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Is an inclusive history possible?

A story about a war²

Marjolein 't Hart

Lecture given on the occasion of her retirement as the Unger van Brero Fund Professor of the History of State Formation in a Global Context, at the Faculty of Humanities, VU University Amsterdam, on 1 June 2022

Society is changing, and history is changing with it. That last part sounds odd, because hasn't history already happened? While that is indeed true, history can always be told in a different way, with different actors and factors.

The aim of this lecture is to consider whether it is possible to tell an inclusive history. What do we mean by 'inclusive history'? Inclusive history brings in multiple perspectives and wants to make different voices heard. The aim of inclusive history is to make members of diverse groups in society feel valued, that their history is worth being told and being heard. Inclusion is not synonymous with diversity. The difference between the two has been expressed clearly by the leading American activist and business expert, Mary-Frances Winters. She argues that diversity is about counting heads, whereas inclusion is about making those heads count.³ One is thus a condition for the other.

Inclusive history has already been the focus of quite a lot of attention. In 2019, for example, Inclusive History was the theme of the Historians' Days organized by the KNHG, the professional organization for Dutch historians. A year later, the war museum for the First World War in Ypres, the Flanders Field Museum, published its 'Namenlijst'. This is a list of names of all of the victims of the war, both civilian and military, regardless of their origin, and regardless of the reason why they happened to be in that place when they died.⁴

Historical systems of power, privilege and oppression often determine who and what is allowed to feature in the historical narrative. Inclusion is a conscious strategy to break through these traditions of power and privilege. But historical narratives change slowly, because a part of history that has lain 'forgotten' for many years, and that suddenly proves to be much more important, cannot be told immediately. It often takes time to arrange the facts in such a way that historians can use them to tell the story for the present age. The first phase is thus necessarily research, and research alone. After that, however, it is not sufficient to acknowledge that there is a dark side to a certain period, or simply to add a black page to what is otherwise a white book. Inclusive history requires more than this.⁵

Most of you will be familiar with the story of the Eighty Years' War as the story of a group of shrewd individuals, including William of Orange, Johan van Oldenbarnevelt, Prince Maurits, Piet Heyn and Admiral Tromp. Together with the Geuzen,⁶ their actions ensured that the Netherlands could become independent. In addition, much attention is usually paid to the positive aspects of what is known in the Netherlands as the 'VOC mentality', the mindset associated with the Dutch East India Company or VOC.

But how did farmers and fishermen fare in this war? What about the common man and the common woman? How does the story of the colonization of vulnerable overseas societies fit into this picture? And why did the Turks enjoy such a good reputation among the rebels? Whilst these stories already exist, they have yet to be inserted with ease into the traditional story. How can we create a single coherent narrative without jettisoning William of Orange and Van Oldenbarnevelt?

I shall do this by placing what is still a predominantly political and military story in a broader framework. After all, the Eighty Years' War brought radical changes to political, social and economic relations. The inhabitants of Holland, especially the urban elites, can be seen as the winners of the war. They gained an independent country that protected their interests, while the other provinces formed a nice buffer. Meanwhile, many others in the Netherlands saw their political influence shrink. Holland's economy flourished enormously, so much so that there was talk of a Golden Age. The term 'Golden Age' is controversial; I do use it, but in an economic sense. In the period of the Eighty Years' War, the Dutch

enjoyed the highest income per capita in the world, a position that they would maintain until the end of the eighteenth century, no less. At the same time, the inland cities lost the luster they had long enjoyed, for example as Hanseatic or imperial cities. Social inequality grew. Both political and economic power was now concentrated disproportionately in the hands of a relatively small group. There was an even greater shift in power from the countryside to the towns. The nobility and other large landowners lost prestige. There was no body in the Republic that could distribute new noble titles, as there was no longer a king to do so. In social terms, the most senior positions in urban government and the two colonial companies were the absolute summit that one could attain in the Netherlands.⁷ It was there that most political, economic and social power was concentrated.

In order to tell an inclusive history of the Eighty Years' War, the story of the victors also needs to be told in a different way. William of Orange and Johan van Oldenbarnevelt were undoubtedly shrewd leaders, but their power was based on effective cooperation with the urban elites of Holland.

The basis of Holland's power

How was Holland able to seize power in this way? It is often said, of course, that Holland was a wealthy province that was excellently placed for overseas trade, but this explanation is not sufficient. Flanders and Brabant were much richer than Holland. Cities such as Ghent and Antwerp enjoyed much more international prestige and power than Amsterdam. Holland's trade network paled in comparison to those of its southern neighbors.

