The relative autonomy initially offered to convicts and orphans during the early period of settlement later emerged as a problem for local Crown representatives as they sought to assert central authority. By the late fifteenth century, as the Portuguese Crown became wealthier and more powerful, these early measures to promote the mobility of free and forced settlers to colonial spaces were replaced by a new set of royal measures with a twofold purpose: to centralize administration, judicial authority, and military power; and to control the mobility of people and the flow of products.

Expanding and Centralizing State Infrastructure in São Tomé and Angola

Throughout the sixteenth century, the Crown made sustained efforts to bring imperial spaces such as São Tomé and Angola under its direct jurisdiction and administration. This meant challenging the earlier donation system by (i) reducing their lifespan; (ii) shifting away from donations and toward fixed term buying, selling, and renting contracts; (iii) refusing confirmation to donations previously granted; and (iv) claiming state jurisdiction over previously donated territories. These measures were part of a general policy to shift from private to royal administration and aimed at reinforcing the central authority and power of the Crown both in Portugal and across overseas territories. Mobility was a key feature of this larger political transformation.

Between 1587 and 1609, new forms of royal governance replaced the capitães-donatários system in São Tomé and Angola. At the heart of this new regime was a captain-governor who was chosen from among the members of the court (either bureaucrats or noblemen) and appointed by the king in reward for previous services. There were two distinct jurisdictions in operation. The captain-governor in São Tomé exercised authority over the island chain, whereas the captain-governor of Angola ruled over the
captaincy previously donated to Paulo Dias de Novais, as well as adjacent Portuguese posts in Kongo and Benguela. To rule over an expanding Angolan hinterland, the Crown established administrative and military commands in key points in Kongo, along the Kwanza River, and in Benguela. These small settlements had their own governments, headed by a captain or captain-general appointed by the governor of Angola or the Crown. This royal official held administrative power to rule over Portuguese fortresses, commercial posts, and their surrounding hinterlands. Responsible for the protection of Portuguese forts, posts, and their populations, as well as for the security of neighboring regions, their fairs, land routes, and waterways, they were the most significant sign of Portuguese authority over extensive areas of the Angolan borderlands and the main gatekeepers for the African internal frontier. Consequently, they were assigned a key role in monitoring circulation of goods and people—of either European or African descent—in these territories.

In the late sixteenth century, the military and defensive functions of the capitães-donatários were formally taken over by the Crown. The captain-governors became the highest military authority and were held responsible for the maintenance of fortresses and equipment, the recruitment of soldiers, general military organization, and defense against foreign naval attack and indigenous territorial incursions. In its attempt to organize military institutions in São Tomé and Angola, the Crown attempted to impose a new monopoly over the exercise of legitimate violence by developing and supervising local militias. All male settlers between eighteen and sixty of either European, mixed, or African descent were forced to serve in these militias without payment. They were compelled to take part in military training and regular surveillance exercises, be present at emergency calls, and acquire and maintain their own weapons. In an effort to centralize and regulate military defense, the Crown went as far as to determine the quality, type, and quantity of weapons and animals that its subjects—either Portuguese or foreigners—were authorized to use according to their social status and wealth. In Angola, the Crown took a step further, instructing the captain-governors to formalize the organization of African auxiliary troops (Guerra preta). Recruited in the territories of the Angolan chieftaincies (sobadás) under Portuguese influence (the borderlands of the Portuguese presence in Angola), these free African warriors, usually members of the military forces of Angolan rulers, were organized in regiments under the command of an Angolan leader, integrated into the Portuguese military,
and subordinated to the command of a Portuguese or mixed-descent captain-general.²¹

Despite not having an explicit aim at regulating human mobility, these measures were designed to bring all men physically capable under some sort of military discipline, which in turn established the Crown as a key arbiter over legitimate and illegitimate forms of movement, since militias were regularly obliged to move when and where the state required them. In São Tomé, these measures were especially useful in preventing manumitted slaves from supporting slave insurrections, thereby creating a further institutional barrier against the illicit movement of enslaved Africans. In Angola, the presence of Angolan warriors fighting alongside Portuguese and other Europeans was particularly advantageous, given their knowledge of the terrain, local fighting techniques, and movements of troops and war strategies. Moreover, by recruiting soldiers among the military forces of local authorities, the Crown also reduced the risk of military attacks against Portuguese settlements from within colonial domains or from neighboring borderlands, since at least some potential African protagonists were co-opted into Portuguese military service.