The difference lay in the provincial structure. In Flanders and Brabant, this was weakened by the great urban rivalry between several preeminent cities, such as Ghent, Brussels, Antwerp and Bruges.⁸ The divisions between them prevented the provinces from uniting against the Spanish regime. This allowed King Philip II and Alva to play off cities and groups against one another. In Holland, this proved less successful. Whilst Amsterdam was the largest city in that province, it was not much bigger than the other cities. In the course of the sixteenth century, the cities of Holland had already started to cooperate in the provincial government.⁹ This allowed a relatively efficient system of state financing to develop, in which neither the nobility nor the large cities were granted exemptions. Taxation per capita in Holland was quite high because everyone contributed, although it was not yet a truly progressive system, of course. It was also easy to raise taxes, because the region was already relatively commercialized and urbanized.¹⁰ The urban elite was used to investing in state loans. In the sixteenth century, Holland had provided considerable sums in this way to fund the wars of Emperor Charles V and King Philip II.¹¹ Holland also differed from the other northern provinces in this respect. Sometimes a few cities in the north were disproportionately powerful, at other times urbanization lagged behind. When it came to the efficiency of the provincial government, Holland was the leader in the Low Countries.

The fact that Holland had so much experience with state loans proved extremely useful during the revolt. In October 1572, William of Orange ran out of money to pay his troops. His men refused to pick up their weapons. Thirteen cities in Holland – namely, Alkmaar, Den Briel, Delft, Dordrecht, Edam, Enkhuizen, Gouda, Haarlem, Hoorn, Leiden, Medemblik, Monnickendam and Oudewater – gave William a loan of half a million guilders, collectively guaranteed on the basis of their own urban tax revenues.¹² Half a million guilders? That isn't much, I hear you thinking. But once you know that the entire Dutch army cost 2.5 million guilders per year in the early years of the revolt, you will realize how massive this

sum was. A fifth of the army's entire annual budget had been put on the table in one fell swoop. The loan did not even include Amsterdam, because that city had yet to join sides with the revolt. The thirteen cities set aside their mutual rivalry – which was always there, of course – to ensure that William could pay his soldiers.

Holland's provincial government was now expanding: initially six cities had had voting rights, now there were eighteen. William was very aware that he had to listen carefully to the wishes of Holland's cities. The fact that it took him just four years to lift the immediate threat of war almost entirely from the province's territory was also extremely good for Holland's economy, of course. The fighting now moved to other regions in the Low Countries.

One problem that William had to solve swiftly was that of the great influence of the Geuzen. They had been terrorizing the Low Countries for some time, both in the north and the south. At sea, the Watergeuzen included many English and Walloon pirates, estimated at around half the men on board. Most citizens of Holland abhorred the excessive coarseness and violence of the Geuzen.¹³ If the cities were to continue to fund William of Orange, military discipline had to be tightened considerably. William therefore dismissed those who refused to be disciplined, despite the fact that some of them had brought him a spectacular strategic victory. For example, even the famous leader of the Geuzen, Lumey, who had taken Den Briel for Orange, had to leave the field.

Disciplining soldiers only worked if they were paid regularly, however, and this was one of the greatest problems in sixteenth-century warfare. Most armies were often paid too late, and some were paid too little as well. For example, it is known that the soldiers of the Spanish army in the seventeenth century ultimately received only a third of the pay to which they were entitled.¹⁴ The Spanish army thus lacked discipline. William tackled this problem in consultation with the cities of Holland, with the latter advancing the amount for wages on a weekly basis. If a small city lacked the funds to pay its own garrison, the provincial government ensured that another, larger city covered the sums. The cities were allowed to deduct expenses for the soldiers from the tax revenues that they usually had to hand over to the province.

The regular payments facilitated a far-reaching process of professionalization. William reduced the size of the companies from several hundreds to just a hundred men. These smaller companies were more agile and could be deployed more rapidly. William had gained these tactical insights from his friends the French Huguenots, by whose side he had fought against the French king until 1569.¹⁵ From then onwards, the soldiers also trained more intensively. They practiced every day, for example to improve the simultaneous firing technique. The Dutch army had initially numbered a few thousand soldiers, compared to the tens of thousands in the Spanish army. Thanks to their good training and discipline, however, the Dutch troops were increasingly able to withstand Spanish attacks.

In addition, the Dutch had the advantage of defensive warfare, with many cities taking cover behind ever-stronger fortifications. The marshy ground also worked in favor of the defense. Furthermore, Spain was simultaneously waging a costly war against the Ottoman Empire in the Mediterranean. Those two war fronts regularly emptied the Spanish treasury. Every time the Turks attacked in the south, the Spanish military pressure on the rebels in the Low Countries was weakened. The Turks therefore enjoyed a good reputation among the Dutch. The Geuzen struck a medal with the text, 'Rather Turkish than Pope'. Some warships flew the Turkish crescent as well as the flag of Holland. The pressure from the Ottoman Empire proved especially significant when King Philip II wanted to send his impressive

Armada to the Netherlands in 1588. The Turks attacked the Spanish fleet so fiercely that it was forced to leave for the north at half strength. It was thus a badly battered war fleet that was defeated by the Dutch and the English in the North Sea. The question remains as to whether 'we' could have achieved that victory had the Armada arrived at full strength.¹⁶

Maurits built on his father's reforms. In the garrison cities, soldiers no longer paid for their own lodgings, but that money was henceforth provided via the city government. City-dwellers were keen to house and feed soldiers, because the money was now guaranteed. The earlier quarrels about overdue payments for soldiers became a thing of the past.¹⁷ During this period, Dutch painters captured the remarkably peaceful relations between city-dwellers and soldiers in the garrisons. A typically Dutch painting genre emerged, the 'kortegaardjes'; a corruption of *corps-de-garde*, the military guard post.