The Crown also took measures to establish a royal monopoly over the exercise of judicial procedures in these territories. First, the Crown appointed and sent judicial supervisors to inspect the exercise of justice by the capitães-donatários and municipal judges²²; second, it established a new royal judicial structure. This involved replacing the capitães-donatários’ judicial authority in São Tomé and Angola with two judicial districts (ouvidorias) and two auditor-generals (ouvidores-gerais). The latter were expected to have a law degree certified by the Royal High Judicial Court and were appointed by the king.²³ Based in São Tomé and Luanda, these auditor-generals exercised judicial authority over criminal and civil causes involving all permanent and temporary residents in Portuguese settlements. They were also authorized to arrest, sentence, and send to Portugal and other overseas possessions common inhabitants, royal officials, and members of the highest social strata.

In São Tomé and Angola, the auditor-generals also had additional judicial officials under their authority (ouvidores or capitães-mores). Often, the captain-generals of the forts accumulated these judicial functions, with their administrative and military responsibilities described earlier. Usually, these officials were placed in areas that were more difficult to access and had a slightly wider jurisdiction.²⁴ In Angola, the captain-generals of the
fortresses along the Kwanza River held jurisdiction over civil and criminal cases, including the death penalty, the cutting of limbs, and fines. Under their control were all inhabitants of the forts, both civilian and military, as well as the indigenous population whenever crimes involved Portuguese subjects or other Europeans. Over time, they were also granted authority over a new judicial institution (Juízo dos Mocanos) established by the Portuguese Crown in the Angolan hinterland. Headed by a Portuguese judge and supported by a clerk, the Juízo was to solve disagreements between local African rulers and common Africans. These officials were supposed to have a key role in securing commercial transactions at the neighboring fairs as well as protecting circulation in the nearest land routes and waterways, leading to the fairs, forts, and/or the main ports in Luanda and Benguela. In combination with other military and bureaucratic positions, these judicial authorities helped concentrate state power in specific spatial locations within Portuguese territories. It remained an open question, however, how much these theories of rule corresponded with local day-to-day practices.

Extracting Wealth from the Movement of People and Goods

The aforementioned network of institutions and overseas officials played a central role in relation to state efforts to both regulate and promote commercial activities. Throughout the sixteenth century, the Portuguese Crown exported a series of fiscal and financial institutions to overseas territories and also legislated extensively in relation to the flow of products and people. Until 1443, everyone was free to access the western coast of Africa, its labor force, and its products. That year, the Portuguese king João I (1385–1433) awarded his son Prince Henry the Navigator a monopoly over the western African trade. After Prince Henry’s death in 1460, the monopoly came under the jurisdiction of his noble house and later under the direct control of the Portuguese Crown in the person of King Manuel I (1495–1521). The king attempted to monopolize control over the import and export of enslaved Africans and African products. As the ruler of Portuguese domains in Africa and holders of a monopoly on western African trade, the Portuguese Crown felt entitled to restrain the access of its subjects and foreigners to these regions as well as to attempt to limit their participation in any form of trade. The Crown also felt empowered to exert control
over the import and export of African laborers, most of whom were enslaved, within their imperial domains and beyond.

Establishing commercial and fiscal agencies both at home and throughout the empire was a top priority from the mid-fifteenth century onward. To organize trade and enforce the royal monopolies over western African trade, the Portuguese Crown established an office to control the colonial trade in Lisbon—the House of India and Mina—and founded an extensive network of royal factories overseas.28 São Tomé and Angola, like other areas, witnessed their establishment in major ports: São Tomé and Luanda.29 These factories were mainly warehouses of European goods to be exchanged in the African coastal markets and a stock house of African products to be exported to overseas markets, whereas the House of India and Mina, based in Lisbon, was established as a central clearing house responsible for the freighting and equipage of ships, the provision of supplies to overseas factories, storage of imported overseas goods, supplying European markets, and collecting taxes on the imports of colonial products under the royal monopoly.30

However, the commercial monopoly of the Portuguese Crown on the western African trade was not completely closed to private individuals. From the late fifteenth century, private merchants were able to obtain trading licenses to operate in certain areas and with a specific range of goods.31 By retaining the power to inspect the loading and unloading of ships and lists of cargo, crew, and passengers, the House of India and Mina continued to exercise a degree of control over the circulation of people and commodities entering and leaving Portugal. On the other hand, in São Tomé and Angola the factories monitored the access of Portuguese and foreign ships calling at these regions and monitored and supervised the crew, passengers, and the type and number of slaves and products imported and exported. These factories effectively concentrated state power within specific spatial locations and institutional settings, and thereby played a key role in channeling the movement of free and forced European migrants, as well as enslaved Africans from Angola, Kongo, Loango, and the west Africa coast to the Americas, Europe, and other coastal regions in sub-Saharan Africa.