Maurits also undertook a far-reaching standardization of arms, both in the army and the navy. He limited the number of gun calibers to four, only one kind of musket could be used, only one kind of pike, one kind of spade, and so forth. This standardization resulted in a high level of transparency in the arms market. The Netherlands quickly established itself as a country where one could buy all the weapons and equipment for an entire company in one go, all of high quality, including the spades, baskets and axes needed for siege works. The cooperation between the state and arms dealers was so extensive that the latter were even permitted to use the state magazines, so they could deliver weapons to private buyers on time.¹⁸ Meanwhile, the five branches of the navy ensured that warships were built efficiently. The colonial companies received plenty of state support, both in money and in kind, allowing the Dutch to perpetuate their power overseas as well.¹⁹

In this way, war was not only an expense, but much of the expenditure also found its way indirectly into the pockets of all kinds of Dutch people: city-dwellers who provided lodgings for soldiers, suppliers of bread and beer for the army and navy, ship-builders, investors in the colonial company, the cannon foundries and musket-makers, and the various middlemen and financiers who coordinated the lines and advanced funds.²⁰ The army was the Netherlands' largest employer, in the navy most of the country's money was spent on building warships, and time and again the Dutch state proved a reliable trading partner in the transactions that maintained the military apparatus. The two large colonial companies completed this whole, allowing the war to be commercialized to an exceptional degree. In this way, war could go hand in hand with a Golden Age.²¹

The economic and social consequences of warfare

There is much more to be said about why Holland in particular was able to grow so rich from the war, but we need to move on to consider the consequences for those groups that were less fortunate. To start with, the other provinces continued to suffer from the warfare for much longer. Paradoxically enough, the Dutch army often fought opponents that owed their suppliers or armaments – in one way or another – to merchants from Holland. Although this was not openly permitted, there were enough semi-legal and illegal ways. Holland's merchants thus profited from the war misery of the Dutch in the rest of the Netherlands.

As high import duties were suddenly imposed on the new borders inland, trade flows by land and by river slowly but surely shifted to the overseas trade. By contrast, Dutch sea ports charged absurdly low

import duties. Moreover, in addition to the hefty customs charges in the interior, there was the problem of all kinds of trade blockades along the Rhine, Waal and Meuse. Once-wealthy cities, such as Nijmegen, Deventer and Groningen, contracted as a result. Although they remained large and powerful regional centers, they lost the international luster they had once enjoyed.

The violence of war also had consequences for mortality rates. Bram van Besouw and Daniel Curtis have used burial records to investigate the consequences of sieges or military confrontations. Within a radius of 30 kilometers, mortality rates rose from the usual 30-40 per 1,000 inhabitants to 45-60 per 1,000 inhabitants. This effect was evident throughout the Low Countries, in both the north and the south, and in both towns and rural areas. The local rise in mortality was temporary, however. The mortality rate rose in the same year and sometimes in the following one, too, but then it immediately dropped back to the normal average.²²

By far the majority of deaths were not caused directly by force of arms, but by the diseases that armies brought with them. Plague, in particular, played a key role. For example, 'Mansfeld disease', named after Ernst von Mansfeld's mercenaries, who were temporarily in the service of the Dutch army, meant that mortality rates rose to record levels in 1623 and 1624. The year 1636 saw another a peak in the death rate, due to a new wave of plague that followed in the wake of the invading army.²³

Although not many people died as a direct consequence of war violence, the suffering was no less as a result. Particularly when a besieged city was taken, women were at risk of being raped. It is difficult to estimate how often this happened, but it must have been extremely common. Rape was and still is an instrument of war designed to punish and demoralize the opponent. It would be incorrect to view women exclusively as victims, however. They often provided plenty of help in a siege, and when the enemy army took the city, the women frequently held out while the men fled. After all, men faced the threat of being taken hostage or killed, whereas women were rarely affected by these dangers.²⁴ In addition, some women accompanied the soldiers in the invading army. They collected valuables in the looted city and sold them at market. We also know of women who dressed up as men and joined the army or fleet.²⁵ Sometimes it took years for their stories to come out. Trijntje Simons of Nijmegen served in Maurits' army, for example. She sent her father letters signed 'your son', which baffled him, as he didn't have any sons. People only realized that she was a woman when she was killed and buried.

The violence of war gave rise to large flows of refugees. Around 150,000 people left the Southern Netherlands to settle in the north. They included Calvinists, of course, but also Catholic refugees who were weary of the violence of war, such as Johan van der Veken of Antwerp, who went to live in Rotterdam.²⁶ The wealthy among them boosted the economy with large-scale investments and by bringing their trade networks with them. There were also many textile workers among the refugees. The Flemish town of Hondschote, a large textile center, would see its population fall drastically from 18,000 to 385. These migrants took their artisanal knowledge with them, and even made Leiden the largest textile producer in all of Europe.

Meanwhile, the population in the Netherlands was still largely Catholic. They became second-class citizens in the new state structure. Forbidden to hold government office and to practice their religion openly, Catholics nevertheless managed to hold their ground relatively well. The 'klopjes' – women who lived a semi-monastic life and tended to remain unmarried – maintained mutual ties in the parishes. Catholics took care of their own poor and orphans, for example.

At sea, the war violence had a particular impact on herring fishermen.²⁷ Unlike the large merchantmen with cannon, their ships were too small to fight back against the Dunkirk-based privateers from the Spanish war fleet. Many a herring fisherman ended up in a Dunkirk prison, where he could be released again for a ransom. Finding oneself in prison was actually one of the less calamitous options, because the privateers also sank crews, ships and all, or sent them directly to the Spanish galleys. The fact that hostage-taking incidents such as these took place are revealed by figures from the herring-fishing villages of Maassluis and Vlaardingen. During the Eighty Years' War, it was standard for 1 per cent of the population to be incarcerated in a Dunkirk prison.²⁸ Those at home faced high costs to pay the ransoms. During the war, the herring fishermen developed mutual insurance schemes that provided an allowance for the relatives of men who died at sea, or for paying ransoms in the case of hostage-taking. In this way, the sector nevertheless managed to keep going.

Even then, however, things could go dramatically wrong when large numbers were suddenly affected. In 1635, Dunkirk privateers succeeded in capturing more than 600 herring-fishermen who were fishing on the Dogger Bank. They should have been protected by the Dutch fleet, but because the admiral's ship had been hit right at the start of the confrontation, it had quickly sailed back to port. The other warships had thought it wise to follow the flagship home immediately, leaving the fishermen exposed. In Enkhuizen, where almost every poor household had a father or son who worked in the fisheries, the news of the navy's lax behavior soon spread and a large-scale riot broke out. The town's militia was unable to suppress the disorder, and an army unit was eventually called in to bring it to an end.²⁹

The forgotten countryside, breach of contract, and the common man and woman in the city

The countryside suffered dreadfully from the war. It is hard for us to imagine what the farmers had to endure. In order to help just one city, Leiden, two-thirds of South Holland was flooded in 1574. Farmers were unable to use their land for at least six years. Many dikes – many more than necessary – were breached haphazardly. The whole transport network was destroyed, as dikes also functioned as main roads. The restoration of the dikes and windmills cost a lot of money: as much as 6 million guilders, almost three times the entire army's annual wage bill.³⁰ The farmers received no compensation at all. The strategic flooding in Zeeland – in the battles for Middelburg or Hulst, for example – caused even longer-lasting damage, because the flooding involved salt water.³¹ The soil needed time to desalinate before it became suitable for agriculture again.

The major problem was that the Eighty Years' War coincided with the Little Ice Age, a period of climactic cooling that caused winter to start in November and end as late as April. The risk of crop failure increased everywhere as a result, particularly when accompanied by war violence. Roving armies caused much damage. There were no city walls or city militias to protect people in the countryside. If the armies stayed nearby for a long time, the violence came from both sides. If one army forcibly requisitioned a harvest, the other side could interpret this as collaboration with the enemy, meaning that farmers could expect further punishment from the first army.

It was possible to mitigate the risk of troops attacking one's farm by buying a license from the army command. Even then, however, problems could arise. In 1589, Dutch troops accused the village of Wommelgem in Brabant of having paid too little for its license, and attacked the village. Thirty-three residents fled to the church tower, where they suffered a horrible death when the soldiers set fire to it.

As these licenses were interesting income for the state, in 1602 our universally esteemed Johan van Oldenbarnevelt decreed that a number of farms be set on fire so that more farmers would show willingness to pay the levy. Those farmers had done absolutely nothing to justify such a threat. Forcing farmers to pay protection money in such a fashion was straight out of the mafia playbook, of course. My teacher Charles Tilly sometimes compared war and state formation to organized crime, and when you hear of practices such as this, you have to agree with him.³²

The Dutch army wreaked particular havoc in North Brabant. Under the direct leadership of William of Orange and Maurits, scorched-earth campaigns were pursued in the Meierij region with the sole aim of targeting Den Bosch, the city they wanted to take. The farmers were accused of supplying grain to the Spanish army, which the army leadership evidently saw as a kind of breach of contract. This campaign was not a one-off event, but was pursued year in, year out, for at least six years in succession. Den Bosch did not surrender, however, because the city was still receiving all kinds of supplies by river. Meanwhile, the confiscation of the harvest and all cattle, of all ploughs and carts, and eventually the razing of dozens of villages to the ground, made life impossible for farmers in Brabant. The result was the large-scale depopulation of the area. Two thirds of the population did not survive or moved elsewhere.³³ This is an incredibly high percentage, one that could only be achieved with a fighting force as highly disciplined as the Dutch army.