However, from the 1530s onward, the king and his advisers determined that the policy of monopoly trading in combination with the supervision of private participants and trade goods was not the most efficient and cost effective way of either extracting wealth or monitoring movement. So, the
Crown took two further measures: leasing the management of the monopolies to private businessmen (contratadores), and starting to impose and collect taxes over the circulation of people and goods within the empire. The decision to lease the management of monopolies can be traced to three main reasons. First, the Crown would receive advance payment based on the expected output of the monopoly. Second, the lease was expected to improve the efficiency of institutional surveillance and thereby reduce losses of capital from smuggling, pirate attacks, and lost ships. Finally, the lease was structured in a way that allowed the Crown to pass on to the contratadores the responsibility of paying the royal officials serving in the forts and settlements within the monopoly areas, thereby saving state funds. Between the 1530s and the 1640s, this became common practice. The different monopolies, namely Cape Verde and Guinea, São Tomé and Angola, were leased out to private businessmen. After the 1530s, the royal monopolies tended to be leased out along with tax collection.

This new scenario led the Crown to transfer its fiscal system overseas. For this purpose, new customs houses were established in numerous territories, such as São Tomé. These new establishments gradually took over the functions of the factories mentioned above. In some colonial areas, as in Luanda, customs houses were only established in the late eighteenth century. In these cases, the royal factories had their functions partially altered, acquiring supervision power over the access of ships, crews, passengers to the colony, the entrance of products into the territory, the export of Angolan products, and, most important, the hideous but profitable forced migration of enslaved Africans.

In the case of Angola, Portuguese officials also claimed the right to collect taxes at fairs located at the outer limits of colonial authority. Here, the Portuguese were also able to compel a number of local rulers (sobados) to pay an annual tribute (tributo dos sobas), which was typically a fixed payment paid in enslaved Africans. The annual revenue from this tribute to the Royal Treasury was estimated at 6,000 réis, almost equivalent to São Tomé’s total annual revenue of around 6,500 réis. Much like other means of extracting wealth discussed above, these tributes saw the state generate economic gains through the movement of people and goods. To support these economic and political goals, the state also heavily invested in controlling the legitimate means of movement of its subjects, European foreigners, and Africans (free, manumitted, and enslaved).
Transferring State Power Overseas to Channel People's Mobility Within the Empire

In São Tomé and Angola, like in other overseas territories, the Portuguese Crown had considerable interest in monitoring the movements of both Portuguese subjects and foreigners. Both populations were targeted by legislation and institutions, regardless of the nature and reason of their travels and stay in these territories. Regulations issued concerned therefore permanent and temporary residents as well as various types of travelers. The mobility and access of Eurafricans and Africans to enter and move within areas under Portuguese control or influence also came under scrutiny, especially after the early sixteenth century.

In this respect the territory of Angola is a case in point. In the early years of colonization, settlers in Angola were allowed to sail along the Angolan coast southward up to Angola and northward as far as the Gold Coast and São Tomé. They held also permission to navigate local rivers, such as the Kwanza, Dande, and Lucala, among others. In regard to the Angolan inland frontier, no restrictions were initially imposed on settlers' movement. Over time, the number and frequency of incursions into the interior increased. These incursions were chiefly characterized by slave raiding, military campaigns, and trade; consequently, they had a negative impact on commercial and diplomatic relations between Portuguese authorities and African rulers, so the Crown tried to contain independent movements in the hinterland of the colony.

Controlling the access of European temporary migrants and travelers to Portuguese sub-Saharan Africa also emerged as a major concern because their presence could do harm to the monopoly of the Crown over the economic resources and trade in these regions and, in extreme situations, could pose a threat to the Crown's sovereignty. Although foreign investment in the empire was allowed, from the fifteenth century onward, any individual, either Portuguese or foreign, intending to travel to or send their vessels and agents for business in São Tomé and Angola could only do so if he met one or several of the following requirements:

(1) if he held a temporary commercial license issued by the Portuguese Crown for a specific venture to these regions, a set of voyages, or a fixed period of time;
(2) if he had leased the management of the Crown’s monopoly over
the trade with these two regions; or
(3) if he held a commercial license issued by the managers of the royal
monopolies over the São Tomé and Angolan trades.41

Besides meeting these requirements, temporary migrants had also to
conform to the legislation defining regions and ports of call for commercial
vessels. Usually, these ships were forbidden to call and conduct trade at the
neighboring African coastal areas of São Tomé, Luanda, and Benguela.42
Ships heading to São Tomé and Angola with passengers and commodities
were also recommended to sail in convoy with royal fleets sailing to the
same destinations.43 On arrival at the ports of São Tomé, Luanda, and Ben-
guela, there were a range of aforementioned procedures in place controlling
the arrival and departures of ships, passengers, and cargoes. On land, how-
ever, temporary migrants had no restriction to their movement, at least
initially.44

The circulation of free, enslaved, and manumitted Africans in São Tomé
and Angola was another key concern for the Portuguese Crown. The first
sub-Saharan slaves brought to Portugal by sea in the early fifteenth century
were regarded with curiosity and used as exotic gifts and external symbols
of wealth by Portuguese kings and powerful nobles and clergymen. The
number of sub-Saharan slaves increased rapidly in Portugal and Spain
within a short space of time, catching the interest of the king and his fiscal
and commercial agents. The monarch’s ambition in controlling the circula-
tion of enslaved Africans resulted from growing demand for African slave
labor in Europe and the European posts and settlements in western Africa
and the Americas, and rising awareness that direct and indirect participa-
tion in the slave trade, as well as control over circulation of slaves, would
generate a significant revenue for the treasury.

Significant investment was required to monitor and control the move-
ments and activities of enslaved Africans. In colonial societies massively
based on slave labor and ruled by small European elites, there was a great
imbalance in the ratio between these two groups. This demographic profile
affected both the ethnic composition and social dynamics of various colo-
nies. Overseeing the movement and actions of slaves became essential for
the general safety of Europeans in Africa. In São Tomé, for instance, the
European population was on most occasions below 10 percent, while the
enslavé population remained above 90 percent. Unsurprisingly, slave
revolts in sugar, coffee, and cacao plantations were a recurring feature of São Tomé’s society. Portuguese local government and the municipality legislated on this matter and took practical measures to protect the European population, plantations, and urban infrastructure. Specific laws were issued defining how to deal with rebellious slaves, strategies to track runaway slaves into São Tomé’s rainforest were established, and new judicial posts were created to patrol the jungle and prevent slave attacks—the so-called sheriff of the hill (meirinho da serra).\(^5\)

In Angola, controlling the movement of Africans (free, enslaved, and manumitted) posed further challenges. As in São Tomé, the Portuguese Crown, the local royal government and the municipalities of Luanda and Benguela legislated and used diplomacy to tackle this question. Cross-cultural diplomatic agreements were negotiated and finalized with numerous African rulers, with mobility being one of the main issues under deliberation.\(^6\) These agreements typically included mutual aid in wartime against common enemies, privileged access to each other’s territories, and mutual effort to secure fairs, land routes, and waterways. By so doing, Portuguese and Angolan rulers sought to prevent their settlements and subjects from being attacked by neighboring powers, to facilitate a “peaceful” atmosphere for the prosperity of trade and to secure the circulation of both Europeans and Africans falling within a Portuguese sphere of influence. However much these agreements might have sounded good in theory, their practice was frequently subject to multiple violations and abuses on the part of Portuguese and violent reactions by African rulers and their subjects.

Large-scale slave raiding and trading regularly implicated various areas within the Angolan hinterland that fell well outside direct Portuguese political control. These hinterlands have often been described in terms of frontiers or borderlands, since territorial boundaries or borders were not fixed but fluid, and political authority tended to wax and wane depending on the disposition of various populations and military forces. As mentioned earlier, early settlers in São Tomé were authorized to acquire slaves in Angola by either purchase or raid. This contributed to a situation where slave raiding was a common feature of early Portuguese Angola, along with military campaigns against local rulers adjacent to Luanda, the estuary of the Kwanza River, and Benguela. Expeditions beyond Portuguese territories to find the mythical Cambambe silver mines were also used as a means to capture slaves, subjugate local rulers, and claim control over territories and populations.\(^7\) In this fluid and uncertain environment, the control of
waterways and land routes proved to be particularly important since they were central to the transportation of people and goods. Enslavement most commonly began with violent capture, but the transportation, trade, and control of these new captives required extensive mechanisms to forcibly move enslaved Africans large distances from the interior to the coast and from the coast to destinations throughout the Atlantic world.

Promoting and regulating the capture, purchase, and transport of slaves was a major undertaking, which generated significant levels of state regulation and surveillance. These regulations went as far as determining who could be authorized to access the interior and which products should be traded. Merchants of European descent, either permanent or temporary residents in the colonies, were to entrust their commodities to local African and mixed descent traders. However, only African and mixed descent traders without visual signs of wealth were authorized to act as brokers between coastal and interior traders. These regulations proved to be extremely difficult to implement, given the limited network of institutions and officials established by the Portuguese Crown in sub-Saharan Africa. Yet Portugal also faced various other obstacles when trying to control the flow of people both within and between territories in Europe, the Americas, and Africa.