Both the flooding strategy and the scorched-earth campaigns had a disproportionate impact on small farmers. Wealthy farmers were often able to get to a place of safety, sell their cattle and grain for a tidy sum in the city, and return once the danger had passed. Small farmers, however, lacked the means to hold out, and not every city was prepared to take in all of the desperate farmers. Gouda closed its gates to those who lacked sufficient funds. The citizens of Alkmaar hoped that the war would last even longer, because the misery in the countryside made the city grow and house prices rise.³⁴ After the war, city-dwellers would often pull out their purses to aid the recovery in the countryside, making good profits with the loans they provided. They themselves frequently bought land and distributed it to larger tenants. A process of scaling up took place as a result of the war, which indirectly advanced the agricultural boom during the Golden Age. City-dwellers also invested in the reclamation of polders on a large scale.

The same lack of compassion shown in North Brabant was evident in the actions of the Dutch in those places where society had yet to build such a strong state.³⁵ When the VOC arrived on the Banda Islands, nowadays part of Indonesia, they were home to around 10,000 people living in a federal structure. If an agreement was made by a tribal head, it was not the case that the entire population immediately had to adhere to it. Some Bandanese continued to sell nutmeg to the English; quite logically, because the English were prepared to pay more for it. Acting with unpleasant legal precision, however, VOC governor Jan Pieterszoon Coen concluded that every Bandanese had committed a 'breach of contract'. After the subsequent 'military operation', only 500 Bandanese were left, and they were deported from the islands by the VOC. The cultivation of the precious nutmeg was outsourced to subcontractors, who used enslaved people to do the real work.³⁶

A similar disagreement about a 'contract' played out in New Netherland. The leaders of the Lenape people had allowed the Dutch to establish farms in return for payment. The Dutch West India Company (WIC) assumed that the land had been purchased, whereas the Lenape believed that the rights extended to use alone. When the Dutch tried to impose a tax on the Lenape people, the latter refused to pay. In

the 'dirty war' that followed, thousands of Indians lost their lives in vain: men, women and children, without any distinction.³⁷

Meanwhile, the war raged on and the costs rose every year. The Republic eventually had an army of 90,000 men and an internationally renowned war fleet of 125 warships. The costs of the war were increasingly financed by loans, which were mostly provided by rich city-dwellers in Holland.³⁸ They profited from the war as a result, because Dutch state loans were an exceptionally safe investment. The interest revenues were used to underwrite new loans, and an enormous process of self-enrichment occurred within an ever-smaller group.³⁹ The investors included a remarkable number of women, who made up around 30-40 per cent of the investors.⁴⁰ Women enjoyed great freedom of action in the age of the Republic, something that foreigners often marveled at. They frequently traded as independent merchants, and a woman did not need her husband's permission to invest large sums of money, for example.

The entire state financing system rested heavily on Holland's efficient tax system. The money for interest payments mainly came from excise duties, as these had the highest yields; namely, around 65-70 per cent of all revenues. The most was raised from levies on basic necessities, such as grain, beer and peat, and these fell disproportionately on the common people in Holland's cities. The ordinary citizen experienced an enormous rise in the cost of living due to the costs of war. In 1575, the tax burden had amounted to around 5 per cent of the annual income of the average craftsman. By 1630, this had risen to 15 per cent.⁴¹ The urban elite, who had invested heavily in state loans, paid much less tax in relative terms – estimated at never exceeding 5 per cent of their annual income. The wealthy among them probably paid even less. At the end of the war, as much as half of the revenue budget of Holland was needed to pay the interest on state loans. In practice, the war was paid for by the ordinary citizens of Holland.⁴²

The fact that excise duty in Holland was so steep meant that wages were high. As a result, Amsterdam's investors started to search for opportunities in rural Brabant, where wages were very low. Farmers in Tilburg had started to weave a fine wooden fabric as a cottage industry. In a putting-out system, merchants from Amsterdam provided them with fine wool, and then distributed and sold the product. In Leiden itself, unemployment rose due to the competition from Tilburg. Leiden's entrepreneurs were furious, because the merchants of Amsterdam were allowed to import their woolen fabrics cheaply from Brabant into Holland and then export them again at high prices. Amsterdam's merchants even exported the fabrics illegally as 'Leiden cloth', because the latter had such a good reputation. Tilburg became the largest textile producer in the Netherlands after Leiden. This entailed a process of proletarianization, whereby farmers gave up their farms and became completely dependent on the merchants from Amsterdam.⁴³

Never too old to learn

The mechanism to commercialize the war was successful, and ensured that the Netherlands ultimately ended the war with a positive result and became a sovereign, independent country.⁴⁴ This came at the expense of large groups of Dutch people, however, especially the small farmer in the Netherlands, and the Bandanese and Lenape overseas. They faced an incredibly professionalized and efficient military

machine, which was deployed against them because they had committed some kind of ‘breach of contract’. The furious citizens of Enkhuizen also faced this disciplined state-forming force in 1635.

Within the Netherlands itself, the position of the wealthy province of Holland was undisputed. It was the richest on every front, and it also wielded the most power and influence. Holland enjoyed a true Golden Age. The rich could become fabulously rich, because state loans provided a comfortable level of security in a still largely uncertain world. In the meantime, however, the war was funded by the ordinary citizen in Holland’s towns. The Eighty Years’ War thus made the Golden Age possible, but it also widened the gap between rich and poor; and that gap emerged not only in the Netherlands, but also around the world.

<i>Aspect</i>	<i>Effect</i>	<i>Golden Age Holland</i>	<i>Gap between rich and poor</i>
Professionalization, disciplining of army	Protection of core area, disappearance of Geuzen terror, no mutiny on Dutch soil	+	+/-
Standardization of arms	Transparent market, commercialization of war. Suppliers paid well	+	+/-
International framework	Huguenot inspiration for efficient tactics; Turks weaken Spanish power	+/-	+/-
Taxation	Many excise duties, heavy burden on the common man and woman	+/-	+
State financing	Safe investment, large-scale enrichment mainly of Holland elite	+	+
Rich refugees from the Southern Netherlands	Expansion of Holland’s trade networks worldwide, injection of capital	+	+/-
Poor refugees from the Southern Netherlands	Labor and knowledge, boost textiles industry	+	+
Women	Direct victims of war violence, but also agency and resilience	+/-	+/-
Privateering	Herring fishermen direct victims of war violence, but also agency and resilience	+/-	+/-
New internal borders	Higher cost of river trade, cities such as Nijmegen, Deventer and Groningen the losers, Holland’s ports the winners	+	+/-
Amsterdam invests in Brabant	Proletarianization of farmer-weavers in Tilburg	+	+
Strategic flooding	Disappearance of small farmer, scaling- up	+	+
Farmers threatened with torching by state and army	‘Breach of contract’, farmers second-class citizens, violence from both sides	+/-	+
Scorched-earth policy	‘Breach of contract’, scaling-up, disappearance of small farmer	+	+
Overseas colonization in areas with weak state	‘Breach of contract’, land-grabbing, decimation of peoples	+	+ worldwide

We can bring together the different narratives in a table, which shows how every aspect was related to the Golden Age and growing social inequality. In the table, this is shown by a plus or a plus/minus sign. A plus indicates a very direct positive connection, whilst a plus/minus shows that although the relationship was not very direct, it was indirect all the same. Not one of the aspects scored a minus, because none of them had a diminishing effect on either the Golden Age or social inequality.

Have I succeeded in telling an inclusive history? Only the audience can answer that question. I did attempt not only to count heads, but also to make those heads count – to paraphrase the words of Mary-Frances Winters. But inclusive history can always be improved, of course, and I look forward to making the necessary adjustments. Fortunately, you're never too old to learn.

Acknowledgements

Having reached the end of my lecture, I should like to add a word of thanks.

First of all, I am grateful to the Unger-Van Brero Fund for making this professorship possible. I am very grateful to the deans of the Faculty of Humanities at VU University Amsterdam, Michel ter Hark and Susan Legêne, for their willingness to facilitate this professorship.

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Finally, I should like to thank my mother, for the faith she has always had in me. I am proud of my children, Micha and Judith. And I thank Jan for just being there for me.

Thank you all.

Notes and credits

¹ Spanish Fury, Antwerp 1576. Detail, Frans Hogenberg, Cologne 1577.

<https://www.rijksmuseum.nl/nl/collectie/RP-P-OB-76.862>

² Thank you to Vivien Collingwood for translating the text into English.

³ Mary-Frances Winters, "From Diversity to Inclusion: An Inclusion Equation," in: Bernardo M. Ferdman and Barbara R. Deane (eds), *Diversity at Work: The Practice of Inclusion* (Hoboken NJ, 2014), 205-228, here 206.

⁴ Stichting Jonge Historici, 'Hoezo inclusieve geschiedenis?', *Over de Muur*, 22 August 2019, <https://overdemuur.org/hoezo-inclusieve-geschiedenis/> (consulted on 18 May 2022).

Pieter Trogh (ed.) *De namenlijst: een algemene inleiding: naar een inclusieve geschiedenis en herdenking van de Eerste Wereldoorlog in België* (Ypres, 2020).