**State Aspirations and Practical Outcomes**

The Portuguese Crown never managed to control or channel consistently the movement of people and goods within either its African territories or maritime networks. Despite the extensive network of institutions, regulations, and agents discussed above, the aspirations of the Portuguese state were at best only ever partially realized from a practical standpoint. There were two main sticking points here. First, there was the relatively straightforward issue of consistent and effective enforcement of policies and regulations across distant and discontinuous territories, particularly in cases such as Angola where the interior frontiers/borderlands were constantly in flux, with regular political disputes both within and between Africans and European elites. The territory the Portuguese claimed was much greater than the territory they effectively occupied. One of the main complications here was the fact that many of those who were on the move were anonymous and unfamiliar to the agents of the state. European interlocutors sometimes found it difficult successfully to navigate unfamiliar political, geographic,
and social settings, so there was much that escaped their notice and understanding. This gap between aspiration and outcome was further complicated by the fact that some territories remained under various types of private administration for extended periods. This was, for example, the case in São Tomé, where Príncipe, Ano Bom, and Fernão Pó remained in private hands until the eighteenth century. Since the exercise of justice remained in private hands, direct Crown interference in the movement of people and products in these territories was muted as a consequence.

The Portuguese were also unable to establish a monopoly over the legitimate means of violence in its African colonies. Despite all reforming measures, Portuguese sub-Saharan Africa lacked a truly professional army and navy until the mid-seventeenth century. Even in later periods, the basis of military defense continued to be local militias of settlers, manumitted slaves, and African auxiliary troops. Supplies of weaponry, ammunition, and other materials were insufficient and sent from Lisbon with delays, due to financial difficulties facing the state treasury. Naval defense was also insufficient and military efforts to protect harbors and towns proved inadequate. As a consequence, both the right and capacity to initiate violence remained with local settlers and African rulers. In São Tomé, the state was forced to share the right to exercise violence with powerful colonists, usually owners of farms, plantations, sugar mills, and a high number of enslaved Africans, some of whom were in a position to organize private armies. Private military forces were often used to defend Portuguese territories from naval attacks by European powers and from terrestrial attacks by runaway slaves.

In addition, the Portuguese state did not succeed in implementing a full monopoly over the exercise of justice because judicial authority was divided among various private and public authorities. The judicial system created by the state, both within Portugal and in overseas territories, continued to share jurisdiction with municipal judges elected by the city councils of São Tomé, Luanda, and Benguela. In general, the exercise of justice by the state officials was considered oppressive by the inhabitants of the settlements, especially by the local elites in control of most land and profitable economic activities, and often by the municipal councils as well. However, according to the Portuguese early modern judicial procedure, in exceptional situations such as a death, the high judicial officials of the state were to be replaced by municipal judges. This fact gave municipal authorities control over the practice of justice by the state and allowed powerful local elites
to avoid culpability for otherwise punishable actions, including smuggling people (enslaved Africans) and goods. Furthermore, on several occasions municipal judges, with the support of local elites, tried to file judicial cases against state judicial officials as well as government, commercial, and fiscal functions in the territories. Mobility remained central to patterns of wealth extraction and administration, but there were many occasions when the opportunities associated with moving people and goods largely accrued to private actors.

The state failed to establish a monopoly over forms of governance, the exercise of justice, and legitimate violence. This had major implications for its capacity to effectively control and channel the movement of people and goods since key functions and locations often remained in private hands; even in cases where the state was directly involved, only part of the activities that took place came to official notice. Since specific cases of both tax collection and trade were leased out to private actors, there was ample scope for fraud, including smuggling individuals and goods in and out of the territories, issuing false or incomplete lists of passengers and cargoes, and nonpayment of taxes relating to people and products. Under these circumstances, state officials serving in factories and customs houses only had jurisdiction to oversee private activities and to denounce abuses against the state to higher government officials. However, before a complaint could reach Lisbon, both public and private actors routinely placed heavy pressure on potential whistleblowers. This pressure included bribes, threats, and, in extreme cases, murder. State officials, on their part, often accepted bribes and allowed smuggling of commodities and enslaved Africans. From low- to high-ranking officials, the agents of the state routinely made use of their posts and authority to defend their own interests. By so doing, they were indirectly benefiting from official attempts to impose a monopoly over government, justice, violence, and movement; yet their actions in turn undercut the realization of this goal.

This recurring conflict of interest between the state and its overseas agents only grew more pronounced with the passage of time. As more state officials were recruited locally, their strong associations with political and economic interests of local elites had a major influence on policy and practice. Those close links reduced the power of officials to unilaterally impose policies that originated in Portugal. Resistance by local elites to metropolitan policies and regulations was evident on numerous occasions during this period. The best examples date from the late sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries. During the 1640s and 1650s, the Council of Luanda and the merchants of the city contested a decision of the Crown to transfer the auctions of the contracts of the Angolan monopoly to Lisbon. In this document, dated April 29, 1659, the City Council argued that the farming of the Angola monopoly by the wealthiest businessmen of Lisbon did great damage to the businessmen of Luanda and the merchants operating in the South Atlantic slave trade. Whenever a wealthy merchant from Portugal won the contract, he and his associates would operate the business with their own ships and supply the required exchange goods in great quantities via their agents in Luanda. Therefore, the merchants of the city and other traders visiting the port with vessels loaded with exchange products for the slave trade, mainly Portuguese-Brazilian traders, could not do much business. ⁴⁹