⁵ Women's history and the history of the labor movement were separate fields of study for many years, but over the course of time acquired a more 'ordinary', inclusive place in history. At present, research on the history of slavery still has a highly exclusive character. At a certain point, that history must also become part of a broader and more inclusive story. See, for example, Pepijn Brandon et al. (eds), *De slavernij in Oost en West. Het Amsterdam-onderzoek* (Amsterdam, 2020); Alex van Stipriaan, *Rotterdam in slavernij* (Amsterdam, 2020).

⁶ The English translation of Geuzen is 'Beggars'. See also Peter Arnade, *Beggars, Iconoclasts, and Civic Patriots. The Political Culture of the Dutch Revolt* (Ithaca, NJ 2008).

⁷ Julia Adams, *The Familial State. Ruling Families and Merchant Capitalism in Early Modern Europe* (Ithaca and London, 2005).

⁸ Marjolein 't Hart, 'De democratische paradox en de Opstand in Vlaanderen, Brabant en Holland', in: Mario Damen and Louis Sicking (eds), *Bourgondië voorbij. Opstellen aangeboden aan Wim Blockmans* (Hilversum, 2010), 323-335; Wim Blockmans, 'De tweekoppige draak. Het Gentse stadsbestuur tussen vorst en onderdanen, 14de-16de eeuw', in: J. de Zutter et al. (eds), *Qui valet ingeni. Liber Amicorum aangeboden aan Dr. Johan Decavele* (Ghent, 1996), 27-37.

⁹ J.W. Koopmans, *De Staten van Holland en de Opstand. De ontwikkeling van hun functies en organisatie in de periode 1544-1588* (The Hague, 1990).

¹⁰ Bas van Bavel and Jan Luiten Van Zanden, 'The jump-start of the Holland economy during the late medieval crisis, c. 1350-c.1500', *Economic History Review* 57 (2004), 503-532.

¹¹ Wim Blockmans, 'The Low Countries in the Middle Ages', in: Richard Bonney (ed.). *The Rise of the Fiscal State in Europe, c. 1200-1815* (Oxford, 1999), 281-309, here 302.

¹² James D. Tracy, *The Founding of the Dutch Republic. War, Finance, and Politics in Holland, 1572-1588* (Oxford, 2008), 85.

¹³ Erika Kuijpers, 'De wonden van een burgeroorlog. Ooggetuigen van het bloedbad van Naarden in 1572', in: Fred van Lieburg (ed.), *Geschiedenis aan de Zuidas. Essays van VU-historici* (Amsterdam, 2018), 56.

¹⁴ Etienne Rooms, *De organisatie van de troepen van de Spaans-Habsburgse monarchie in de Zuidelijke Nederlanden (1659-1700)* (Brussels, 2003), 165, 178-9, 217.

¹⁵ Erik Swart, *Krijgsvolk. Militaire professionalisering en het ontstaan van het Staatse leger, 1568-1590* (Amsterdam, 2006); Jonas van Tol, 'William of Orange in France and the Transnationality of the Sixteenth-Century Wars of Religion', *Low Countries Historical Review* 134:4 (2019), 33-58.

¹⁶ Geoffrey Parker, *The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road, 1567-1659. The Logistics of Spanish Victory and Defeat in the Low Countries' Wars* (2nd ed., Cambridge, 2004), 231-238; Marjolein 't Hart, '1569. Turken helpen Nederlanders', in: Lex Heerma van Voss et al. (eds), *Nog meer wereldgeschiedenis van Nederland* (forthcoming, Ambo/Anthos, Amsterdam, 2022).

¹⁷ Griet Vermeesch, *Oorlog, steden en staatsvorming. De grenssteden Gorinchem en Doesburg tijdens de geboorteeuw van de Republiek (1570-1680)* (Amsterdam, 2006).

¹⁸ Michiel de Jong, *Staat van Oorlog. Wapenbedrijf en militaire hervorming in de Republiek der Verenigde Nederlanden, 1585-1621* (Hilversum, 2005).

¹⁹ Gerrit Knaap, *De 'Core Business' van de VOC. Markt, macht en mentaliteit vanuit overzees perspectief* (Utrecht, 2014).

²⁰ Pepijn Brandon, *War, Capital, and the Dutch State (1588-1795)* (Leiden, 2015), 170.