Conclusion

The evidence here presented suggests that the Portuguese Crown tried to control the movements of people and goods to advance a larger state- and empire-building project. In its attempts to advance this empire-building project, the Crown tried to channel mobile populations by adopting different strategies and measures to promote and/or prevent movement. In the early stage of maritime expansion and empire building, the limited authority of the Crown and its limited access to human and material resources made it necessary to turn to private actors to promote the mobility of people with skills and capital to ensure settlement and economic development. As the Crown centralized more power and economic resources by means of taxation, the state- and empire-building project entered a second phase. By the early sixteenth century, the Crown started to invest in the reform and consolidation of the state administrative, fiscal, judicial, and military machine to reinforce its control over the flow of people and products. Creating different types of controls over movement emerged as a key instrument of state policy. Portuguese subjects and foreigners (both of European and African descent) were subjected to control, although regulations differed from group to group.

To succeed in this undertaking, the Crown transferred a series of institutions to overseas territories, with particular emphasis being placed on
locations and settings where state representatives could attempt to monopolize the flow of people, products, and their associated wealth. However, these Crown monopolies were only accomplished in a limited way due to various contingencies, which had to do with the nature of the state, the means at its disposal (institutions and officials), and the particularities of Portuguese settlement in sub-Saharan Africa. Thus, in contrast to Torpey’s argument, the interest of the states in monitoring the movement of people across external borders did not become important only in the modern era. The data here analyzed suggest that early modern states were not only concerned with controlling internal flows of people; controlling people’s and products’ movement across the external borders of imperial domains, the borderlands of colonial settlements, and wild frontiers of unknown regions was an extremely important affair.

By controlling the mobility of free and unfree individuals and the flow of products, the Portuguese Crown was able to develop its empire in early modern sub-Saharan Africa, extend the authority of the state, and extract wealth from mobility. Thus, the information here discussed also suggests that the project of state- and empire-building was, from its outset, associated with the ambition of the Crown to extract surplus wealth by way of taxation, and not only to document, register, and mobilize national populations as argued by Torpey. Mobility appears, therefore, to have been paramount not only to make states but also to shape empires.
Chapter 2. Portuguese Empire Building and Human Mobility in São Tomé and Angola, 1400s–1700s


3. Ibid., 13.


5. For further information on the powers of each of these institutions, see Manuel Subtil, “A Administração Central da Coroa,” in História de Portugal, ed. José Mattoso (Lisboa: Círculo de Leitores, 1998), 83–90.

6. The most important legal codes were the Ordemações of the Kingdom (Ordenações do Reino). There were three editions of the general ordinances with Afonso IV, Manuel I, and Filipe I (Philip II of Spain). Besides these general codes, there were also compilations of extravagant regulations. Ibid., 80–83.


10. A similar administrative system had already been used in Portugal during the Middle Ages. In order to populate, defend, and promote economic exploitation on the areas bordering the Spanish and Muslim kingdoms, the king attributed vast territories with political, judicial, and fiscal jurisdiction to noblemen and religious and military orders. The success of this solution led the Crown to use it overseas. First, it was tried with success in Madeira and the Azores, and from there was transferred to Cape Verde, São Tomé, Angola, and Brazil. Given this evidence, the early Portuguese administration of its Atlantic possessions had a medieval character. Cristina Maria Seuas Serafim, As Ilhas de São Tomé no século XVII (Lisboa: Centro de História de Alm-Mar da Universidade Nova de Lisboa, 2000) 9–14, 48–49; Eunice R. J. P. L. J. da Silva, “A Administração de Angola: Século XVII,” vol. 1, MA thesis, Universidade de Lisboa, 1996, 300–314; Luís de Albuquerque, “A Colonização de São Tomé e Príncipe: Os capitães do século XV,” in Portugal no mundo, ed. Albuquerque, vol. 2 (Lisboa: Publicações Alfa, 1989), 189–90; Matos, “Aspectos da administração das colónias


12. See note 11.


14. Sending orphans and convicts to serve in the army in São Tomé and Angola was one of the few solutions found by the state to cover for the absence of a professional army and navy until the mid-seventeenth century and the reluctance of mercenaries and soldiers to serve in the deathly environments of these regions. On several occasions, the governors of different garrisons in sub-Saharan Africa requested from the state the shipment of convicts to serve as soldiers. For instance, in 1671, the governor of Angola asked for exiles to serve in the forts under his jurisdiction. His appeal was heard in Lisbon, and by the mid-1670s 300 exiles were sent to Angola. On the same occasion, a second group of convicts was shipped to São Tomé. Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino (hereafter AHU), Angola, box 10, doc. 43: 1671-07-27 and box 11, doc. 70: 1676-07-17; Madeira, box 1, doc. 27: 1676-05-06; São Tomé, box 3, doc. 22: 1674-09-24.


16. Orphans and exiles were also used by the state during periods of economic crises to balance free migration of European population to colonial areas offering better economic opportunities. For instance, in seventeenth-century São Tomé, the transport of exiles to the island increased to compensate the population fleeing to other areas due to the decline in the sugar production and the shifts in the Atlantic commercial circuits and networks. Fernando Castelo-Branco, O Comércio externo de S. Tomé no século XVII (Lisboa: Centro de Estudos Históricos Ultramarinos, 1968); Serafim, As Ilhas de São Tomé no século XVIII, 154–210; Isabel Castro Henriquez, “O Ciclo do açúcar em São Tomé nos séculos XV e XVI,” in Portugal no mundo, ed. Albuquerque, 1: 264–80.
17. For further details on the consolidation of the Portuguese early modern state, see
Hespanha, As Vésperas do Leviathan; António Manuel Hespanha, “Cities and the State in
Portugal moderno: Político e institucional (Lisboa: Universidade Aberta, 1995). See also Ana
Cristina Nogueira da Silva, O Modelo espacial do estado moderno: Reorganização territorial em

18. For more information on Novais’s rule in Angola, see Ilídio do Amaral, O Consulado
de Paulo Dias de Novais: Angola no último quartel do século XVI e primeiro do século XVII
(Lisboa: Ministério da Ciência e da Tecnologia, Instituto de Investigação Científica Tropical,
2000).

19. Silva, “A Administração de Angola,” 1: 259–63; António Luís Alves Fereira,
“Angola: 10 Anos de história (1666–1676),” vol. 1, MA thesis, Universidade de Lisboa, 1988,
126–38; Beatriz Heintze, “Angola nas garras do tráfico de escravos: A guerra do Ndongo

20. António Dores Costa, “Recrutamento,” in Nova história militar de Portugal, ed. Manu-
el Themudo Barata and Nuno Severiano Teixeira, vol. 2 (Lisboa: Círculo de Leitores, 2004),

21. Beatriz Heintze, “Ngounda a Mwiza: Um sobado angolano sob domínio português no
rivée des Portugais a-t-elle sonné le gars du Royaume du Ndongo: La marge de manoeuvre
de escravos.”

22. Manuel José Subtil, “Governo e administração,” in História de Portugal, ed. José
Mattoso, vol. 5 (Lisboa: Editorial Estampa, 1993), 157–203; Hespanha, As Vésperas do Levi-
326–27.

1985); M. A. Costa, ed., Ordenações manuelinas, 5 vols. (Lisboa: Fundação Calouste Gul-
benkian, 1984).

24. In the Guinea-Bissau region, there was an identical situation. António Carreira, Os


26. Valentin Alexandre and Jill Dias, eds., O Império africano (séculos XIX e XX) (Lisboa:

27. On the monopoly of Henry the Navigator over the western coast of Africa, see, for
instance, João Silva de Sousa, A Casa senhorial do Infante Dom Henrique (Lisboa: Livros

28. Carlos Alberto Caldeira Geraldes, “Casa da Índia: Um estudo de estrutura e funcio-
nalidade (1509–1630),” MA thesis, Universidade de Lisboa, 1997; “Índia, Casa da,” in Dic-
nário de história de Portugal, vol. 3 (Porto: Liv. Figuerinhas, 1981), 281–89; Francisco Mendes
da Lus, ed., Regimento da casa da Índia: Manuscrito do século XVII existente no Arquivo Geral
de Sintra (Lisboa: Ministério da Educação e Cultural, Instituto de Cultura e Língua Portu-
guesa, 1992); Damião Peres, ed., Regimento das casas das Índias e Mina (Coimbra: Instituto de
Estudos Históricos Dr. António de Vasconcelos, 1947).

29. Serafim, As Ilhas de São Tomé no séc. XVII, 84–89; Isabel de Sá-Nogueira and
Bernardo de Sá-Nogueira, “A Ilha do Príncipe no primeiro quartel do século XVI:

30. See note 29.


34. For further information on the transfer of the Portuguese fiscal system to the colonies, see ibid., 545–67.


37. In January 1620, Captain Garcia Mendes Castello Branco informed the Court that around two hundred Angolan rulers (sobas) had recognized Portuguese sovereignty and, therefore, they were to pay tribute to Portugal. Heintze, “Angola nas garras do tráfico de escravos”; Heintze, “L’Arrivée des portugais a-t-elle sonne le glas du Royaume du Ndongo,” 117–46; Heintze, “Ngonda a Mwiza.”