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- ²¹ Marjolein 't Hart, *Oorlog en ongelijkheid. Een inclusieve geschiedenis van de Gouden Eeuw* (forthcoming, Boom, Amsterdam, 2022).
- ²² Bram van Besouw and Daniel Curtis, 'Estimating warfare-related civilian mortality in the early modern period: Evidence from the Low Countries, 1620–99', *Explorations in Economic History* 84:4 (2021), 1-21.
- ²³ L. Noordegraaf en G. Valk, *De gave Gods: de pest in Holland vanaf de late middeleeuwen* (Amsterdam, 1996), 78.
- ²⁴ Els Kloek, *Kenau & Magdalena. Vrouwen in de Tachtigjarige oorlog* (Nijmegen, 2014), 13, 24-28, 31.
- ²⁵ Rudolf Dekker and Lotte van de Pol, *Vrouwen in mannenkleren. De geschiedenis van een tegendraadse traditie, Europa 1500-1800* (Amsterdam, 1989).
- ²⁶ J.H. Kernkamp, *Johan van der Vecken en zijn tijd* (The Hague, 1952).
- ²⁷ One sometimes encounters the claim in the historiography that the war gave the final blow to the herring fisheries, meaning that the sector did not survive the war. However, herring fishing actually initially increased during the war. The decline that occurred at the end of the war was in fact a result of the migration of herring shoals to waters further to the north-east. Christiaan van Bochove, 'De Hollandse haringvisserij tijdens de vroegmoderne tijd', *Tijdschrift voor Sociale en Economische Geschiedenis* 1 (2004), 3-27; John F. Richards, *Unending Frontier. An Environmental History of the Early Modern World* (Berkeley and London, 2003), 51.
- ²⁸ A.P. van Vliet, *Vissers en kapers. De zeevisserij vanuit het Maasmondgebied en de Duinkerker kapers (ca. 1580-1648)* (The Hague, 1994), 162-164; Annette de Wit, *Leven, werken en geloven in zeevarende gemeenschappen, Schiedam, Maasluis en Ter Heijde in de zeventiende eeuw* (Amsterdam, 2008), 217.
- ²⁹ Rudolf Dekker, *Holland in beroering: oproeren in de 17de en 18de eeuw* (Baarn, 1982), 106.
- ³⁰ Simon Groenveld, *Van vyanden und vrienden bedroevet. De gevolgen van het beleg van Leiden voor de omgeving van de stad* (The Hague, 2001).
- ³¹ Adriaan M.J. de Kraker, *Landschap uit balans. De invloed van de natuur, de economie en de politiek op de ontwikkeling van het landschap in de Vier Ambachten en het Land van Saeftinghe tussen 1488 en 1609* (Utrecht, 1997), 129-135, 144, 320-321, 328, 333, 352.
- ³² Charles Tilly, 'War making and state making as organized crime', in: Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol (eds), *Bringing the State Back In* (Cambridge MA, 1985), 169-191.
- ³³ Leo Adriaenssen, *Staatsvormend geweld. Overleven aan de frontlinies in de meierij van Den Bosch, 1572-1629* (Tilburg, 2007).
- ³⁴ Frits Snapper, *Oorlogsinvloeden op de overzeese handel van Holland 1551-1719* (Amsterdam, 1959), 32.
- ³⁵ See also the NWO-VIDI project led by Pepijn Brandon, *Land Grabbing Empire: State Strategy and Large Scale Land Transfers in Dutch Expansion (16th-18th century)*, which was granted funding in 2021 and will be carried out at VU University Amsterdam and the IISG.
- ³⁶ Martine van Ittersum, 'Empire by Treaty? The role of written documents in European overseas expansion, 1500-1800', in: Adam Clulow and Tristan Mostert (eds), *The Dutch and English East India Companies* (Amsterdam, 2018), 153-178.
- ³⁷ Willem Frijhoff, *De vergeten Republiek. Zutphen en de Nieuwe Wereld in de zeventiende eeuw* (Amsterdam 2021), 209, 237.
- ³⁸ Maarten Prak, *Gezeten burgers. De elite in een Hollandse stad: Leiden* (Amsterdam, 1985), 276; Manon van der Heijden, *Geldschietters van de stad. Financiële relaties tussen stad, burgers en overheden 1550-1650* (Amsterdam, 2006).
- ³⁹ Bas van Bavel, *De onzichtbare hand. Hoe markteconomieën opkomen en neergaan* (Amsterdam, 2018).
- ⁴⁰ Marjolein 't Hart, *The Making of a Bourgeois State. War, politics and finance during the Dutch Revolt* (Manchester, 1993), 174.
- ⁴¹ Jan de Vries and Ad van der Woude, *The First Modern Economy. Success, Failure, and Perseverance of the Dutch Economy, 1500-1815* (Cambridge, 1995), 109.
- ⁴² C.f. Wim Blockmans, 'Finances publiques et inégalité sociale dans les Pays-Bas aux XIVE-XVle siècles', in: J.-P. Genet, *Genèse de l'état moderne. Prélèvement et redistribution* (Paris 1987), 77-90.
- ⁴³ Leo Adriaenssen, 'Hoe Tilburg in de Opstand goed garen spon. De opkomst van Tilburg als lakencentrum', *Bijdragen tot de Geschiedenis* 85 (2002), 5-34.
- ⁴⁴ Marjolein 't Hart, *The Dutch Wars of Independence. Warfare and Commerce in the Netherlands 1570-1680* (London, 2014).
- ⁴⁵ Pepijn Brandon, Lex Heerma van Voss, Annemieke Romein (eds), *The Early Modern State: Drivers, Beneficiaries and Discontents. Essays in Honour of Prof. Dr. Marjolein 't Hart* (London: Routledge 2022).