40. By the 1660s, European and mixed descent permanent residents were forbidden by Angolan and Portuguese authorities to access the hinterland, in particular the fairs. The same dispositions applied to European temporary migrants and wealthy Angolan merchants operating in the inland commerce. AHU, Angola: 1664–11–19: “Consulta do Conselho Ultramarino,” in Brásio, *Monumenta Missionaria Africana*, 12: 508–13. Biblioteca do Arquivo

41. In practical terms, the contratadores were allowed by the Portuguese Crown to transfer to a third party a part or a branch of the contract through a sort of trading licenses (avenças). The avenças were contracts authorizing the holder (avençador) to export a certain quantity of a given product in a specific geographical area. According to these contracts, the contratadores would cover the risks involved in the transport, such as sinking, fire, and capture by pirates and corsairs. The other party had permission to load the quantity of goods mentioned in the contract in a specific port. For instance, in Angola, the ships of the avençadores were to be loaded only at Luanda. The loading was to be inspected by the agent of the contratador and the royal factor. The contratadores or their agents could sell these trading licenses in Portugal and the various Atlantic territories. To register all the avenças sold in Portugal, the contratador received a book issued by the Royal Treasury Council (Conselho da Fazenda). The trading licenses sold overseas were to be listed by the highest royal official of the Royal Treasury in the colony (Provedor da Fazenda) and dispatched to Lisbon annually, 221-53; Aurélio de Oliveira, "As Concessões Mercantis e a Construção Atlântica Portuguesa," in Actas do Congresso Internacional Atlântico de Antigo Regime: poderes e sociedades (Lisboa: Instituto Camões, 2008).

42. Serafim, As Ilhas de São Tomé no século XVII, 11-13; Albuquerque, "A Colonização de São Tomé," 174.

43. For security reasons, private ships heading to São Tomé, Cape Verde, the Upper Guinea Rivers, and Brazil were obliged to sail a convoy with at least four vessels. To facilitate the process, they were authorized by the Crown to join the royal fleets departing from Lisbon to the same destinations every year. For identical reasons, ships were also required to transport a specific number and type of guns on board for their own defense. The number and type of guns were defined according to the ships' tonnage. "Livro do despacho das naos e naujos que foram da ciclade que ham de hir armadas," in J. A. Pinto Ferreira, ed., Certas providências regulares respeitantes à guarda da costa do Reino e ao comércio ultramarino, no século de Quinhentos (Porto, 1967), 39-46.

44. However, this situation would change over time. In the late seventeenth century, the Portuguese state took several measures to restrain the movement of temporary migrants, both Portuguese and foreigners, especially in the Angolan borderlands and frontiers. The state's main goal was to limit these men's access to the Angolan fairs located close to the Portuguese forts in the vicinity of the Angolan chieftaincies under Portuguese influence. According to a law dating from 1666, Europeans living temporarily in Luanda, Benguela, or the fortresses along the Kwanza River for commercial purposes were forbidden to leave the towns and forts, to travel to the interior to conduct trade at the fairs, and to engage in slave raiding. This legislation aimed at stopping these traders from inflicting all sorts of abuses on African traders and local populations either by ambushing slave caravans on their way to the fairs, by offering unfair deals to local traders, or by simply conducting slave raids in neighboring villages. AHU, Angola, 1664-11-19; "Consulta do Conselho Ultramarino," in Brásio, ed., Monumenta Missionaria Africana, 12: 508-13; BAHU, "Regimento do Governador do Reino de Angola, Tristão da Cunha (10-04-1666)," Legislacao Antiga 18: 297-367; Silva, "A Administração de Angola," 1: 259-63, 309; Ferronha, "Angola: 10 anos de história," 1: 126-38; Heintze, "Angola nas garras do tráfico de escravos."

46. These agreements, known as contratos de vasalagem, aimed at obtaining from the neighboring chiefs recognition of Portugal’s sovereignty over their territories and populations and the recognition of their “submission” to the authority of the Portuguese king, establishing a sort of seigniorial relationship on a very medieval style; Heintze, “Ngonda a Mwiza”; Heintze, “L’arrivée des Portugais a-t-elle sonné le glas du Royaume du Ndongo”; Heintze, “Angola nas garras do tráfico de escravos.”


48. Even in the 1960s, Angolan borderlines remained out of reach for Crown officials, partly given the lack of road infrastructure and disinterest of colonial authorities toward certain areas.


Chapter 3. “Captive to Civilization”: Law, Labor Mobility, and Violence in Colonial Mozambique


3. The phrase comes from British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan’s 1960 speech, delivered in Ghana and South Africa in January and February, respectively.

4. A few of the broader conceptualization of this problem are discussed in Jean-François Bayart, L’état en Afrique: La politique du ventre (Paris: Fayard, 1989); Mamdani, Citizen and Subject; Achille Mbembe, De la postcolonie: Essai sur l’imaginaire politique dans l’Afrique contemporaine (Paris: Kharthala, 2000).